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Abstract 
This thesis is concerned with the absence of substantive, functioning Palestinian 
cities, and of Palestinian urbanisation and urbanism in Israel. Framed and guided by 
conceptions of the city and public space, their potentialities, the possibilities they 
allow, and the challenges they pose to the state, the thesis using Umm al-Fahem as a 
case study seeks to investigate the Palestinian city in Israel, its materiality, the 
semiotics of its public space and socio-spatiality, and to deconstruct the historical, 
structural, political and social forces that shape its (un)making. Employing mixed 
qualitative methods of ethnography, photography, archival research, historical, 
sociological and discourse analysis, the thesis questions and deconstructs the nominal 
status of the city of Umm al-Fahem, the first Palestinian village to earn the official 
status of a city in Israel. It considers how to conceptualise Palestinian cities inside 
Israel and aims to give answers to questions such as: what can be made of Palestinian 
cities inside Israel? What kind of spatial configurations and arrangements are being 
formed and why? What kind of socio-political and cultural order is being formed and 
why?  How does the city respond under (post)colonial conditions? Can there be a 
functioning Palestinian city and a fulfilment of the right to the city under 
(post)colonial conditions? Umm al-Fahem, the subject and object of research, 
suggests that the process unfolding is one of absenting the Palestinian city, depriving 
Palestinian citizens of the right to the city, and producing domesticated, suspended, 
fragmented city and citizens. The production and mastery of space is used as a 
technology of control to achieve this, and forms part of a governmentality project 
whose underlying objective is the management of Palestinians. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
Nominal, liminal: urbanisation under siege - the case of Umm al-Fahem1 
A city is composed of different men; similar people cannot bring a 
city into existence. 
Aristotle, The Politics (Quoted in Sennett 1994: 13) 
Umm al-Fahem is a hamlet...cities you find in Jewish areas…it is a 
city which exists on paper only… it has no order...Jewish cities 
have parks...here people cut their trees to make room for parking.... 
Rida, Umm al-Fahem, 28 June 20092 
Umm al-Fahem is not fit to be a city at all. It does not have the basic 
ingredients of a modern city because of racist planning policies. 
Where are the facilities in the city?! It may fulfil some of the criteria 
of a city, such as population size, but where are the facilities?! The 
streets?!...It is one big refugee camp. It does not provide work for 
the bulk of its work force. Workers still have to leave the city at the 
crack of dawn to travel 80km and sometimes up to 300km each way 
to go to work...all in search of making a living. A city would have a 
museum, a market, work opportunities, theatres, leisure facilities, 
parks, playgrounds ... We have not got any of that ... just restaurants 
and coffee shops ... it is frustrating to compare it to other cities ... 
we belong to the world of being...not doing. 
Hussain, Umm al-Fahem, 17 August 2009 
 
 
                                                
1 Umm al-Fahem has numerous English transliterations. These include the following variations: Umm 
al-Fahm, Umm al Fahm, Umm el-Fahem, Um al-Fahm, Um el Fahm. 
2 Rida used to work as a construction worker in Tel Aviv. 
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Umm al-Fahem, in terms of urbanism and urban centres, is not a 
city. It is one big refugee camp. It is inadequate to be a city ... [it 
has] no industrial zone, no streets names3... we lack all the normal 
facilities of a city ... there is no planning in Umm al-Fahem ...[it 
has] nothing of a city but its name ... it is a pile of stones ... no 
parking...no order ... no master plan ... we have not got cities in the 
modern sense of the word. 
Raja, Umm al-Fahem, 12 August 2009 
In 1985, after leading a political battle with the Ministry of Interior and within 
parliamentary circles, Umm al-Fahem, then the largest village in Israel with a 
population of over 20,000, was the first Palestinian locality to earn the official legal 
status of a city after meeting the required population threshold. For years, however, its 
local government has suffered from persistent under-budgeting, which rendered it 
almost completely dysfunctional in delivering public services and kept it in a 
perpetual state of debt.4 The city’s materiality was severely affected. It was left with 
inadequate urban infrastructure, no public sanitation, poor educational and health 
services, no organised public transport, or adequate public spaces. Sewage flowed in 
the streets, and the roads were in dire condition. The city had no playgrounds or green 
parks and limited or non-existent work opportunities.  
Demographically, the city was growing fast, mostly due to natural reproduction rather 
than in-immigration. Despite this, its imposed spatial boundaries remained almost 
constant, after its residents were dispossessed of their land in 1948. The refusal of the 
                                                
3  The local government did in recent years name some of the streets in the city. The names, however, 
have not taken root in the residents’ consciousness. Locals identify the streets mostly by vernacular 
landmarks, such as a local mosque, a local store or family households. Navigation in the city is 
therefore personalised.    
4  The concepts of local government, local authority, local council and municipality are used 
interchangeably throughout the thesis.   
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planning authorities to approve an up-to-date master plan meant that no industrial or 
commercial zones were provided, and growing numbers of unauthorised buildings, 
officially referred to as “illegal construction,” were being built and therefore under 
threat of demolition.5 
The lack of industrial zones and job opportunities drove the bulk of Umm al-Fahem’s 
workforce to go outside the city in search of a living. Therefore, the city could hardly 
attract outsiders to come and reside in it, a process which is indispensable to 
urbanisation, the heteroisation of the social fabric, and the making of a city. In the 
words of Hashim Mahameed, the mayor of the city in the 1980s, Umm al-Fahem was 
a city on wheels. “At four in the morning, the entire city is on the move, on wheels. 
All of them go to work in Jewish towns, as the city has no industries, no local 
factories. They go out of it, heading to wherever they can get few pennies,” said 
Mahameed in an interview with Uzi Mahnaimi of Yediot Ahronot in October 1988 
(Mahnaimi 1988). The lack of work opportunities persists to this day, 29 years after 
Umm al-Fahem was declared a city. Its social fabric is mostly homogenous, and the 
majority of its working male residents are still manual workers in Jewish cities and 
towns. Many of them work in construction, hotels, restaurants, bakeries and 
maintenance jobs.  
                                                
5  For more details on the issue of master plans and house demolition, see chapter 6 on planning.  
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The proletarianisation of Umm al-Fahem dates back to the Nakba of 1948.6 Before 
the establishment of Israel in 1948, Umm al-Fahem was one of the biggest Palestinian 
villages, in terms of land and agriculture. Out of its 149,000 dunums before the 
Nakba, the village was left with only 22,500 dunums after ‘48.7 Forcibly separated 
from the majority of their land, Fahmawis, whose village became a sanctuary for 
Palestinian refugees fleeing their villages during the war, had to face up to the new 
socio-economic, spatial and political order.8 Offering a pool of cheap wage labour for 
Israel, they became its hewers of wood and drawers of water. Working out of the 
village/city during the day and coming back to sleep in it in the evening, Umm al-
Fahem became a dormitory settlement for its workforce.9 Hence the host of names 
which became synonymous with the city: a hotel city, a hostel city, a workers’ city, 
one big refugee camp.10  
Despite, and perhaps because of, such challenging socio-economic, political and 
spatial conditions, Umm al-Fahem up until the late 1980s was buzzing with leftist, 
nationalist and communist politics. Following its annexation to Israel in 1949, and the 
                                                
6 Nakba, as often transliterated into English, means catastrophe in Arabic. It is the term Palestinians use 
to refer to the war of 1948 that brought the destruction of hundreds of Palestinian villages and towns 
and the establishment of Israel. The chapter uses 1948 and ’48 interchangeably.  
7 The figures vary between what local historians record and those provided by the British Mandate 
Statistics. Ighbariyih (1988: 17) along with research interviewees and newspaper articles on the city 
account that the village owned 148,000 dunums, most of which were in the Jezreel Valley, bordering 
Afula to the North, Jenin to the East, and Arah to the South. The British Book of Statistics (1945) 
figures are: 77,242 dunums, 8,838 of which were public. Dunum in Arabic, dunam in Hebrew, is a 
measure of land area used in some parts of the former Ottoman Empire. In Palestine and Israel a 
dunum equals 1000 square meters.  
8 Fahmawis is another term for the residents of Umm al-Fahem. The term will be used throughout the 
thesis.   
9 The slash between village and city signifies the transition in status from village to city. It indicates 
that the transition has occurred relatively recently as socio-economic and spatial conditions remained 
almost persistent even after the transition.  
10 These different descriptions were used by many of the research interviewees in reference to their 
city.  
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imposition of a military government in the Palestinian areas within Israel (1948-
1966), the communists in the then village organised, mobilised and spearheaded the 
fight against the oppressive regime, and demanded that their basic rights were met. 
Defying repressive regulations, intimidation and criminalisation of political activism, 
the communists and their supporters organised demonstrations outside the military 
governor’s house in the village, demanding bread, work and an end to military rule.  
Their activism created the climate for other political movements to emerge.11 Umm 
al-Fahem, then a stronghold of communists, became home of renowned, even leading, 
Palestinian political movements. These included the Al-Ard movement (the land), 
which was outlawed in the 1960s, the secular nationalist and left wing movement 
Abnaa el-Balad (Sons of the Land), and the popular Islamic Movement.12 Locally, 
those forces challenged tribal collaborative politics, cronyism and nepotism, which 
were encouraged by the state as they were highly compatible with Zionist policies of 
controlling its subjects and pitting them against each other.13  
                                                
11 This is not to argue that other factors did not contribute to the emergence of new movements in 
Umm al-Fahem. In terms of the international and regional context, the 1950s, 60s and 70s were 
particularly politically interesting times in the Middle East and worldwide. This was the era of 
decolonisation, liberation movements, Arab nationalism, Nasserism, and the emergence of the 
Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and Palestinian resistance as an organised political force.  
12 Although Al-Arad movement did not emerge in Umm al-Fahem, it had a strong base there. In 1969 
Fahmawi members of the outlawed movement initiated Abnaa el-Balad. At the time, Abnaa el-Balad 
was made of a majority of young members and had a mixture of nationalist and leftist politics. The 
movement still exits to date. Despite its nationalist character, it does not have a problem with Jews as 
such. In fact, some of its members are Jews. The movement believes in a one state solution.  
13 See chapter 5 for more detail on the workings of divide and rule in Umm al-Fahem, particularly 
during the era of the military government (1949-1966).  
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The politically active city, “the revolutionaries’ den,” as a local historian has 
immortalised it in a book with the same title,14 or “mount of fire” as Palestinians refer 
to it, was targeted by both the state15 and far-right racist Zionist parties.16  Throughout 
its contemporary history, and particularly in the 1970s and 80s, Umm al-Fahem was 
known for its mass demonstrations against Israel’s continued occupation and 
colonisation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the 1982 war on Lebanon, the 
dispossession of Palestinians inside Israel of their lands, and other subjects pertaining 
to social and political justice. Its communist-led local government (mid 1970s-1989) 
did not isolate Umm al-Fahem’s problems from the wider context of the Palestinian 
cause or the right of Palestinians in Israel to a substantive equal citizenship.17 It 
challenged the establishment and was vocal in demanding Palestinians’ rights. 
                                                
14 The Revolutionaries’ Den (Umm al-Fahem 1935-1936): Notes on National Struggle as Told by 
Muhammed Shraydih and Others (1988), written by local historian Tayseer Ighbariyih, covers the 
history of Umm al-Fahem from the great Arab rebellion of 1935 against British rule and its support for 
the Zionist movement until 1965.   
15 The concept of the state is very strong in everyday life, especially amongst the Palestinians. For 
them, the different state apparatuses and ministries in charge of overseeing and implementing 
government policies are often referred to by the general term of “the state.” This is perhaps because of 
historical and political reasons to do with the relatively recent history of the establishment of the state 
of Israel and its very centralised character. In both official and colloquial references, Israel is referred 
to as the state of Israel. In the context of the thesis, the concepts and terms “the state”, “the 
government,” “the establishment” and Israel are used interchangeably.   
16 In 1984, Rabbi Kahana and his followers, whose openly racist party was later outlawed, tried to 
march into the city demanding it swore allegiance to the state. Kahana’s followers tried again to repeat 
the move in 2010 and 2011. Fahmawis resisted such moves. In 1984 a demonstration of over 20,000 
was organised to drive Kahana out and other smaller ones were organised to fend off Marzel, one of 
Kahana’s main disciples in 2010 and 2011.  
17 Although throughout the thesis I refer to Umm al-Fahem’s local government from mid 1970s to 1989 
as being led by communists, in actual reality, the communists formed part of an alliance called al-
Jabha, or Hadash in Hebrew: the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality. Al-Jabha was formed as a 
party in 1977 by the Israeli Communist Party and included, as well as communists, other non-partisan 
groups and activists who were active at the time. These included the Black Panthers, academics and 
activists from the land day of 1976. For more details see http://hadash.org.il/english/.  
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Yitzhak Rabin, Israel’s Prime Minister in the early 1980s, said in reference to the 
communists: “this plant has to be cut before it grows.”18   
Through the employment of a mixture of technologies, some of which could be 
qualified as slow violence, the state tried to isolate and weaken the communist-led 
local government. 19  The technologies included discriminatory budget allocation, 
rejection of master plans, and continued negligence of persisting socio-economic, 
land and spatial planning problems in the village/city.20 Fahmawis, however, refusing 
to capitulate to the state’s racist and discriminatory policies, organised annual 
voluntary work brigades. Under the communist local government these were 
internationalist and gender-mixed in character. They hosted Jewish and Palestinian 
volunteers from both sides of the Green Line and at times individuals from abroad as 
well.21 Basic urban projects and maintenance work, such as paving roads, cleaning the 
                                                
18 Fieldwork interview, Umm al-Fahem 13 August 2009.  
19  The term slow violence is inspired by Rob Nixon’s (2011) work: Slow Violence and the 
Environmentalism of the poor. In his book Nixon details what he means by slow violence and provides 
ample examples of it. The gist of the book is that unlike the spectacular, sensational, and immediate 
violence which attracts the instant attention of people and propels their activism, slow violence is not 
instantaneous. It is rather incremental, more gradual, attritional, more invisible and more out of sight. 
Despite its damaging and sometimes lethal effects, it is not viewed as violence at all. Climate change, 
deforestation, biomagnification, toxic drift and oil spills are amongst the things Nixon treat as slow 
violence. Just as spectacular violence, slow violence also has a social and political unjust base. It is 
exercised more against the exploited invisible poor, who are disempowered, underrepresented and 
taken advantage of, thus rendering them even more vulnerable. Poor in this context are not individuals, 
but people of the global south, or the oppressed people of the world, whose health and lives are 
perceived to worth less.  
20 Chapters 6 and 7 deal in detail on what could be considered attritional damaging effects which 
spatial planning and under-budgeting have had on the residents of Umm al-Fahem.    
21 The Green Line is the demarcated ceasefire line, which became the border between the West Bank, 
occupied by Israel in 1967, and Israel. It is called the ‘Green Line’ because of the “colour with which it 
was later printed on official Israeli maps” (Newman 1995: 8). It is worth noting that the border is not 
demarcated on the ground. Israel has continuously worked to blur it through the construction of 
settlements, roads, and other infrastructure. Palestinians from the West Bank however cannot cross the 
line without a permit from the Israeli authorities.   
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streets, painting schools and building safety walls were some of the projects they 
accomplished. 
In the 1980s, the national government attack, however, became increasingly 
incapacitating. The mayor, Hashim Mahameed, felt this was deliberate. “The city was 
under siege,” he said.22 The sustained budget deficiency rendered his administration 
incompetent and incapable of delivering basic services and paying salaries for the 
local government workers.23 At numerous times, secondary school teachers went on 
strike which when put together reached the equivalent of an entire academic year.24 
The water supply to the city was also systematically cut off for days at a time, as the 
local government could not pay its debt to Mekorot, Israel’s national water company. 
“Being political was the harshest thing for the [Israeli] establishment ... they just 
wanted us to manage rubbish collection ... good management was waste 
management,” said Mahameed.25 
1989: the turning point 
In 1989 Fahmawis tired of the severe inadequacy of urban services, with flowing 
sewage in the streets of their city symbolising the epitome of their harsh conditions, 
voted overwhelmingly for the Islamic Movement. This was a vote for change. Prior to 
                                                
22 Fieldwork interview, Umm al-Fahem, 13 August 2009.  
23 Mahameed, in the interview (ibid), acknowledged that under his tenure there was an element of 
mismanagement of local affairs and at times over-prioritisation of the national question over the 
everyday affairs of the city. 
24 In Israel, local governments are in charge of paying the salaries of secondary school teachers.  
25 Fieldwork interview, Umm al-Fahem, 13 August 2009. His statement echoes what the former mayor 
of the occupied city of Ramallah, Karim Khalaf said in 1979 in response to a peace plan brokered by 
the United States and Egypt to give Palestinians in the West Bank a form of autonomy. Dismissing the 
plan, Khalaf said that Israel’s intention is to give Palestinians the “’power to collect garbage and 
exterminate mosquitos’” (Abrahams 1994: 73). 
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its victory, during a time characterised by increasingly crippled management and poor 
urban performance, the Islamic Movement managed to build a successful record in 
offering welfare and charitable services to the urban poor. These included nurseries, 
medical and drug addiction rehabilitation clinics, as well as relief services. 26 
Emulating the communists and leftist forces in recognising residents’ agency, the 
Movement also launched its annual Islamic voluntary work brigades.27 
Possessing material resources combined with invigorated young leadership and fresh 
breath for change, the Islamic Movement, within a relatively short period, managed to 
implement public urban projects which its predecessors were unable to deliver. Its 
promising performance, leadership skills and competence were enhanced by state 
support. The Israeli government at the time, in contrast to its animosity towards the 
communist leadership, had a vested interest in empowering the Islamic Movement, 
whose prime priorities at the time were social and moral. As soon as the latter was 
elected, the state offered the local government relatively generous budgets, including 
writing off its debt.28 A tamed Islamic Movement, concerned more with religious, 
social and moral issues than with Palestinian nationalism, seemed compatible with the 
state’s interest in reducing its subjects to their faith and defining them along religious 
and ethnic lines.  
                                                
26 Abnaa el-Balad had, despite its limited resources, also offered health and educational services. Al- 
Hayat (the life) clinic and Al-Hadaf (the goal) nursery both established in the 1980s are still 
functioning. See chapter 5 for more details.    
27 The Islamic Movement and the Movement are used interchangeably throughout the thesis.  
28 For more details, including statistical figures, see chapter 7. 
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Adopting religion, which is already close to people’s hearts and minds, as its ideology 
and presenting it as the panacea for all the ills of society, including mundane everyday 
life problems, combined with its successful performance in urban management and 
regeneration, and relatively strong economic base, won the Movement the residents’ 
trust, including from those who were/are not its affiliates. Twenty-Five years after it 
was first elected, the Movement still enjoys the trust of the majority of the city’s 
residents. It has been repeatedly voted in to lead the local government, thus 
establishing what seems to be an unchallengeable hegemonic rule.   
As can be expected, Umm al-Fahem’s cityscape and semiotics - its socio-spatial, 
cultural, economic and political landscape - have changed throughout the last 25 
years. The biopolitical projects which the Movement embarked on in the domains of 
public health, urban infrastructure, economy, education, body politics and the 
building of a new society were congruous with its ideology. 29  They worked to 
Islamise different spheres of life, including the production of a new cultural and 
normative order and new subjectivities which are socially and spatially visible. 
Spatially, more than 20 mosques were built during this period. 30  Socially and 
culturally, the city became more conservative in some respects and more open and 
relaxed in others. More girls, for example, now complete secondary school education, 
and some make it to university.  
                                                
29 See research argument section of the introduction chapter, and chapter 7 for details on what is meant 
by biopolitical projects.  
30 Before the Movement was elected, Umm al-Fahem had four mosques.  
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A prominent and important site where social, cultural and political change is asserted 
was and still is the female body. Cross-age campaigns were launched to encourage 
religious sartorial practices, which resulted in more women and young girls wearing 
the hijab. The Movement also worked towards accentuating the halal/haram binary. 
In its beginnings, it criticised, even banned existing cultural and traditional practices 
and attempted to introduce new ones, which corresponded more with its version of 
Islam. As can be expected, the Islamisation of the social, the spatial and the bodily 
politics was also reflected in a shift in cultural, political and colloquial references.  
Economically, the city has more shops and stores, and in the last decade shopping 
malls and twenty-four-hour outlets have started to penetrate the local scene. 
Statistically, however, the city still ranked second from the bottom on the socio-
economic nationwide ladder.31 According to Al-Itihad (2009), as of November 2009 
unemployment in the city was 32 per cent, when at the national level it was 8 per cent. 
It is still more of a consumerist city with very few job opportunities to offer.32 
Compared to the 1970s and 1980s, when the gap between the rich and the poor in the 
city was almost negligible, Umm al-Fahem of today is more polarised, with a tiny 
minority forming a rich elite and a majority of low-income households.  
Politically, while left wing movements and forces have suffered enduring defeat, the 
Islamic Movement has gathered more support, thus establishing what this thesis calls 
                                                
31 See (Statistical Abstract 2000: 55, Local Councils in Israel, 2006:90). 
32 In terms of education, in the year 2000 Umm al-Fahem had the largest average number of students 
per class in secondary schools, in the entire country (Central Bureau of Statistics [CBS] 2000: 56). 
According to official statistic from 2006, only 6.6 per cent of the population managed to gain an 
academic degree (Local councils in Israel 2006).   
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biopolitical hegemony.33 Religious events became more popular than the once widely 
attended nationalist and leftist public events. The once city of mass demonstrations 
and widely celebrated national commemorations such as those of Land Day34 and 
anniversaries such as the First of May, international workers’ day, has changed. Its 
public events have shrunk in size and some have changed in form altogether. The 
annual festival of “Al-Aqasa is in danger,” inaugurated in 1996, has become one of 
the main public events in the city, attracting tens of thousands every year.35  
The political change is not only limited to public events and the city’s urban, social 
and cultural character. The atmosphere of diminishing citizenship has been 
accompanied by consumerist citizenship. Material values have started to replace 
values of social solidarity. For example, the once popular voluntary work brigades 
which were emblematic of social solidarity and citizens’ agency have almost 
disappeared. In recent years, violence in the form of gunshots, murder and robbery, 
has become a major concern for both the local government and its residents. 36 
Moreover, the generation born in the 1980s onwards have been characterised by some 
Fahmawis, especially those with left and nationalist politics leanings, as the “lost 
generation” of the city. They are a generation born into the era of identity politics, 
                                                
33 See chapter 7 for details on what is meant by biopolitical hegemony. 
34 Land Day is an annual commemoration day observed by the Palestinians, remembering the bloody 
events of 30 March 1976 when the Israeli army shot dead six Palestinian citizens from the Galilee. 
Palestinians were demonstrating against the government’s announcement of land appropriation in the 
Galilee to build Jewish settlements and for security purposes.  
35 The annual festival of “Al-Aqsa is in danger” is the Islamic Movement’s main public national event, 
held in the city. It attracts thousands of believers from across the country. The festival is in support of 
Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem which the Movement says is in danger of collapse as a result of Israel’s 
archaeological excavations that are taking place underneath it.  
36 This thesis does not argue that such changes, particularly in regard to increasing violence in the city 
and the shift towards a materialistic culture, are reducible to the rise of the Islamic Movement to 
power. International trends, particularly globalisation and neoliberalism, as well as the withdrawal of 
the state from fully fulfilling many of its duties towards the citizens are major contributors to this shift.  
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neoliberalism, individualism and the fetish of material wealth and possessions. 
Although such a shift is by no means reducible to the Islamic Movement, for 
Fahmawis 1989 was a turning point in the history of their city.37  
This condensed introduction to the urban, political and social history of Umm al-
Fahem, the research site, presents a complicated and multi-layered story to be 
disentangled and investigated. It generates urgent questions about what the right to the 
city under (post)colonial conditions means, as well as about the relationships between 
the urban and the political, the social and the spatial, the colonial state and the citizen, 
space and power, resilience and control, the nominal city and citizenship, the 
substantive city and citizenship, governmentality and domination, religious identities 
and control. 38  These questions will be explored throughout the thesis. In what 
follows, I give a brief background to the genesis of this project and its framing 
questions in an attempt to contextualise, conceptualise, analyse and understand the 
city of Umm al-Fahem. 
                                                
37 The reference here is to the majority of the research interviewees.  
38 Postcoloniality in this context, indicated by the term postcolonial, is not a temporal concept and does 
not suggest what Shohat (2000) and others make of it, that is a linear periodization implying the end of 
colonialism, the ushering in of a new era and the closure of certain historical events or an end to the 
denial of people’s agency and resistance. Rather, it is a paradigm that not only acknowledges the 
history of colonialism, the subordination of the colonised, and the existence of systems of oppression 
and coercive domination but also seeks to analyse it and investigates its effects and the configurations 
of power structures in the present (Young 2001, 2003 ; Hall 2001 [1996]). Postcoloniality allows for a 
better understanding of a transformed historical situation and the political and cultural complexities 
which have arisen in response to such change, which at times seem to blur and confuse existing binary 
oppositions of either-or situations and definitions of colonised versus colonisers. As Hall (2001: 247) 
argues, while the differences between colonising and colonised cultures remain profound, they never 
operated in a purely binary way. Postcoloniality is an analytical tool that helps account for some of the 
data that emerged from the field, the materiality and governmentality of the village/city and the 
conditions under which Fahmawis live. 
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Suspension as control: conceptualising the Palestinian city and the right to 
the city 
Place remains fundamental to the problems of membership in 
society. 
Holston and Appadurai (1996:188) 
Our condition reminds me of [Emile Habibi’s novel] Al-Mutasha’il, 
The Pessoptimist, when in one of its episodes the main protagonist, 
Said, finds himself sitting on a pole; where he can neither sit 
properly nor descend.39 
                                                                    Muhammed, Umm al-Fahem, 12 July 2009  
On the one level, I was concerned with the absence of functioning Palestinian cities, 
urbanisation and urbanism in Israel, as well as the changing character of Palestinian 
villages and towns in regard to their materiality and socio-economic, spatial and 
political characteristics. As indicated above, some indications of the absence of 
functioning urbanism in Umm al-Fahem and other Palestinian localities include the 
conspicuous paucity or complete lack of neutral public spaces, cultural centres, green 
parks, playgrounds, job opportunities and industrial and commercial zones. On 
another level, I was concerned with the increasing privatisation, atomisation, 
parochialism, identity/tribal politics and neoliberal articulations in Palestinians’ 
everyday life, reflected in the increasing appetite for personal material wealth and 
consumerism. In an attempt to try to investigate these concerns I decided to embark 
on a research journey which did not have a definitive route and did not follow any 
single established tradition of scholarship on the Palestinians in Israel.  
                                                
39  For Edward Said (1986: 26), Habibi’s novel and Mahmoud Drawish’s poem, Identity Card, are the 
“[t]wo great images [that] encapsulate our [Palestinians’] unresolved existence.”  
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Initially interested in the (re)production and ordering of space under (post)colonial 
conditions and its manipulation in ways conducive to operating power structures and 
political objectives, I thought that investigating the absence of substantive functioning 
Palestinian cities and urbanism could be the way forward to address my concerns. My 
premise was that the city and public space - how they are organised, produced and 
reproduced - reflect the historical, socio-economic and political processes and 
developments which contribute to their (un)making. They offer analytical tools and 
provide an entry into untangling the relationship between the historical, the political, 
the economic, the social and the spatial. They reveal the nature of citizenship and 
visualise the limits and boundaries between those who belong and those who do not. 
The city and public space in this context expose the workings of the power structure: 
who decides what and who does what to whom.  
Framed and guided by concepts and theories of the city and public space, their 
potentialities, the possibilities they allow, and the challenges they pose to the state, a 
number of meta-questions became necessary to raise and unpack, especially in a 
context where the state is colonial, space is contested, and the citizenship it offers is 
corrupted and racialised. If cities are civilisation and incubators of advanced culture 
and sites where people can be public and visible, creative and contesting, where 
human agency has the potential to be fulfilled, where social movements, subcultures 
and countercultures have the potential to emerge and become visible, where politics 
and collective forms of art flourish and prosper and where the substantive nature of 
democratic citizenship is tested and materialised; and if material public space is a 
prerequisite for the materialisation of public life and is both indicative and an 
indispensable component of the democratic nature of society; if urban life, as 
 
28	
Lefebvre (1996) argues, is an indicator and a gauge against which the development of 
society is measured and depriving people of the urban means depriving them of 
civilisation, the questions we must ask become: what can be made of Palestinian cities 
inside Israel? What kind of spatial configurations and arrangements are being formed 
and why? What kind of socio-political, economic and cultural order is being produced 
and why? And can there in fact be a functioning Palestinian city under 
(post)colonialism?  
In an attempt to form an understanding of the Palestinian city and find answers to my 
concerns and the above-mentioned questions, my journey into the fieldwork started in 
the summer of 2009. Employing a mixed qualitative methodological approach, I 
gathered ethnographic, visual and archival data to capture the lived experience of the 
city and investigate the seemingly simple question of whether Umm al-Fahem indeed 
functions as a city. Umm al-Fahem, with a current population of about 50,000, was 
the first Palestinian village to earn the official status of a city, since Israel’s 
establishment, and which until the late 1990s was the second largest administratively 
registered Palestinian city in Israel.40 Twenty-four years have passed since Umm al-
Fahem was declared a city in 1985, the question of whether this official transition has 
been substantive or remained merely nominal and cosmetic formed the departure 
point for my research.   
I spent three intensive months in the city, meeting and interviewing random people in 
the streets and alleyways, shops, coffeeshops and the city’s art gallery. I also 
                                                
40 Nazareth and Shfa A’mir in the Galilee enjoyed the status of a city before the establishment of Israel.  
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conducted interviews with people from the local government’s planning department 
and political leaders from the city, and took photographs of Umm al-Fahem’s built 
environment and everyday life. This was followed by two-month worth of work at 
universities’ archives in Israel and individual day trips into the city in 2010. I was 
interested in deconstructing the nominality and abstractionism of the city, the social 
and political factors involved in its (re)production, and exploring how the city 
responded to (post)colonial conditions.  
Unravelling the complexities and multifaceted contexts of the simple question of 
whether Umm al-Fahem functions as a city required the development of a new 
conceptual framework. It also raised a host of other questions about the political 
status of Palestinians in Israel, the nature of their citizenship, the character of the state 
and its relationship to its Palestinian citizens. The project soon developed to be 
simultaneously in and of the city. Umm al-Fahem became simultaneously the subject 
and object of analysis. As the subject, it speaks through both its history and its 
residents about its experience, socio-spatiality, built environment, politics, economics 
and culture. At the same time, it remained the object of analysis as I tried to analyse 
the Palestinian city under (post)colonial conditions. 
While in Umm al-Fahem, and during the months upon months of digesting, reflecting 
on, and analysing the wealth of material obtained from the field, as well as in the 
numerous and thought-provoking conversations with my supervisor, I realised that 
determining in a definitive way whether Umm al-Fahem functioned as a city had 
become virtually irrelevant. I became increasingly aware that the process taking place 
was in fact one of absenting the Palestinian city - the deliberate deprivation of the 
right to the city - which I also call urbicide, and the correspondent production of a 
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suspended, domesticated, docile and dependent space and a suspended, domesticated, 
docile, dependent citizenry.41 I realised that part of the process was the production of 
a space which is ambiguous in its identity: neither a city nor a village, a space where 
its residents inhabit a state of uncertainty and precariousness, and where both the 
city/village and its residents live a simultaneous presence/absence state of being, 
where they are also deprived of self-fulfilment.  
In this suspended space, the Palestinian city in Israel acquires particular forms and 
functions which are not compatible with those of functioning substantive cities. The 
city is more of a dormitory and consumption site. It is a concrete centre, cramped and 
crowded with buildings, with hardly any planned development, neutral spaces or 
green public spaces. Its green spaces are often either cemeteries or private domestic 
gardens, created when and if the private space and financial conditions allow. 42 Its 
public spaces are mostly limited to religious spaces such as mosques and churches, 
and recently to commercial spaces such as cafés, restaurants and shopping malls. The 
use-value, to borrow Lefebvre’s terminology (1991), of this concrete urban jungle, 
which can easily become suffocating and claustrophobic, is in many cases reduced to 
serve the rudimentary functions of eating, sleeping, reproducing, worshipping and 
consuming.   
                                                
41 For details on urbicide see the introduction’s section on research arguments below.  
42  Many Palestinian cities and villages, Umm al-Fahem included, are surrounded by pine forests. 
These, however, are Jewish National Fund (JNF) forests. The JNF, a pre-state colonial body in charge 
of land purchase, defines land as the exclusive, inalienable property of the Jewish people. The forests 
have a number of political functions. They have been used as a tool for asserting Jewish control over 
land, covering up destroyed Palestinian villages, and preventing geographical continuity between 
Palestinian localities.  See chapter 4 on Israel’s colonial nomos for more detail on JNF’s role in 
perpetuating the Manichaeism and exclusionary-exclusive nature of the state.  
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As for the Palestinians inside Israel, just like their cities and villages, they reside in a 
state of the betwixt and between, the state of simultaneous inclusion-exclusion, the 
state of the suspended dialectic of citizens and enemies. Despite being officially 
citizens of the state, they have been subject to systematic and institutionalised racism 
and discriminatory policies since the establishment of the state in 1948. The state still 
sees them as a problem to be managed, even as enemies rather than citizens. Their 
citizenship is more obscuring than revealing of their actual status, the way they live 
and the nature of rights they are able to claim effectively. Although they legally enjoy 
civil and individual rights, they are neither fully included in the state nor fully 
excluded.43 Their citizenship has been hollowed of many political, economic, social 
and cultural rights, and faces an ever-increasing state of precariousness. 44 
Precariousness and suspension permeate the most private and sacred aspects of their 
life: home and family. The unauthorised buildings, which are under threat of 
demolition by the state, and the 2003 Nationality and Entry into Israel Law-
Temporary Order, which affect family unification and which broke families up and 
                                                
43 On 22 March 2011, for example, the Knesset passed an amendment to the budgetary law which gives 
the Minister of Finance the power to employ punishment procedures by reducing budgets given to 
bodies that deny the existence of the state of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state, commemorate the 
Nakba, or show contempt for the country’s flag or symbols. For more details on the law see: Book of 
Laws 2286, 30.3.2011, pp 686-87 [Hebrew], available at: 
http://www.knesset.gov.il/Laws/Data/law/2286/2286.pdf. The “Nakba Law,” as it is described by 
Adalah, the Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel, leaves the term “bodies” ambiguous, and 
potentially pertains to all cultural and education institutions that receive budgets from the state. 
44 Amal Jamal (2007) in his article ‘Nationalizing States and the Constitution of Hollow Citizenship’, 
Ethnopolitics, volume: 6, Issue: 4, pp. 471-493, discusses in detail the process of what he calls hollow 
citizenship. Oren Yiftachel (2002) has described the attack on Palestinian rights in Israel, as a shrinking 
space of citizenship. 
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threatens the same for many more, are quintessential of the Palestinians’ unresolved 
existence.45  
Hence, the suspended space and the suspended citizen become a technology of 
domination and control. It is a mode of governmentality and a way of managing 
Palestinians which helps create the conditions for domestication and docility and 
perpetuate the state of dependency on Jewish cities and towns. 46  Moreover, 
suspension problematises the sense of belonging, accentuates the unresolved 
condition of being and deepens the state of uncertainty.  It robs both the citizen and 
the city of the sense of security and stability, and frustrates creativity, vision and the 
ability to plan. It marks the limitation of Palestinians’ right to the city, the right to 
difference, urbanity and substantive citizenship and the right to live without the 
burden of precariousness. Space under the state of suspension is not one of 
potentialities but constraints. Both space and the citizen are ruled and controlled by 
                                                
45 The right to choose who to marry and who to build a family with, once thought to be a personal 
choice, is not the case with Palestinians. Falling in love has been politicised, securitised, racialised, 
collectivised, problematised and in some cases suspended. Legitimised by the international state of 
politics after the terror attacks of 11 September 2000 on World Trade Centre in the United States of 
America (U.S.A.), and the doctrine of the war on terror led by the latter and Britain (the two main allies 
of Israel), as manifested in draconian anti-terror legislations where curtailment of civil liberties seemed 
appropriate for counterterrorism, on 31 July 2003 the Knesset enacted the Nationality and Entry into 
Israel Law- Temporary Order, which bans the Palestinians from Occupied Palestinian Territories 
(OPTs) from obtaining residency status or citizenship in Israel, including through marriage to an Israeli 
citizen. Not only does the law ban Israelis from marrying Palestinians from the OPTs, it is also 
retrospectively applied to couples who were married before the enactment of the law and have not yet 
received a residential status. By imposing the sweeping ban, the law severely violates fundamental 
rights and freedoms enshrined in both international treaties to which Israel is party and those protected 
also under domestic law. The law that was initially presented as a temporary measure to stem the flow 
of Palestinian suicide bombers who allegedly entered Israel through the “gate” of family unification, 
has been extended repeatedly (Peled 2006: 32). In 2005, Adalah together with the Association for Civil 
Rights in Israel submitted a joint petition to the High Court of Justice contesting the factual base of the 
Law. Despite repeated claims that the law was designed to prevent suicide attacks, Israel, has only been 
able to point to a maximum of 25 individuals out of thousands of status receivers whom it questioned 
on suspicion of engagement in terror activity in the last preceding five years.  
46 The section on research arguments below details what the notion of governmentality means.  
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fear, the unknown, and lack of clarity. They are reduced to living in the moment, to 
taking a chance, all of which facilitates the condition for docility, domestication and 
fragmentation.  
The state of suspension, which characterises the transition which both Palestinians 
and their localities have undergone, cannot be understood myopically. It cannot be 
divorced from the urban history of Palestinian cities before the Nakba of 1948. 
Therefore, before getting into the research arguments and its scholarly contribution, in 
what follows I give a brief historical background on the Palestinian city before and 
after 1948. Central to this history is the way Zionists related to the Palestinian city as 
a site of threatening politics and resistance, and as a site which could potentially bring 
Jews and Palestinians together as illustrated by the case of the Communist Party, an 
outcome which would be counterproductive to the exclusive-exclusionary 
Manichaean essence of Zionism. Understanding the urban question in a historical 
context helps shed light on understanding the urban question after 1948 and its 
potential challenge to the colonial project of establishing and maintaining an 
exclusively Jewish state. It helps facilitate the grounds for the research arguments.  
The rise and fall of Palestinian cities 
The tragedy of Palestine…is not the Nakba but the loss of its cities. 
Tamari (2005: 96) 
Jaffa's destruction, the city and the port, will certainly come, and for 
the better… If it goes down I will not lament it. 
Ben-Gurion (1973 [1936]: 335) 
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Before the Nakba, the catastrophe of 1948, Palestinians had urban centres. In 1945, 
more than one-third of Palestinians lived in cities and towns (Benvenisti 2000: 6). At 
the turn of the twentieth century, the port cities of Jaffa and Haifa, for example, were 
undergoing fundamental socio-economic transformations and an accelerated process 
of urbanisation. Khalidi (1997:26) notes that the two cities were the fastest growing 
cities, which by 1948 had the largest Arab populations of any cities, and were the 
commercial, economic and cultural foci of Palestine. In Jaffa, for example, the 
principal trading city in Ottoman and Mandatory Palestine (Tamari 2005; Katz 1986), 
the population grew from 39,700 in 1904 to 50,000 in 1913 (Kark 2003 [1984]: 
132).47 The city, with Haifa joining at a later stage, became more integrated into 
global trade and commerce, a process which started under the Ottomans and 
intensified under the British Mandate.  
The changes in the geopolitical map of the region, the discovery of petroleum in the 
Arabian Peninsula and Iraq, along with the post First-World-War partition of the 
Middle East between imperialist powers, Britain and France, played a pivotal role in 
the socio-economic and political trajectories of Palestinian cities. Urbanisation, for 
example, which contributed to the formation of what Zureik (1978:52) and Tamari 
(2005) call a nascent and distinguishable Palestinian bourgeoisie and proletariat, got 
accelerated. Haifa, ‘the bride of the Carmel,’ like its compatriot city of Jaffa, on a 
different trajectory nonetheless, began to bustle with life, culture and employment 
opportunities. In less than ten years, Haifa’s Palestinian Arab population doubled, 
from 18,240 in 1922 to 34,148 in 1931, reaching 62,510 in 1944 (Anglo-American 
                                                
47 A different source cites that Jaffa in 1904 had a population of 30,000. See (Kark 2003 [1984]: 132) 
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Committee of Inquiry on Jewish Problems in Palestine Europe 1946: 148 & 151).48 Its 
geopolitical characteristics, being on the Mediterranean with deep-water shores, made 
it particularly important for British economic and political interests. Under British 
rule, the city was turned into an industrial centre which had a deep-water harbour, a 
railway; the Hijaz railway to Baghdad, an airport and the Mosul-Haifa oil pipelines 
which connected to the oil of Northern Iraq.49 It was also in Haifa that Palestine 
Railways built their main repair and maintenance workshops and where an oil 
refinery began to function soon after the Second World War broke out (Lockman 
1996: 85). “We miss and lament the days of Haifa,” said an old Palestinian woman 
who in early 1940s moved from her village to Haifa together with her husband for 
work.50 
Inevitably, such socio-economic developments led to a demand for luxurious goods, 
such as the automobile and spaces for cultural and leisure activities, which were 
distinctively secular and urban in nature. Kark (2003 [1984]) notes that Jaffa at the 
time had theatres, cabarets, football clubs, coffeeshops, brothels, as well as 22 
newspapers. Its cultural scene included cinemas, which attracted not only the local 
population but also those from neighbouring cities, such as Il-Lydd. The cinema was 
                                                
48 To get to these numbers I added the Muslim population of the city to the Christian one. The British 
divided their census along religious lines. The category of Arab did not feature in the census.   
49 For more information about the oil pipe line, see Iraq Petroleum Company. (1934) An Account of the 
Construction in the Years 1932 to 1934 of the Pipe-line of the Iraq Petroleum Company, Limited: 
From its Oilfield in the Vicinity of Kirkuk, Iraq, to the Mediterranean Ports of Haifa (Palestine) and 
Tripoli (Lebanon). (The construction of the Iraq-Mediterranean pipe-line: a tribute to the men who 
built it. October. 1934). London: St. Clements press. 
50 Najjiyih, born in the 1920s, remembered vividly her days in Haifa, and how the city was bustling 
with life, culture, cafes and musicians from Egypt and Lebanon playing there. Her husband, who is 
from the same village, was working in a canteen in a British Police station (interviewed in September 
2010).  
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not a male dominated space. Women also enjoyed it. They even went there dressed up 
in their best and special occasions clothes.51 Known as 'the bride of the sea,' Jaffa was 
also integrated into the regional cultural scene. It was not an isolated city. The 
Egyptian singer Umm-Kulthoom, renowned as the greatest Arab singer ever, had 
along with other famous Egyptian artists performed in Jaffa.  
In those days, Jaffa was also known for its openness to difference and tolerance to the 
other. The city was cosmopolitan in its social fabric and outlook, with Muslim and 
Christian Palestinians, Jews, Armenians and others all residing in the same city. 
Tamari (2005: 16) notes that Ottoman Jaffa’s urbanisation, like other port cities under 
their rule, was not only limited to traditional rural migration into the city, but included 
Europeans who worked in commerce and business.  
Cities, however, were not only sites of employment, culture and leisure. They were 
spaces where politics, labour movements, class, feminist and national identities were 
being shaped. Parties and movements from across the political spectrum were formed. 
These included Islamists, nationalist and communist. Cities were also sites of 
resistance against the intensification of Zionist immigration to Palestine and the 
increasingly repressive British colonial rule with its favourable policies towards 
Zionism. Although as Khalidi (1997: 7) notes, the Palestinian peasantry was the first 
to realise the nature of Zionism as a colonial movement which sought to assert its rule 
in Palestine through land purchase from absentee landlords at the end of the 
                                                
51 This is what one of my women interviewees from Il-Lydd, A’aqlah who is in her 70s, told me during 
my fieldwork in the summer of 2009. Remembering her days in Jaffa and the cultural life of the city, 
she told the story of her sister-in-law who in the 1940s was in her 20s and used to dress-up to go to the 
cinema in Jaffa with her brother.    
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nineteenth and early twentieth century, it was the urban intelligentsia which later 
played a crucial role in opposing the Zionists. The struggle of those peasants, who 
were driven off their farmland, was a wake up call to the urban intellectuals, who 
were not fully aware of the developments in inland Palestine. 
Despite the increasing national tension between Zionists and Palestinians, in Haifa, 
which was rapidly becoming a mixed city of Jews and Arabs, other forms of relations 
between Palestinians and Jews, especially the anti-Zionists Jews, were being formed. 
Lockman (1996), in his book Comrades and Enemies, which investigates the 
relationship between Arab and Jewish workers in various work sites such as in the 
case of the railway men, reveals a story of comradeship at times and enmity at others. 
Their common interests as workers and their shared work conditions brought them 
together. This was despite being profoundly affected by the national and political 
environment, and despite the fact that workers did not repudiate either their respective 
cultural nor their emerging national identities. Such alliances, however, generated 
dismay and discontent amongst respective nationalist elites, especially the chauvinist 
Zionist trade union, the Histadrut.  
In early 1920s, the Palestine Communist Party (PCP), which was at first entirely 
Jewish and later became mixed with Arab and Jews joining together until the party’s 
disintegration in 1943, was militantly on the side of workers’ rights and against the 
Zionist movement. Its efforts to win support amongst the Arab community were 
enhanced by a clearer anti-Zionist stance. In 1924 it set up Haifa, the Arabic biweekly 
newspaper. The PCP, even when it was Jewish, attacked the Zionist movement for 
displacing Palestinian peasants. For example, it organised and publicised a campaign 
in support of the latter’s resistance to their displacement by the Jewish National Fund 
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(JNF), which bought their farmland in Afula, Jezreel Valley, from Arab landlords. 
The PCP had openly called “for an end to Jewish immigration to Palestine” and urged 
“Jewish workers to break with Zionism and seek a revolutionary alliance with the 
Arab workers and peasants” (ibid: 130).  
The PCP activities and platform became increasingly alarming for the Histadrut, 
which feared its growing influence amongst Arab and Jewish workers. The Histadrut 
was particularly concerned about Jews who recently came from Eastern Europe and 
who were “hungry and desperate,” (ibid) at a time which was considered politically 
and economically vulnerable for the Zionist project. The fear resulted in a purging 
campaign against the communists in 1920s and led to their expulsion from the 
Histadrut in 1924 (ibid). Despite the PCP’s disintegration in 1943,52 the experience as 
a joint party of Arabs and Jews united by a shared vision built on equality and the 
fight against oppression shows that other forms of coexistence were and are possible 
between Arabs and Jews. Such experience, where the city and the workspace form its 
home and where common interests bring people together, also shows that national 
chauvinism cannot tolerate organised voices which challenge its racialised exclusive-
exclusionary agenda.   
1948  
The Nakba of ’48 was a turning point. The establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 
resulted in the destruction of Palestinian urban centres and the exile of their 
                                                
52 As political circumstance both internationally and nationally changed, the PCP’s Jewish members 
changed their stance towards the Zionist project, moving towards supporting the establishment of Israel 
(Lockman 1996). 
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Palestinian urban population, including their nascent middle class. Jaffa, which by 
1948 had a population of 80,000, was left with only 3,800 marginalised and excluded 
Palestinian inhabitants. Haifa’s and Jaffa’s fate epitomised a wider consequence of 
‘48: the vanishing of the Palestinian city as a social, political, economic and cultural 
site, the amputation of Palestinian urbanisation, the exile of most of the urban 
Palestinian population, and the forcible conversion of major Palestinian urban centres 
into cities which became either predominately or entirely Jewish. 
Tamari notes that the destruction of the Arab and cosmopolitan character of port 
cities, and the exile of their Palestinian Arab intelligentsia had devastating and far-
reaching consequences on the development of the Palestinians who remained in the 
homeland. The urban infrastructure of daily newspapers, secular political parties and 
trade unions was completely destroyed, as so was their influence on inland 
Palestinians (Tamari 2005:45) who were more rural and more socially conservative. 
With the loss of major cities, Palestinians lost their centre of gravity. They became 
scattered, fragmented, even disappeared from the political map as an independent 
actor and as a people. This remained the case until the emergence of the Palestinian 
Liberation Organisation as political force in 1964 (Khalidi 1997:178-179).53  
The destruction of Palestinian cities was not inevitable, but deliberate. Critical reading 
of Zionist literature and policies shows that the targeted destruction of urban centres 
had been part of Zionist designs well before 1948. Israel’s founder and first Prime 
                                                
53 The PLO emerged in exile. It was not allowed back into Palestine territories until the signing of the 
Oslo Accords in 1993.  
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Minister, David Ben-Gurion (1973: 335), wrote in his memoirs in 1936: “Jaffa's 
destruction, the city and the port, will certainly come, and for the better… If it goes 
down I will not lament it.” After the establishment of Israel, Ben-Gurion admitted 
that, “[t]he strategic objective was to destroy the urban communities, which were the 
most organised and politically conscious” (quoted in Abrahams 1994: 86). 
 
 
1948 onwards: urbanisation without urbanism and the right to the city 
We do not weep for the mill of the village but for the bookshop and the 
library. We do not want to regain the past but to regain the future and to 
push tomorrow into the day after. Palestine’s progress in the natural paths 
of its future was deliberately impeded, as though Israel wished to make of 
the whole Palestinian community a countryside for the city of Israel. More 
than that, it plans to turn every Arab city into a rural hinterland for the 
Hebrew State.  
 Barghouti (2005: 149) 
Palestinians after ‘48 were stripped of their right to the city, to culture, to diversity, to 
urbanity, full substantive citizenship, and to living without the burden of colonisation, 
occupation, fragmentation, discrimination and racism. The right to the city in this 
context is not only an individual right to reside in an urban space. It is rather one for a 
city of potency and opportunities, cosmopolitanism and openness, agency and 
struggles, culture and countercultures, heterogeneity and assemblage, production and 
employment, politics and citizenship, freedom and liberties, difference and tolerance, 
collectivity and individuality, art and creativity, public and unmediated spaces.  
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The right to city is the right to urbanity, in which the city forms its characteristic 
locus. 54  The city as a place of what the French sociologist, intellectual and 
philosopher Henri Lefebvre (1996: 179) calls “renewed centrality…of encounter and 
exchange…” It is the right to a city which transcends the individual liberty to access 
urban resources, as David Harvey argues (2008:23). It is “a right to change ourselves 
by changing the city. It is, moreover, a common rather than an individual right since 
this transformation inevitably depends upon the exercise of a collective power to 
reshape the processes of urbanization” (ibid).  
After the war of ‘48, less than 160,000 Palestinians, the majority of whom living in 
rural villages, remained in the newly established state of Israel. Those Palestinians 
found themselves living under a new geopolitical landscape. They became de jure 
Israeli citizens supposedly enjoying equal rights as their fellow Jewish citizens. 
Although they could vote and get elected for parliament, unlike Jewish citizens they 
were soon placed under a strict military colonial rule, which suspended their 
citizenship rights and fragmented their entire existence. The military rule (1948-1966) 
subjected them to a regime of pass permits, curfews, confined their spatial 
movements, dispossessed them of the majority of their land, underdeveloped their 
economy and at times criminalised the most basic of their rights, that is the right to 
cultivate their land or visit a family member who resided in a different village. Israel, 
                                                
54  Louis Wirth (1938) in his article ‘Urbanism as a Way of Life,’ identifies the city to be the 
characteristic locus of urbanism. He, however, argues that urban mode of life is not necessarily 
confined to the city, an argument which was also echoed in some of my fieldwork interviews.  
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defining itself as a Jewish state,55  isolated them from the rest of the Palestinian 
people, and had for long not only barred them from publicly expressing their 
Palestinian identity, but in fact criminalised and harassed those who did.56  
With the exception of the Naqab (the Negev) where the state built townships to 
forcibly and coercively concentrate the desert’s nomadic Bedouin population, Israel 
failed to build any new town or city for the Palestinians.57 Instead, it has continuously 
confiscated their land and has denied some of them the right to live on their own land. 
Some 40,000 Palestinians live in what Israel defines as unrecognised villages, which 
puts them under a constant threat of eviction and the demolition of their corrugated 
iron huts and tents.58 Despite their pre-state existence, Israel did not put their villages 
on its official maps, thus rendering them invisible and illegal residents on their own 
land. Not only does the state deprive them of the basics of rights: clean water, 
electricity, access to health and education, but also considers them invaders who need 
to be removed. “We must stop their illegal invasion into state land by all means 
                                                
55  On the Jewish character of the state being enshrined in the Law, see: The Declaration of the 
Establishment of the State of Israel, dating back to 14 May 1948, 
http://www.knesset.gov.il/docs/eng/megilat_eng.htm , and amendment no. 9 to the Basic Law: Knesset, 
which stipulates that ‘A candidates' list shall not participate in elections to the Knesset if its objects or 
actions, expressly or by implication, include… negation of the existence of the State of Israel as the 
state of the Jewish people;...’http://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic2_eng.htm . In addition, 
in 2011 Member of Knesset Abraham Dichter put forward a bill for a basic law to define Israel as the 
nation state of the Jewish people. For more details see Dicther Bill, at the Ministry of Justice website: 
http://index.justice.gov.il/StateIdentity/ProprsedBasicLaws/Pages/DichtersProposal.aspx  [Hebrew].  
56 For more information on political persecution and criminalisation of political activists see the section 
Everyday Coloniality, Everyday Manichaeism, in chapter 5 on Historical Sociology of Umm al-Fahem.  
57 For more details on the politically motivated sedentary policies towards the Bedouins of the Naqab 
see Falah, G. (1989) ‘Israeli State Policy towards Bedouin Sedentarization in the Negev’, Journal of 
Palestine Studies, 18:71–90. Also see Yiftachel, O. 2006 Ethnocracy. University of Pennsylvanian 
Press: Philadelphia.  
58  Al-A’araqeeb unrecognised village in the Naqab, until 16 June 2014, has been subjected to 
demolition for 71 times (‘Another Brutal Attack on Al-A’araqeeb to Demolish it’ (2014), available at: 
http://www.aljabha.org/index.asp?i=85250 [Arabic]). Despite the repetitive demolition, its people are 
still living there steadfastly. The village symbolises the unwavering insistence of its people to live in 
dignity on their land.   
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possible…” stated Avigdor Lieberman in February 2002, then the minister 
responsible for land management (quoted in Yiftachel 2006: 3).59 
Over the years, with the loss of the majority of its land, the remaining Palestinian 
peasantry was transformed into what Zureik (1978: 131) calls a “marginal 
proletariat,” who had to commute to Jewish cities and towns in search of a living. 
Palestinians were left with only 3 per cent of land under their control and many 
village economies that had previously been agricultural-based lost the capacity for 
viable agricultural production. This fundamental change in the production-base and 
the socio-economics of the village or the proletarianisation of the village has been 
called by some academics, the like of Khamaisi (2005), “selective and misshapen 
urbanisation.” 
This process of urbanisation without urbanism has accelerated over the years. Despite 
the Palestinians’ exponential growth, from 156,000 in 1948 to 1,694,000 in 2014, 
making up 20.7% of Israel’s population (Central Bureau of Statistics 2014), the 
physical expansion of their villages and towns has been proscribed by Israel’s land 
and planning policies. The designated jurisdiction area of 2.5 per cent of land, where 
they are allowed to build their houses, has remained constant (Khamaisi 2000; 
Yiftachel 1998).60  
                                                
59  The statement was made in reference to the Bedouins of the Naqab, on the day the Israeli 
government sent light planes to spray twelve thousands dunums of crops with poisonous chemicals. 
The act was repeated in October 2002, April 2003 and 2004 (Yiftachel 2006: 3).  
60 Unlike Jewish settlements and towns, land in Palestinian localities is privately owned and housing is 
self-provided, which means that Palestinians build their own houses on their private land. On the 
challenges this system poses on Palestinians’ everyday life see chapter 6 on planning.  
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In mixed cities, where Jews and Palestinian Arabs “occupy the same urban 
jurisdiction” (Yacobi 2009:1), a state of racial spatial segregation exists in most cases. 
While the term mixed cities could abstractly suggest that the two communities are 
integrated, the reality, however, is more complex.61 The built-environment in these 
cities has been framed by “a prevailing ethnocratic drive for Judaization” (Yiftachel 
and Yacobi 2005: 144), and is shaped by the logic of ethno-nationalism (Yacobi 
2002).62 This is manifested in the “spatial patterns of segregation between the Jewish 
dominant majority and the Arab subordinate minority” (ibid), which according to 
Yacobi demonstrates “the inherent nexus between the disciplines of planning and 
urban design and the realization of the modern Zionist utopia.”  
Wherever they live, whether in the villages and towns of the Galilee, the Naqab 
(Negev), the Triangle, or the mixed cities of Haifa, Akka, Jaffa, Ramlih or Il-Lydd, 
Palestinians have been stripped of their right to a functioning city and citizenship.63 
The process of urbanisation without urbanism has transferred their villages and towns 
into what the research calls suspended dormitory spaces.  
 
                                                
61  The term mixed cities, as Yacobi (2009:1) argues, misleadingly “raises images of mutual 
membership while ignoring questions of power, control and resistance.” 
62 On the meaning of ethnocracy see the section: Why bother: same old story, new methods, new 
angles. 
63 The thesis uses mostly Naqab, as opposed to Negev.  
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Governmentality and control - When war is not an option: Research 
arguments and analytical concepts 
Aren’t processes of domination more complex, more complicated, 
than war? 
  Foucault (December 1977) 64 
When you have thus formed the chain of ideas on the heads of your 
citizens, you will then be able to pride yourselves on guiding them 
and being their masters. A stupid despot may constrain his slaves 
with iron chains; but a true politician binds them even more strongly 
by the chain of their own ideas... and on the soft fibres of the brain 
is founded the unshakable base of the soundest of Empires. 
Joseph Servan (quoted in Foucault 1979: 102-3)  
In his book Citizen and Subject (1996:3), Mahmood Mamdani argues that in the 
context of a colonial state, the native question - the problem of securing and 
stabilising the colonials’ rule - becomes a riddle preoccupying “the best of its minds.” 
Foucault, as quoted above, reminds us that processes of domination are more complex 
than war. In the case of Israel, as a settler colonial state governed by ethnic 
absolutism, with a sizeable Palestinian population which shares its territoriality and 
resides the dialectics of citizens and enemies, the question of how best to govern and 
                                                
64 Quoted in (Fontana and Bertani 2003: 282). See Fontana, A. and Bertani, M. (2003) ‘Situating the 
Lectures’, in Foucault, M.  Society must be Defended. New York: Picador. 
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control this population becomes more challenging when options such as military 
violence and large-scale forced transfer are more difficult to pursue.65 
While the research acknowledges that the control of Palestinians rests upon a synergy 
between spatial, social, economic, political and military technologies, it argues that 
forms of domination and subjugation, their simultaneous inclusion and exclusion 
continues to operate in and through space. At the centre of these structures of control 
stands the urban question, the materiality of the city, and its quotidian conditions and 
their role in shaping social, political and cultural orders.   
This thesis’ premise is that the city, the citizen and public space, if not controlled and 
managed, form a potential threat to the state, regardless of the character of the latter, 
whether capitalist, democratic or (post)colonial. This anxiety becomes particularly 
acute in a colonial setting. The thesis therefore argues that the deliberate destruction 
of Palestinian cities did not end in 1948, but continues in the form of urbicide and 
slow violence. Urbicide is understood as the deliberate absenting and killing of the 
city, not by obliterating and physically destroying it in its entirety by means of war, 
but rather by coercively detaining and controlling its economic, socio-spatial growth 
                                                
65 In recent years the idea of transfer has been advocated by a number of Israeli politicians. Although 
they are small in number, the very fact that it has been discussed in public gives the idea some sort of 
legitimacy among some segments of the Jewish public. In an article in Haaretz from the 19 April 2002, 
Avigdor Lieberman, then the Minister of Infrastructure said: “There is nothing undemocratic about 
transfer; even in Europe millions were transferred from one place to another and it helped to bring 
peace...The separation, like surgery, helps healing… When I see Arabs going to blow themselves in 
Haifa or Nahariyya, or Arabs who donate to terrorists’ families- if it depended on me, they wouldn’t 
have stayed here one minute, they and their families” (quoted in Yiftachel 2006: 184). On the idea of 
transfer resurfacing, as Yiftachel calls it, see (ibid). More specifically relating to the case of Umm al-
Fahem see the discussion of Lieberman’s proposal for a demographic and land swap in chapter 5. Note 
that Lieberman remains an influential politician in Israel, and currently serves as the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs.   
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and urbanity by means of what could be qualified as slow violence. 66 Slow violence, 
in this context, is performed through racialised land and planning policies, 
marginalisation, under-budgeting and persistent neglect of the city’s materiality and 
infrastructure. Urbicide is thus tantamount to the deprivation of the right to the city.  
Linked to urbicide is the privatisation of experiences. The state, through its land and 
spatial planning policies, as well as its withdrawal from providing basic services such 
as housing, job opportunities and public transportation, encourages individualism and 
the atomisation of social structures.67 When socio-spatial conditions are privatised and 
confined to private spaces and spheres: the family, the private home, the private 
space, and private car, these ultimately contribute to the privatisation and atomisation 
of the social. Under such conditions, people become consumed with their personal 
                                                
66 Stephen Graham, Professor of Cities and Society at the Global Urban Research Unit at the School of 
Architecture, Planning and Landscape at Newcastle University, employs the concept of urbicide to 
describe Israel’s policies of deliberate destruction in the battle of Jenin in 2002 (See Graham, S. 
(2002)‘Clean Territory: Urbicide in the West Bank’, available at: www.openDemocracy.net , and 
Graham, S. (2003) ‘Lessons in Urbicide’, New Left Review, 19: January-February, pp. 63-77). The term 
urbicide appeared in Berman Marshal (1996) ‘Falling Towers: City Life after Urbicide’, in Crow, D. 
(ed.), Geography and Identity. Washington, DC: Maisonneuve Press, pp. 172-92. Urbicide was also 
used by the architect Bogdan Bogdanovitch in his description of the deliberate cultural annihilation of 
Sarajevo and other Balkan cities (www.openDemocracy.net). 
67 For more details on spatial planning and its effects on privatisation and atomisation, please see 
chapter 6 on spatial planning.  
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daily matters and private lives, thus diminishing their citizenship and participation in 
collective civil political and life.68  
Absence of urbanity is another facet of urbicide. Absence of urbanity, in this context, 
means the homogenisation of the social fabric that contributes to the encouragement 
of rural, traditional and parochial ways of thinking and the proliferation of the gazing 
and controlling eye of society. 69  Under these conditions, people are expected to 
conform to existing social norms, and are less open to difference. Therefore, social 
control becomes local because of a less heterogeneous and relatively closed 
population, confined to a restricted space.70 This system of control is one from within, 
and is potentially more effective and less costly for the state. It relies on society to 
control and govern itself through its traditions and norms. It encourages people to 
                                                
68  Hannah Arendt (1998 [1958]) in The Human Condition has aptly described the essence of 
privatisation. For her, to be private is to be “deprived of seeing and hearing others, of being seen and 
being heard by them.’’ It is “to be deprived of things essential to a truly human life: to be deprived of 
the reality that comes from being seen and heard by others, to be deprived of an ‘objective’ relationship 
with them that comes from being related to and separated from them through the intermediary of a 
common world of things, to be deprived of the possibility of achieving something more permanent than 
life itself. The privation of privacy lies in the absence of others ... [Those who are private are] 
imprisoned in the subjectivity of their own singular experience...”(1998 [1958]: 58). On a more 
concrete and critical level, especially in a racially segregated society, Paul Gilroy (2010: 22), in his 
book Darker than Blue critiquing the African American car culture, notes how its privatising character 
not only diminishes citizenship but also “confiscates the possibility of collective experience, 
synchronised suffering, and acting in concert.” He argues, “In these circumstances, the automobile 
becomes the instrument of segregation and privatisation, not an aid to their overcoming” (ibid).  
69 Rural, in this context, is free of value judgment. It is not in reference to inferiority, but rather to 
cosmopolitanism and openness to the other. 
70 Social control under these conditions is by no means unique to Umm al-Fahem. Giddens (1981) 
argued that this form of control is characteristic of closed, insular and static communities. In his 
analysis of medieval communities which were relatively closed and static, Giddens argued that because 
“everyone...knew everyone else...there was no need for a particularly developed system of control and 
surveillance” (Giddens 1981, quoted in Nigel Thrift 1995: 66). 
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invest their energies and thoughts in social, local and private affairs, thus again 
contributing to the diminishing of their citizenship.71  
As shown in the case of Umm al-Fahem, the thesis argues that in cities where politics 
are vibrant and people are aware of and resisting their oppressed conditions by 
vocally demanding their collective rights, and where absenting the city and the 
creation of a suspended space are not enough to control people, the state resorts to 
additional means and technologies of control. One form of control is through the 
encouragement of religious politics which by definition reduce subjects to their faith. 
Encouraging the hegemony of religious identities which prioritise the social and the 
moral, or the biopolitical, over the collective experience of national oppression, 
becomes a valuable technology of control, as these identities inherently work towards 
the fragmentation of society along religious lines.  
Biopolitics, in this context, is employed to describe the Islamic Movement’s projects 
and objectives which it prioritised in its early years in office, and which were 
succinctly captured in its slogan “Islam is the solution.” The concept proves insightful 
to the analysis of the Movement’s mode of governmentality.  This is despite the fact 
that biopolitics, in its original Foucauldian sense, was not developed in relation to 
(post)colonial, religious contexts, or the analysis at the level of the individual, but 
rather worked to analyse processes of life at the level of population, its demographics, 
birth rate, longevity, public health, housing and migration, as Foucault discussed in 
                                                
71 See chapter 6 on planning and the contribution of the land and planning system to the controlling 
gazing eye of society. Chapter 7 on control from within also touches on this point and how religious 
gendered sartorial practices contribute to the spatialisation of female bodies and to bringing those 
bodies which are unveiled to the scrutinising eyes of society.   
 
50	
the History of Sexuality (1991:140). The concept is stretched here to accommodate its 
function as an interventionist technology and practice which seeks to govern at the 
level of both the singular body and the collective, in the name of a higher morality 
and the correction of society.      
The Foucauldian concept of biopolitics is conjoined with the Gramscian concept of 
hegemony. This thesis understands hegemony as ruling by (active) consent. As 
demonstrated in the case of Umm al-Fahem, over the last 25 years, the Islamic 
Movement has been repeatedly elected to lead the local government. The Movement, 
since it first took office in 1989, has been winning the trust and support of the 
majority of Fahmawis. 
Against this background, the thesis adopts four concepts that make up the analytical 
framework which help to conceptualise the Palestinian city. These are ‘suspension,’ 
‘urbicide by other means,’ ‘religious identities,’ and ‘biopolitical hegemony.’ 
Drawing on Foucault’s dynamic concept of governmentality (1991, 2003, 2007), the 
thesis argues that these interconnected technologies of control are part of a 
governmentality project whose underlying objective is the management of 
Palestinians in ways that produce suspended, domesticated and fragmented cities and 
citizens. These technologies are employed to shape the general conditions of everyday 
life, control the conduct of cities and their citizens and perpetuate a state of 
dependency.  
Foucault’s concept of governmentality is the most suitable analytical concept that 
allows complex and multiple technologies of control and power to explain the 
management of populations and the conditions of their everyday existence. 
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Governmentality, for Foucault (1991: 102, 2009: 108), means among other things, 
“the ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, 
calculations, and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific, albeit very 
complex, power that has the population as its target.” Broadly speaking, it is about the 
technologies and procedures designated for directing human conduct (2009: 388).  
Lastly, to help contextualise and conceptualise the Palestine city, this thesis draws on 
Carl Schmitt’s theory of the nomos. Although Schmitt will always be remembered for 
his role as a jurist who actively supported and legitimised the inhumane Nazi regime, 
which was responsible for the Holocaust, brutal occupations and other war crimes, his 
theory of the nomos gives special attention to deconstructing the relationship between 
spatial ordering, power, and law, and therefore proves insightful to the understanding 
of the historical, structural factors which shape and account for the (un)making of the 
Palestinian city. 72     
Why bother? Same old story, new methods, new angles 
Israeli mainstream social sciences scholarship on Palestinians, especially those in 
Israel, adopts a de-historicised, culturist, and ethnicised approach which naturalises 
and essentialises notions of difference and presents them as innate and natural, rather 
than being historically, socially and politically constructed. The socio-politico 
developments of what are often referred to as “Israeli Arabs” or “Arab Israelis” are 
explained through the “Arab mentality,” and the hamula (extended family), as the 
                                                
72 See chapter 4, Israel’s colonial nomos, for more details on the concept of the nomos.   
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basic unit of social organisation, which follows the dictates of a conservatively run 
society ruled by traditions and customs.73 Such scholarship frequently divides the 
population along ethnic and religious lines and promotes the state as an agent of 
modernity which modernised Palestinian villages. 74   
Edward Said (1994), Elia Zureik (1979), and Talal Asad (1975) have been critical of 
such a paradigm which, “has been dedicated to accentuating the cultural and 
psychological peculiarities of Arabs and Jews” (Zureik 1979:2), with little or no 
attention to foreign domination, social, political and structural changes. Asad (1975), 
critiquing anthropological texts on Palestinian Arabs, especially Cohen Abner’s 
(1959) description of Arab border villages in Israel, notes that such texts, though 
presented as objective, are in fact ideologically motivated. They employ abstract 
theoretical categories such as ethnicity to “disguise the contradictions generated by 
exploitation and repression” (1975: 275). The “hamula,” he argues, “was the 
ideological resolution of a Zionist problem - for it constituted a mode of control and 
                                                
73The production of knowledge that constructs and shapes the Jewish Israeli public discourse on the 
“Arabs” is not limited to academia. State media, for example, employs what they call ‘Arabist’ 
commentators, who are specialists in the Arab culture and mentality, and whose main role is to 
reproduce the orientalist image of the Arab. On a different but related level, one personal anecdote 
illustrates the argument and the power of discourse. In 2003, on one of my travels to Europe, as part of 
the normal procedure at Ben-Gurion International airport, I was asked a few questions before the 
check-in. When the security guard, who was a man, found out that I was a Palestinian, he gave me a 
rather bewildered and surprised look, and asked: “how come an Arab young woman is traveling by 
herself?!” implying that Arab women have no agency and are subordinate to men in their patriarchal 
society. 
74 Oren Yiftachel (2002) in his article ‘The Shrinking Space of Citizenship: Ethnocratic politics in 
Israel’, Middle East Research and Information Project, No 223, talks about the stratified system of 
citizenship which exists in Israel. According to him, this system is attributed to “the combination of 
Judaization policies and religious-legal control” (ibid: 3). In such a system each category, mainly 
among the religious groups is subdivided. “The groups include: a) ‘mainstream’ Jewish citizens, b) 
ultra-Orthodox Jews, c) ‘pseudo-Jews’ (mainly Russian immigrants recognized as Jews under the 
Israeli law of return, but not recognized as such by the religious establishment), d) Druze, f) 
Palestinians holding Israeli citizenship, g) Bedouins, h) East Jerusalem and Golan Arabs, i) Palestinians 
in the rest of the West Bank and Gaza and j) immigrant labor” (ibid). 
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an imputed identity for the only political existence allowed to Arab villagers in Israel” 
(ibid: 274).  
Since the 1990s, critical approaches in the social sciences have emerged in Israel, 
especially in the fields of political geography and urban planning.75 These tend to 
analyse Israel’s land and planning policies and the contentious Judaization of the 
Galilee and the Naqab through new theoretical tools: ethnocracy and ethno-
nationalism.76 In ethnocratic regimes, it is ethnicity, not territorial citizenship, which 
determines access to power and the allocation of resources (Yiftachel 1998, 2006). 
However, such scholarly paradigms have in some cases overlooked colonialism and 
racism as a framing background. It was only in 2008, in an article, ‘Epilogue: 
Studying al-Naqab/Negev Bedouins - Toward a colonial paradigm?’ that Yiftachel 
advocated colonialism as the lens through which Israel’s spatial policies should be 
analysed.77 For him, the colonial paradigm “exposes the previous scholarly ‘politics 
of depoliticization’ as it shows how the overlooking of the colonial setting conceals 
state and ethnic oppressions - hence, my call for a scholarship that would not only be 
accurate, but also amend the distortions of the power-knowledge nexus of previous 
studies” (2008: 177). 
                                                
75 Amongst these academics are Oren Yiftachel and Haim Yacobi. Architect and Professor of Visual 
Cultures Eyal Weizman and historian Ilan Pappé have both contributed immensely to the critique of the 
Zionist project and the popularisation of the Palestinian question in academic circles. Each in his own 
way has contributed to shedding new light onto the scholarship of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. See 
Hollow Land (2007), Weizman’s seminal work on Israel’s architecture of occupation and its spatial 
policies in the 1967 Occupied Palestinian Territories, and Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine (2006) by 
Pappé. Both scholars reside outside of Israel, in the UK.  
76 The concept of ethnocracy was initially developed in the mid 1990s by the Israeli critical geographer 
Oren Yiftachel.  
77 As Yiftachel argues very little research has analysed Israel within a colonial framework (ibid 2008: 
173). 
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This thesis challenges and seeks to unsettle the culturist, orientalist, dehistoricised and 
ethnicised approaches to the study of Palestinians, especially Palestinians inside 
Israel. It argues that those approaches are characteristic of a colonial order which 
seeks to essentialise difference and to gloss over structures of oppression and 
institutionalised racism. Culture in this sense is the veil behind which mainstream 
academia seeks to hide the state’s racialised policies.78 It is employed to dismiss 
Palestinians’ political agency by presenting them as passive and powerless receivers, 
and blaming their underdevelopment solely on what is characterised as their 
conservative, chaotic, unorganised and undemocratic culture.  
This thesis’ reference to racism draws on Paul Gilroy’s theory of race and racism 
where he asserts that there is no race but racism.79 Racism refers to a system of 
exclusion and inferiorisation which is predicated on power relations. This system 
creates racial hierarchies. It produces a racialised and hierarchised space, and 
demarcates the boundaries between those who belong and those who do not. 
                                                
78  During the years of my activism in Israel, one of the common arguments presented by mainstream 
Israeli Jews, young and old alike, against arguments for a one state solution, is that Arabs are not 
democratic. As well as being framed through an orientalist, supremacist and racist lens, their argument 
implies that democratic values are of genetic disposition, not socially and politically contingent, as if 
the Palestinians belong to a group that is not capable of being democratic.  
79 The research does not imply, or recognise the Palestinians and the Jews as belonging to different 
races. The project is not concerned with the question of whether the Jewish people is a race, either. On 
the argument of “there is no race but racism,” it would be valuable to recall what Frantz Fanon 
observed decades ago. “At first thought it may seem strange that the anti-Semite’s outlook should be 
related to that of the Negrophobe. It was my philosophy professor, a native of Antilles, who recalled 
the fact to me one day: “Whenever you hear anyone abuse the Jews, pay attention, because he is talking 
about you.” And I found that he was universally right- by which I meant that I was answerable in my 
body and my heart for what was done to my brother. Later, I realized that he meant, quite simply, an 
anti-Semite is inevitably anti-Negro” FRANTZ FANON (quoted in Gilroy 2004: 1) 
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This thesis rejects such supremacist discourses and approaches to the study of 
Palestinians, and argues that Israel’s policies of depriving the Palestinians of the right 
to the city and urbanity are a direct result of its colonial nomos, through which the 
state seeks to dominate and control its Palestinian population by creating suspended, 
fragmented and domesticated bodies and spaces.  
By giving agency to the people of Umm al-Fahem to narrate the story of their city, 
deconstruct its nominal status and functionality, as well as critically untangle the 
relationships between the historical, the urban, the social, the economic, this thesis 
wishes to bring to light new angles and new voices which have been under-researched 
and underrepresented. 80 In fact, the Palestinian city as both an abstract concept and a 
lived space has hardly been researched. In addition, by situating the research within a 
multidisciplinary, inter and intra-disciplinary scholarly framework, where the 
historical, the sociological, the (post)colonial, the cultural, the political, and the urban 
merge together, along with employing mixed methodologies of ethnography and 
photography, the thesis seeks to bring together new perspectives which have not been 
presented before.  
Chapter outline 
The title of this thesis engages directly with my argument that the absence of a 
functioning Palestinian city in Israel is a direct outcome of deliberate policies which 
work towards depriving the Palestinians of the right to the city, and the production of 
                                                
80 For a comprehensive overview of the research which has been done on the Palestinians in Israel, see 
Sabbagh-Khoury, A. (2005) Bibliography on the Palestinians in Israel and Related Issues. Haifa: 
Mada al-Carmel: Arab Center for Applied Social Research. 
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a suspended space that has an effect on their socio-economic, cultural and political 
development. The thesis is organised as a plait made of independent but 
interconnected threads which weave together to produce one unit. Reflecting its multi, 
inter, and intra-disciplinary character, it is organised thematically along two parts and 
around seven chapters (excluding the conclusion) which converge to deconstruct 
historical, political and social factors that shape the (un)making of the Palestinian city 
under post(colonial) conditions. 
Part one, including the introduction, is divided into four chapters that introduce the 
subject and its context, and discuss the theoretical foundation and methodological 
aspects of the thesis. The two theory chapters are dedicated to the question of the city, 
urbanity and public space on one hand, and Israel’s nomos, on the other. Part two of 
the thesis engages directly with Umm al-Fahem and is divided into three substantive, 
empirical data chapters, numbered five, six, and seven.  
Chapter one, the introduction, starts by presenting a condensed history of Umm al-
Fahem to pave the way for introducing the subject of the Palestinian city and the 
different historical, social, political, and structural factors which need to be untangled 
throughout the thesis. It presents the genesis of the project, its research questions and 
conceptualises the Palestinian city in Israel. The introduction situates Umm al-Fahem 
and the question of the Palestinian city and urbanisation as part of the Palestinian 
collective that cannot be understood in isolation from its pre-1948 history. Therefore, 
it provides a brief history of the Palestinian city and urbanisation before and after 
1948. It then presents the research arguments and its key analytical and theoretical 
tools and framework, followed by the scholarly contribution it wishes to make.   
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Chapter two outlines the different methodological aspects of the research and the 
process of deconstructing for constructing aimed at forming an understanding of the 
contemporary Palestinian city. The methodological aspects include the rationale 
behind choosing the case study, the research questions, the various methods 
employed; the ethnographic experience and the challenges involved in conducting a 
research in politicised, contested, (post)colonial contexts. The chapter captures the 
organic process of how the research, its questions and methods, developed and 
evolved to reflect the material which emerged from the initial ethnographic 
experience.  
Chapter three outlines one of the thesis’ theoretical foundations, that is the question of 
the city, public space and urbanity. It is a literature review which deconstructs the 
three concepts and their indispensable role in enhancing citizenship, politics, public 
life, culture, creativity and personal freedoms. It discusses their potentialities and 
challenges, and puts forward the argument that cities and public spaces are produced 
and constructed in ways that reflect, and reproduce social, economic and political 
relations. It discusses public space under neoliberal and colonial conditions as an 
exclusionary-exclusive site and concludes that regardless of the state’s character and 
nature, whether capitalist or colonial, urban space, public space, and the undesirables 
are perceived as threats that need to be fragmented and controlled. The undesirables 
are often classed and racialised. In a colonial context they are the colonised. The 
chapter’s overall objective is to anchor the Palestinian city in the wider context of 
what makes a city and to address meta-questions of why the city and why public 
space. 
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Chapter four is concerned with the thesis’ second theoretical foundation. It takes up 
the subject of the state’s foundational character and its juridico-political order that 
impinges on and shapes both the very essence of the Palestinian city and citizenship, 
and their (un)making. It introduces Carl Schmitt’s concept of the nomos and Paul 
Gilroy’s ethnic absolutism, and argues that its “Jews only” inscriptions are 
Manichaean and exclusionary-exclusive in character. By defining itself as a Jewish 
state and a state of the Jews, Israel not only engages in an unfinished transformative 
project of spatial and demographic colonisation, but also sets itself as a state that can 
never be a state of all its citizens. This nomos treats Palestinians as a problem that 
needs to be governed and controlled, and perpetuates their citizen-enemy suspended 
dialectic.    
Chapter five concentrates on Umm al-Fahem’s historical sociology from 1949, when 
it was handed over to Israel, to the mid-1980s, when it was declared a city. Three 
main and interconnected themes run through this chapter. These are governmentality, 
Fahmawis’ response to it, and the materiality of the village/city. The chapter 
deconstructs the workings of (post)colonial governmentality in the way the state 
sought to govern Umm al-Fahem on one hand, and Fahmawis’ resilience, defiance, 
agency and determination to achieve substantive citizenship, and to build a 
village/city buzzing with culture, creativity and solidarity, on the other hand.  
The chapter puts forward the argument that the underlying objectives of the different 
technologies which constitute governmentality, whether direct military rule, co-
option, material incentives, divide and rule, criminalisation of resisting political 
activists, (in)direct intervention in local politics, the state’s withdrawal from 
providing services and negligence of urban infrastructure, or perpetuating a state of 
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suspension, is to control Umm al-Fahem and render Fahmawis docile and 
domesticated who are stuck in a state of suspension. Its overall objective is to unravel 
the nature of the city and citizenship under (post)colonial conditions and discuss some 
of the historical factors which shape its making. Situating the chapter as part of a 
holistic, one-unit thesis, helps demonstrate that the technologies of control which the 
state employed throughout Umm al-Fahem’s history, from 1949 onwards (to-date), 
have not been monotonous.   
Chapter six engages in a critical deconstructs the subject of spatial planning and the 
land system at work and their socio-spatial and economic implications as 
demonstrated in the case of Umm al-Fahem. It argues that the state, through its 
centralised, comprehensive and hierarchised planning system, employs spatial 
planning as a powerful technology of control and governmentality which contributes 
to a state of urbicide by deliberately detaining and withholding the economic and 
spatial development of the city. It argues that this ultimately contributes to the 
production of suspended, docile, socially-controlled, privatised, atomised and 
dependent Palestinian bodies and spaces.  
The chapter’s objective is to demonstrate how this system and its policies shape the 
very materiality and character of Umm al-Fahem, its present and future trajectory, the 
conditions of its everyday life, its socio-spatial make-up, and the prospects for socio-
economic and spatial development. Moreover, the chapter seek to illustrate how this 
system is politicised and racialised, and is employed to serve political ends, not the 
wellbeing of Fahmawis and Palestinians in general. This chapter, in other words, is 
also about unpacking how Palestinians are deprived of the right to the city and how 
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they are subjected to attempts to reduce their lives to the fulfilment of the rudimentary 
functions of eating, drinking, reproducing and consuming.   
Chapter seven takes up the subject of control from within through the incorporation of 
Fahmawis into their own subjugation and the attempts to reduce them to their faith. In 
other words, the chapter deconstructs the workings of governmentality as manifested 
in Umm al-Fahem’s contemporary socio-spatial and political order, particularly 
throughout the immediate years around 1989. 1989 was the year that witnessed the 
enduring decline of the communist-led local government and the rise of the Islamic 
Movement to power. Governmentality is deployed in relation to two different but 
interconnected contexts. The first context is in relation to how Israel, through 
employing a mixture of technologies and through using the democratic structure of 
local elections sought to change the power configurations in the city. It discusses how 
the state sought to neutralise and incapacitate the then challenging communist-led 
local government, and instead encourage tamed religious identities.  
The second context relates to how the victorious Islamic Movement sought to render 
Umm al-Fahem governable. The chapter puts forward the argument that the 
Movement’s mode of government is biopolitical hegemony. It discusses the 
Movement’s biopolitical projects and deconstructs the mechanisms which helped it 
establish its dominance. The chapter demonstrates how the materiality of the city, 
urban performance and promoting religion as the panacea for all the mundane, social, 
spiritual, and moral ailments in society, along with the new levels of state sponsorship 
stand at the centre of the fundamental change in the city’s local political map.  
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Lastly, the conclusion chapter briefly summarises the subject of the thesis, its 
premises and research questions and conclusions. It briefly describes how the research 
developed organically and in correspondence to material which emerged from the 
initial ethnographic experience and its methodological challenges. It illustrates how 
the thesis had to be situated within multiple, inter and intra-disciplines which 
combined the historical, the sociological, the (post)colonial, the urban, the cultural 
and the political together. The chapter, in the process of conceptualising the 
Palestinian city, engages with empirical findings and conclusions, and ends with 
recommendations for further research.   
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Chapter 2 
Methodology 
 
Figure 2: First day of fieldwork: Umm al-Fahem 9 June 2009: 8:03 am 
 
Figure 3:Kids negotiating their way between cars Figure 4:The neighbour who runs a nursery  
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Getting started: a woman with a camera 
“Take a photograph of the kids between the cars,” shouted a man from behind who 
seemed to have rushed towards me when he noticed I was taking photos of a jammed 
street (figure 2). He sounded keen to have me document the conditions of the street 
and was disturbed by the fact that the drivers did not care about the street sign, which 
clearly stated it was a one-way street, nor about the safety of pedestrians, especially 
the kids. This was in an early morning in June 2009, when I accompanied my brother 
who was giving his wife a lift to her work in Umm al-Fahem, and was meanwhile 
stuck in bad traffic. It was both my first time in the narrow alleyways of the city and 
my first day in the field. All I had pre-scheduled and planned for the day was an 
interview with the city’s strategic planner who worked for the local government, and 
a visit to the city’s nationally renowned art gallery, Galleria, where I had arranged to 
meet with its director. 
The journey to school where my sister-in-law worked, which is in the old crowded, 
steep and labyrinth-like part of the city, was stimulating and captivating for me as a 
researcher with a camera, interested in urban environments and people’s socio-spatial 
experiences. Upon my arrival in the city I was immediately entranced by it. I felt 
intrigued and looked forward to spending time in it, getting to know it and know its 
people and learn about its past and present. What was immediately visible and 
intriguing about the city was its sense of contradictions and postcoloniality: the 
juxtapositions of the global and the local, order and disorder, the rich and the poor, 
the old and the modern, the religious and the mundane. The city seemed to be a 
consumerist bonanza, with a lot of things going on and a lot to offer a researcher.  
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The city’s entrance was straddled by a big store of the Israeli chain Super-pharm81 on 
one side of the main national artery road of Wadi Ara, and a police station on the 
other side. A few metres into the city, a market area branched off the main road and 
overlooked Wadi Ara. The market bustled with life. Continuing on the main road, I 
felt bombarded by big commercial billboards, advertising both local and global 
brands. To my surprise, I noticed the iconic pre-state Kapulsky café, in one of the 
complexes of stores located on one side of the main road.82  Before not too long, I 
could also see the unmistakable, conspicuous and imposing icon of the MacDonald’s 
sign. I soon realised that the sign was adorning a post-modern styled mall of glass and 
steel. The mall, of course, hosted other international brands, such as Pizza Hut and 
Keds: Kids and Baby, along with Naa’Naa’, another Israeli café chain. All along, 
publicity billboards, both in Hebrew and Arabic, dotted the road. The signs however 
were not exclusive to commerce only. Political and religious signs, though smaller in 
size and less conspicuous, also featured amongst the signs on the main road.  
Continuing with my journey I could feel more and more the city’s vibe. I could see 
the hustle and bustle of people negotiating the space and pushing their way through 
the cars. I could feel how inescapable the cityscape was and how mixed it was. I 
noticed the wide and narrow streets, old and modern, spacious and crammed 
buildings, affluent and poor houses, the big mosques and the Islamic designed 
                                                
81 Super-pharm is a pharmacy and beauty products chain in Israel. It is the Israeli equivalent of Boots 
or Superdrug in the UK. 
82 Kapulsky is a Jewish pre-state cafe, established in 1934 and has branches in many Israeli Jewish 
towns and cities. It is considered among Israelis as “legendary” and symbolic of the middle class type 
of cafe. For a brief history of the café, see: Zomer N. 2011 ‘Kapulsky Café Making a Comeback’,  
Ynetnews, 14 February 2011 : http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L4025535,00.html.  
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roundabouts, and the normative religious signs reminding people to pray and recite 
small prayers and asking women to wear hijabs. This small journey, though so short 
in time yet so intense, left an immense impression on me. Invigorated with adrenaline, 
I could not wait to get out of the car and start chatting to people and take photographs. 
Getting stuck in traffic seemed to be the perfect moment to get started.  
Taking photos provoked interest amongst those surrounding me. Sparing no time, and 
taking advantage of the moment, I introduced myself and gave a generic idea about 
the research to my first random contact, the man who earlier rushed towards me to ask 
if I could take photos of the kids between cars. The concerned man, a doctor at a local 
surgery, immediately and without hesitation agreed to be interviewed. Meanwhile, a 
veiled woman in her forties standing outside her small shop next door to the school 
selling stationery was staring at me and seemed to be wondering about my presence 
and why I was taking photos of an ordinary street at that time of the day. She had 
witnessed the brief encounter between me and the doctor from across the narrow 
street.  
Conscious of her gaze and motivated by the need to get started, I greeted her and 
immediately approached her, introducing myself with a warm handshake. 
Intentionally speaking with the local accent, I told her I was from the neighbouring 
village/town,83 and immediately flashed out my university business card to clear off 
any doubts she might have about my researcher identity. Without hesitation and 
                                                
83 The dash between village and town emphasises the state of ambiguity that characterises the status 
and perception of Palestinian localities. Kufur Qari is not a village in the traditional sense. It is not 
officially recognised or classified as a town, either. In 2012, the village/town was home to about 16,500 
residents (Statistical Abstract of Israel 2013). 
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without taking much notice of the card she agreed to be interviewed. While talking to 
her, a next-door neighbour, who ran a nursery down the street (figure 4), showed 
interest in the scene and joined us in conversation. She also answered my request to 
be interviewed positively. All the three people I had met thus far gave me their mobile 
numbers so that I could contact them to arrange a time to meet. Within less than 10 
minutes, while my brother was still stuck in traffic, the project was already on its way.  
Photography, in this context and without any previous plans to use it as a research 
facilitator, did prove to be, as Pink (2007: 73) notes, a successful entry point to the 
research.84 It created a situation that mediated the first contact with potential research 
collaborators.85 It served as a “can opener,” in terms of establishing rapport with 
them, as Collier and Collier (1986: quoted ibid) would say. Noteworthy, however, is 
the very first impression of the welcoming, warm, positive and smooth reception 
radiated from those random locals which certainly gave me the push and confidence 
and wrote off fears about where and how to start. 
In what follows, I first give an outline of research design and its process: what the 
research is about; why I chose Umm al-Fahem as my case study; the research 
questions; how I came to choose my preliminary methods for what I call the 
                                                
84Sarah Pink notes that some ethnographers/photographers find it challenging to start their project with 
photography. Only after a while of building trust and finding other ways to connect to the researched 
group does photography become possible. See Pink (2007:143) who tells the story of Shanklin who 
described her role as ethnographer/photographer during her research of rural Ireland, how she found 
out that her initial plan to photograph people at work was inappropriate. Only once she had established 
herself as someone who took photographs within the local community, did she find she could proceed 
by photographing agricultural workers at work as she had originally intended.  
85  I refer to informants as fieldwork interviewees or collaborators. I employ the two terms 
interchangeably. For those who themselves were research collaborators but have directed me and put 
me in touch with other interviewees, I refer to them as gatekeepers.  
 
67	
deconstructing for constructing process; and how the research, its questions and its 
versatile methods, including ethnographic work, historical and discourse analysis, as 
well as archival research, developed organically and in correspondence to the research 
needs and the material that was emerging from the field. In retrospect, I refer to this 
process as the different stages of research. I then give a brief theoretical background 
on the ethnographic and visual methods used for the research. Lastly, before finishing 
with the section on breaking the boundaries and building trust with the research 
collaborators, I engage in a reflective process on some of the material that emerged 
from the field and the methodological, contextual and positional challenges of 
conducting research in a politicised context(s).   
 
Deconstructing for constructing: Research design, interviewees and 
gatekeepers  
Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; 
they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under 
circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past.  
   Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (1852).  
Concerned with trying to form an understanding of the Palestinian city in Israel, its 
materiality, the semiotics of its public space and its socio-spatiality, the way it is 
perceived by its residents, and the social and political actors involved in its production 
and (un)making, a process of deconstructing for constructing was essential. Umm al-
Fahem, the first Palestinian village in Israel to be declared a city, was my chosen site 
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of research.86 Possessing little knowledge about Umm al-Fahem, and reviving a long-
standing interest in getting to know it and learn about it were enough to make it my 
definite choice of research site.87  
Its geographical proximity to my village, about 8 km (4.9 miles) away, made it even 
more attractive for both convenience and research purposes. Practically, it meant that 
one of my siblings or friends could give me a lift, if s/he were available, or I could 
catch any passing shuttle or bus from the main road of Wadi Ara.88 The fact that, 
despite such proximity, I had hardly ever set foot in the city was in itself interesting 
and revealing. Geographical proximity did not mean connection and dependency 
between the two localities, despite the fact that Umm al-Fahem’s population was three 
times bigger. The two, to my experience and in many different respects, were insular, 
disconnected units. 89  Not because the two places were self-contained and 
independent. If I want to be crude and reductionist, I would say that one visits a city if 
it caters for his and her needs; whether work, study, cultural, leisure or seeking 
                                                
86 Umm al-Fahem was the second largest Palestinian city up until the late 1990s, early 2000s. It was 
then taken over by the city of Rahat in the Naqab that the state built in 1972 as part of a sedentary 
process to settle the nomadic Bedouin Arabs of the Naqab. In 1983, for example, two years before 
Umm al-Fahem was declared a city, Umm al-Fahem’s population was 21,000. Rahat had only 9200 
(Statistical Abstract of Israel 2013).  
87 The interest in the city was particularly nurtured throughout my studenthood in Jerusalem in the mid 
1990s. Students from Umm al-Fahem were in the leadership of Palestinian students movements. At the 
time, many were involved in nationalist and leftist politics.  For more details on this point see section 
below on gaining access.  
88 Both Umm al-Fahem and my hometown are located on the main road of Wadi Ara. Wadi Ara is an 
artery road connecting the north of the country to the centre and south. For example, many shuttles and 
buses to Tel Aviv, Jerusalem and Be’er Shevaa’ in the centre and south pass along it on their way north 
and vice versa. It should be noted that at the time of the research there was no direct public transport 
available connecting the centre of my hometown to that of Umm al-Fahem’s.    
89 This is not to argue that social and amicable relationships did not exist between members of the two 
places. On the levels of politics, at the time of the voluntary work brigades of early 1980s, communist 
activists from my hometown did take part in them, as field interviewees told me. I also know that 
supporter of the Islamic Movement and families who want their kids to learn the Quran by heart send 
their kids to Umm al-Fahem to receive these services. Moreover, in the last decade, Umm al-Fahem’s 
thriving food and vegetable market attracts people from my hometown as well.  
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administrative and bureaucratic services. Throughout my adulthood in the 1990s 
before moving to study and live in Jerusalem, Umm al-Fahem fulfilled none of these 
needs, and offered none of these services. It was the neighbouring Jewish town of 
Hadera that provided some of them.  
Sticking to my belief in original research that follows its own instincts in the way it 
should be conducted, rather than lending itself to some generic methodological 
blueprints, in the summer of 2009 I jumped into the cold deep water of the world of 
fieldwork. All I was interested in was to get started, be in the field, and be open, 
flexible and attentive. Admittedly, this resonates strongly with my personality which 
prefers to learn by doing. Having said that, I did have a preliminary, if primitive, idea 
of how I should go about structuring and conducting the research, at least in its first 
stage.  
Grounded in my belief that subjectivities and objective conditions, or what I call here 
the materiality of the city, are not separable from questions of structure, I thought two 
sets of research groups should be interviewed. These were the city’s residents and the 
local government, represented by the strategic planning department. I also thought 
that interviews alone were not enough to capture the lived experience of the city. 
Strolling through the streets of the city, exploring and photographing its built-
environment and experiencing its socio-spatiality first hand were no less valuable than 
interviews. Embedding myself in the field, I employed a mixture of qualitative 
methods that could be qualified as ethnographic and seemed to be the most suitable 
for this first stage of research. Participatory observation, in-depth structured and semi-
structured interviews, group interviews, as well as visual methods were all mobilised 
to help with the deconstructing for constructing process.  
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The leading research question put forward to both ordinary interviewees and the city’s 
planning department was quite simple: Is Umm al-Fahem a city? A cluster of sub-
questions about the materiality of the city; regarding its public spaces, public facilities 
and infrastructure, its spatiality and its (il)legibility for both local residents and 
visitors, were explored. 90  Resident interviewees were also asked about how 
comfortable they felt in their environment, and what they did for leisure. They were 
asked whether they had a kin-relationship to their neighbours and if they could move 
to live in other neighbourhoods, if they wished to.91 To gain an insight into everyday 
life in the city, and get a pictorial representation of the city, those residents were 
asked to draw two maps, one of their socio-spatial practices, and the other about of 
the image of the city; what Umm al-Fahem’s spatially represented for them.92 
In light of the wealth of material that the simple question of whether Umm al-Fahem 
is a city generated, and the simultaneous engagement in a process of reflection on data 
as it was being gathered, additional questions and additional methods needed to be 
deconstructed and pursued. This second stage of research, as I call it, corresponded to 
the city’s social and political history. The questions that needed to be explored 
related, amongst other things, to major landmarks in the history of the city since 1949. 
                                                
90 The (il)legibility of the city is important in revealing the extent of its accessibility and how spatial 
knowledge and orientation are organised; whether they are based on local, private and oral knowledge, 
or one which is legible and accessible to strangers independently of local and personalised knowledge. 
91  In some cases the question of kin-neighbours was almost unnecessary, as I could see that the 
interviewee’s house was part of a complex that included first-degree relatives. On the question of 
moving between different neighbourhoods, and the movement from scene to scene, the Chicago school 
considers it a feature of the urban experience.  
92 This method was inspired by Kevin Lynch’s (1991) methodology of investigating urban life and how 
people interact and conceive of their environment by using mental mapping. Unfortunately, because of 
questions to do with thesis’ scope, the 54 amateur maps produced by resident-interviewees will not be 
included in the body of the thesis. However, their insightful information is incorporated into the body 
of the text, across the different data chapters. 
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Crudely speaking, this history included three main historical periods: the military 
government era 1949-1966, 1970s-1989, and 1989 onwards. Historical, political and 
sociological analysis of these different periods, as well as discourse analysis, was 
needed.93  
What made the analysis more interesting was that urban matters, or the city’s 
materiality, seemed to play a prime role in shaping the social and political history of 
the city. For example, they were among the most immediate reasons for the radical 
and defining transformation of the city’s political and social landscape in 1989. They 
contributed to the demise of the communist-led local government and the rise of the 
Islamic Movement to power. Thereafter, they helped the latter maintain its hegemony 
in the city.  
To be able to proceed with the analysis, and being keen to find historical 
documentation for the interviewees’ narrative of the city’s history, the field interviews 
had to be complemented by archival research. Therefore, the ethnographic work was 
followed by two-months worth of intensive work, digging through newspapers and 
magazine archives at two different universities in Israel: the university of Haifa and 
the Hebrew University’s National Library. To make the task manageable, I had to 
identify the best and most accessible sources that could provide the relevant 
information. In cases where the search through newspapers was manual, either in the 
                                                
93 Drawing on Foucault’s (2002) understanding of discourse, discourse relates to a body of knowledge 
and statements that inform and guide the way one thinks about particular matters.  
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form of micro-films or physical papers, I had to limit the search to significant days 
and events in the history of Umm al-Fahem, as identified by the interviewees.  
Because of the active role communists played in Umm al-Fahem, especially during 
the military government era, and their distinguished work in documenting the 
everyday life of Fahmawis, I examined the communist newspaper of Al-Itihad, which 
had reports written by Fahmawis on the conditions of their village at the time. Al-
Itihad, founded in 1944 in the port city of Haifa, has been the communist mouthpiece 
in Arabic and the only non-establishment media outlet for Palestinian intellectuals at 
the time.94 The newspaper was also used to gain an insight into the city’s conditions 
when it was declared a city in November 1985, and the immediate years that followed 
until the 1989 elections.  
For the second period in the history of the city, the 1970s and 1980s, in addition to Al-
Itihad I searched through the available copies of Al-Ghad magazine that was also 
associated with the communist party. Al-Ghad magazine was particularly useful as it 
had an investigatory type of journalism. I also tried to get hold of Abnaa el-Balad ’s 
(Sons of the Land) magazine of Al-Hadaf, which was particularly active in the1980s. 
Unfortunately, there were no documented copies of it, neither public nor private. 
Although the archival research was mostly limited to the years up to 1989 and 
early1990s, the years the research identifies as the formative years in the 
contemporary history of the city, I could not resist searching through the online 
archive of Al-Itihad, that was available through www.aljabha.org, and the only local 
                                                
94 At first, al-Itihad was weekly, then bi-weekly and since 1983 became daily. 
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website www.um-elfahem.net, which seemed to be more associated with the Islamic 
Movement. The rationale behind the online search was to keep me up-to-date with the 
city’s news.  
The available archive copies of the Islamic Movement newspaper Sawt Al-Haq wa Al-
Hurriyyih were searched through for the period covering the years when the Islamic 
Movement won the elections in 1989 up until 1991.95  The reason I chose those 
specific years was because the newspaper was first established in October 1989 
(www.sawt-alhaq.com) and it was within those early years in office that Movement’s 
competence and high performativity in managing the city’s affairs were most visible 
and striking compared to the crippled years of the predecessor communists. Those 
were certainly defining years in the current history of the city. As argued above, they 
also helped build up Fahmawis trust in the Movement, which ultimately contributed 
to establishing its biopolitical hegemonic government.  
Haaretz daily newspaper archive and that of Yediot Ahronot, among the most widely 
read paper in Israel, both in Hebrew, were used as well, especially their coverage of 
key events in the history of the city. Searching through Yediot Ahronot was 
particularly easy to manage, as the search was computerised. All I needed to do was 
type ‘Umm al-Fahem’ in Hebrew and the search engine would find all the relevant 
articles about the city. Using Hebrew sources was particularly interesting as it 
provided room for discourse analysis, especially in relation to analysing statements 
                                                
95  In 1991, Sawt Al-Haq wa Al-Hurriyyih was closed down by the state for three months: June-
September 1991 (http://www.sawt-alhaq.com/web/pages/details.aspx?Id=2) [Arabic].  
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made by voices from within the establishment in the way they viewed the Islamic 
Movement.  
In relation to the new questions that needed to be explored, at the level of ordinary 
interviewees, these involved clarifications about two public urban sites in the city that 
seemed to represent the transformation in the local political map. These were Al-
Meedan and Abu Oibaida’s Mosque. The two sites were very different and 
respectively manifested the transition in the city’s political landscape: before and after 
the Islamic Movement’s landslide victory in the local government elections of 1989. 
Interviewees were asked what the two sites meant for them.  
While in the field and thereafter, the ensuing process of digesting and analysing the 
body of material that emerged in the field along thematic lines, I realised that special 
attention had to be given to deconstructing the nature of the state in which the city and 
its residents resided and the relationship between them all. This work, that I later 
called Israel’s colonial nomos, drew mostly on secondary resources and proved 
foundational for anchoring the case study. It also related directly to questions of 
structure and establishment as well as macro historical processes and how these 
shaped the (un)making of the city. A smaller literature review chapter on 
deconstructing the city and public space in general was also necessary to anchor the 
question of why the city and public space are used as tools of control and 
governmentality. The chapter on the city and public space preceded the chapter on 
Israel’s nomos. 
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Interviewees and gatekeepers 
While in Umm al-Fahem more than 50 in-depth and a few snapshots interviews were 
conducted. These included 14 interviews with the local government planning 
department and local political leaders from across the political spectrum: communists, 
nationalists and the Islamic Movement. Among those interviewees were two previous 
mayors who represented two distinct periods in the history of the city as well two 
different political trends. The first was the mayor when Umm al-Fahem was declared 
a city in 1985 and was under the communist local government. I met and interviewed 
him at his home for about 3 hours. The second was the Islamic Movement elected 
mayor in 1989. He was interviewed at his office for a shorter time (about an hour), 
due to his tight schedule and public commitments as a national figure. Immediately 
after the interview he had to rush to the High Follow-Up Committee for Arab citizens 
of Israel meeting.96  
As land and spatial planning policies constitute an important component at the 
structural level, a theme that was later reinforced by almost all the field interviewees, 
including the random ones, I thought it was essential to interview the local 
government planning department. After conducting an initial research, I found out 
that the local government had a department for strategic planning. The next expected 
step was to contact the department. I phoned the strategic planner office to introduce 
both the research project and myself and check if an interview with him would be 
possible. Luckily and without hesitation he agreed to meet. After meeting for the first 
                                                
96 For more information about the committee see their website: http://www.arab-lac.org  [Arabic]. 
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time, he kindly introduced me to the city’s architect and the person in charge of road 
planning and transport in the city. All of the three valuable contacts were generous 
with me. I interviewed them at length on a number of occasions. For the interviews I 
used a semi structured as well as a more tailored approach. The manager of the city’s 
Economic Firm for Development, an auxiliary to the local government, who is in 
charge of the ‘build your home’ project was interviewed too.97 
After forging a trustful relationship with members of the department, and as it 
happened on the same day I had an interview with the town planner, I was allowed to 
observe an internal ad hoc emergency meeting convened at the department of 
planning, pertaining to the pressing issue of house and commercial premises 
demolitions. The meeting included representatives from the local government, the 
popular committee for the defence of land and recent victims of demolitions. The 
department also subsequently provided me with internal documents related to 
planning in the city. To visualise and deepen my understanding of the city’s planning 
and urban development, I also joined the city’s engineer who led national 
professionals concerned with conservation for an informative tour of the city. 
The rest of the interviews were largely with random people whom I met either in the 
streets of the old city, the art gallery, coffeeshops, restaurants, on informal public 
transport, in informal social places, such as shops, public squares and at the main 
entrance to the city. The interviews lasted from one hour to four hours, or five to ten 
minutes, if they were conducted on the move while using public transport or in places 
                                                
97 The ‘build your home’ project is explored in chapter 6 on land and spatial planning.  
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that allowed only brief encounters. Those who became main collaborators were 
interviewed more than once, with each interview lasting a good few hours. In regard 
to the interviewees’ identities, a balance of age, gender, women with and without 
hijab and people with disabilities, was sought. While the research recognises the 
importance of such identities, they do not form a major part of the analysis. The 
research is concerned more with how Fahmawis experience their city, not how their 
different identities and subjectivities inform their experiences of the city. 
10 local artists involved in theatre, poetry, creative writing, painting, sculpting and 
music were interviewed to investigate, as well as the core questions of the research, 
the state of art in the city and the challenges artists face.98 The first contact with two 
of them was coincidental; one in his musical instruments store and the other while 
walking in the streets of the city. The latter, who during the day worked as a 
fishmonger and in the evening pursued his passion for theatre, took on the role of a 
gatekeeper after I had built a trustful relationship with him. He recommended many 
other artists, and later invited me to attend, as an observer, one of their internal 
meetings that discussed how they could develop their theatre work. Another artist, 
who became one of the main gatekeepers and collaborators with whom I spent hours 
learning about the city, its art and politics, was also key in introducing me to other 
                                                
98 While in the field, and upon encountering a number of artists, I thought I should write a chapter on 
art and artists in the city. This stemmed from the belief that having an art scene in a city was 
distinctively urban. I was happy to see that Umm al-Fahem had a relatively good number of artists. 
These, however, worked more within individual initiatives. Although the city hosts the nationally 
renowned gallery, Galleria, there was no art scene as such. For the local artists, the gallery catered 
more for Israeli Jewish and international artists and was more oriented to attract an Israeli Jewish 
audience. The gallery’s manager denied the artists’ allegation. Due to thesis scope and pressing time 
for completion, I decided to drop the chapter, which I wanted to call artists without art.  
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artists and writers in the city. He became a reference point and made himself available 
for phone interviews whenever needed when I was back in London. 
Other informal quick interviews, or snapshots interviews as sociologist Claire 
Alexander (Kim 2011) calls them, took place with individuals, many of whom were 
not from the city, when opportunities arose. These interviews took place while on the 
move: in shuttles in Umm al-Fahem, in a taxi to Tel Aviv, in the Art Gallery, or with 
locals from my own town. The Art Gallery was an attraction for some Israeli Jews, 
some of whom had never visited the city before. Those visitors were asked what 
Umm al-Fahem represented for them.  
For recording the interviews, I used a digital recorder, except when asked not to by 
the interviewee. In order to make sure everything said was recorded and written 
down, in case something went wrong with technology, I always made sure to write 
the interviews down, as they were taking place. The written notes produced a total of 
711 A4-size hand-written pages, transcribed by hand in large script, and three A5 
notebooks, all in Arabic. Most days, upon returning from the field, I kept a diary of 
events, observations, quotes and thoughts of the day. 
To provide an academic justification for two of my prime methods of choice, 
ethnography and photography, and to translate my unarticulated sentiments about the 
importance of photography in research, in what follows I provide a detailed account 
of their methodological and analytical contribution to research.  
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Why ethnography? Why visual?  
“Can the subaltern speak?” asked Gayatri Spivak in 1988. Drawing on Antonio 
Gramsci’s understanding of the subaltern class, Spivak, by using the subaltern she 
referred to the oppressed, subordinated and marginalised section of society, especially 
those who were subjected to colonialism for a long period. So how could this be 
applied to Umm al-Fahem? This research problematises and challenges established 
knowledge. It is concerned with critically and qualitatively deconstructing the 
nominality and abstractness of Umm al-Fahem’s status as a city in order to form an 
understanding of the Palestinian city as experienced by its residents and the actors 
involved in its (un)making. Through addressing the lived experience of Umm-el-
Fahem’s residents, as well as the material and structural conditions that shape it, the 
research investigates the nature of the transition from a village into a city. Therefore, 
the research had to adopt methods that adequately corresponded to its needs, 
questions, case study, and the context under which it was taking place. 
As discussed in the previous section, the research methods were not decided upon in 
the abstract, but had to concretely relate to the subject of research. The substantive 
part of the research is predicated mostly on Fahmawis’ perspective and socio-spatial 
experiences of their city. It gives voice to agency and is concerned with their own 
reading and understanding of their city. Such urban subjectivities would have been 
difficult to capture in a few pages of a questioner. It is within this framework that the 
research is ethnographic and employs combined qualitative methods in addressing the 
case study.  
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Genealogy of ethnographic practice 
Before delving into the critical contribution of urban ethnography to the 
understanding of cities, especially those who reside in their margins, I trace the 
genealogy of ethnographic research and introduce some of the theoretical problems 
which accompanied much of its historical development. Ethnographic research has 
historically been associated with anthropology, which together with other disciplines, 
such as geography, trace their genealogy back to colonial and imperial projects. It was 
at the beginning of the colonial era that anthropology established itself as “a 
distinctive discipline” (Asad 1973: 14). By making claims to neutrality, objectivity 
and empiricism that produced accounts of non-European cultures and ways of being, 
anthropology was complicit in justifying and buttressing the racial supremacist 
project of colonial domination. Defining itself as “the study of primitive societies” 
(Asad 1973: 11), anthropology served to consolidate rather than contest the colonial 
project by helping construct, objectify, hierarchise, classify and represent the non-
European other as primitive, uncivilised and exotic.  
In the mid nineteenth century, anthropology became institutionalised through the 
formation of anthropological and ethnological societies. The main intellectual 
objective behind the formation of those European and American societies as Davies 
(1999:68) argues was “to collect information about other cultures and ‘races’ which 
were being brought into Euro-American consciousness...” with an “...emphasis on 
collecting and cataloguing...either to trace historical diffusion of specific customs and 
institutions or to establish the evolutionary course of various social and cultural 
forms...” In imperial Germany, for example, as Zimmerman (2001:1) notes 
anthropology “functioned as a new antihumanist worldview.”  
 
81	
Throughout the colonial era, the discipline’s “efforts were devoted to a description 
and analysis - carried out by Europeans, for a European audience - of non-European 
societies dominated by European power” (Asad 1973: 15). By possessing the 
privilege to produce and author knowledge about the other, ethnographers reproduced 
the unequal power relations between dominating European and dominated non-
European cultures. In those accounts, the colonised and the subaltern did not represent 
themselves. They were represented. As Asad put it, “...anthropology is ...rooted in an 
unequal power encounter that gives the West access to cultural and historical 
information about societies it has progressively dominated, and thus not only 
generates a certain kind of universal understanding, but also reinforces the 
inequalities between the European and the non-European worlds...” (ibid: 16). Culture 
in such anthropological accounts and discourses operated to “enforce separations that 
inevitably carry a sense of hierarchy” (Abu-Lughod 1991: 138). 
The research methods and approaches employed in the study of natives progressively 
underwent changes in the early decades of the twentieth century. Bronislaw 
Malinowski in Britain and Franz Boas in the US advocated a fieldwork based on long 
term participant observation of the people being studied. “Both had come to recognize 
the complexity of the so called ‘primitive’ and to link this with both an attack on 
cultural evolutionism and a deep and genuine opposition to ethnocentrism” (Davies 
1999: 69). For Malinowski (1922) spending time with the natives and maintaining 
everyday interaction with them was invaluable. For him ethnography was about 
grasping “the native’s point of view, his relation to life, to realise his vision of the 
world.” 
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However, a major shift in ethnographic work occurred with the development of the 
Chicago School of Sociology in the 1920s and 1930s, with a major emphasis on urban 
ethnography in Western cities. Although some urban historians, e.g. Sanjek 
(2000:108-9) trace urban ethnography to Engels’ 1844 The Condition of the Working 
Class in England, and Du Bois’ 1899 The Philadelphia Negro with their special 
attention to power relations, it was the Chicago School that ushered in a new 
development in the study of urban environment. For Robert E. Park, a prominent 
figure in the Chicago School, ethnographic methods were the most suitable for the 
study of the marginalised in urban environment.  
Prior to the School’s work and establishment, ethnographic urban studies as Jacobs 
(1993: 828) notes were “more appropriate in the context of the Third World city than 
the Western city,” which she sees as “a product of the tendency to anthropologise the 
exotic ‘other”(ibid). Interestingly, early ethnographic studies of Western cities 
reproduced the same approach towards the non-western other. Jacobs, drawing on 
Hannerz (1980), Jackson (1985) and Atkinson (1990) notes that such studies 
remained within the confines of investigating the exotic other; the ghetto, the poor, 
the deviant, the ethnic and racial sub groups. Hannerz (1980: 2) described the shift as 
an “undignified scramble to find substitute savages in slums” of the Western cities 
(quoted in Jacobs 1993: 828).  
The abundance of ethnographic studies, however, was mostly “in the city, rather than 
of the city” (Jackson 1985:171, quoted in Jacobs ibid). Such studies lacked a clear 
relationship or engagement with social theory and macro processes which linked the 
case study to bigger structural processes, particularly those pertaining to the political 
economy of cities. The 1970s witnessed another turn that sought to challenge 
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preceding positivist research frameworks. Radical experimental ethnographies 
emerged seeking “a bottom-up reformulation of key theoretical concerns within 
political economy accounts of the city” (Marcus 1986, quoted ibid).  
In those years, more critical voices, mainly those associated with the Marxist school 
of thought, became vocal against the culturist, unreflective approach to urban studies. 
Culturist discourses assumed that “culture is self-evident and unproblematic category 
that can be used to explain people’s behaviour. Culture is given casual powers, and 
people are said to do things because of their culture” (Jackson 1989: 29 [original 
emphasis]). Manuel Castells’ 1977 book The Urban Question, and David Harvey’s 
1973 Social Justice and the City were both critical of the descriptive culturist 
approach of the Chicago School, advocating instead more attention to a materialist 
analysis of cities and structural processes which shape cities and space. The British 
cultural studies with its interest in critically engaging with researching questions of 
race, ethnicities, urban social movements, and resistance within urban settings, e.g. 
Hall, Critcher’s et al 1978 Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State, and Law and 
Order, and Gilroy’s 1987 There Ain’t No Black in the Union Jack, further radicalised 
qualitative approaches to the study of cities.  
In recent years, photo-ethnographies, the likes of Bourgois and Schonberg’s 2009 
righteous dopefiend on the Edgewater homeless and heroin addicts of San Francisco, 
and Mitchell Duneier’s 2001 collaborative book Sidewalk on the struggle for survival 
of African-American second hand book and magazine vendors on a sidewalk of the 
affluent Greenwich Village - Sixth Avenue in New York, have followed the critical 
tradition in ethnography. Bourgois and Schonberg challenged what they called 
“community-based studies of exotic and dehistoricized others in a vacuum of external 
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power relations” (2009: 14). Through their research they sought to “clarify the 
relationship between large-scale power forces and intimate ways of being in order to 
explain why the United States, the wealthiest nation in the world, has emerged as a 
pressure cooker for producing destitute addicts embroiled in everyday violence” (ibid: 
5).  
Not only did their research challenge the theoretical binary distinction between 
structure and agency, it was also innovative in its methods. They both incorporated 
photography to illustrate and argue their cases. In Sidewalk, Duneier (2001) sought to 
illuminate how race and class operated in an urban setting and how those in positions 
of power such as the police, Business Improvement Districts, business owners and 
politicians as well as society at large attempted to rid public spaces of the 
disadvantaged and outcast whom it had a hand in producing. He gives voice and 
agency to the sidewalk vendors, the homeless and panhandlers who were trying to 
make “an honest living,” in a society engulfed by racial and class exclusion and 
stigmatisation (2001: 313).  
In linking the micro to the macro, Duneier wrote, “I certainly want the reader to know 
that the lives of the people on Sixth Avenue are engendered, sustained, and/or 
complicated by social forces” (2001: 344). For him ethnographers who “shy away 
from analysis of constraints and opportunities because they cannot be sustained with 
hard evidence...will leave the inaccurate impression that the manifest behaviors are 
self-generated” (ibid).  
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What is ethnography? 
So what is ethnography then and why is it most suitable for my research? 
Ethnography is a “social research based on close-up, on-the-ground observation of 
people and institutions in real time and space, in which the investigator embeds 
herself near (or within) the phenomenon so as to detect how and why agents on the 
scene act, think and feel the way they do” (Wacquant 2003: 5). It addresses issues 
around perspectives and how people see and understand their world (Becker 1996; 
Marvasti 2004). It investigates “the view point of those studied” and is about 
“learning and understanding the meaning people give to their world and experiences 
instead of making them up” (Becker 1996: 59, 61). It also allows for the 
understanding of the everyday life, the quotidian. In addition to providing an in-depth 
insight into city life, residents’ spatialities and their daily experiences, ethnography 
also problematises accepted knowledge. It challenges it by bringing to the fore the 
accounts of ordinary residents who are the ones who know best about their lived 
conditions and the happenings in the city. It gives room and voice to their 
subjectivities.  
Moreover, and in contrast to quantitative methods, ethnography allows flexibility and 
fluidity in the field, and gives room for unexpected and unplanned data. It allows the 
project to organically develop in a trajectory which could be different to that initially 
thought of. It does not brush aside complexities that emerge in the field. It tries to 
understand them. On the unexpected data which emerge in ethnographic projects, and 
in contrast with other methods, Becker (1996) writes, “...the situations of data 
gathering present fieldworkers, whether they seek it or not, with a lot of information, 
whether they want it or not. If you do a survey, you know in advance all the 
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information you can acquire. There may be some surprises in the connections between 
the items you measure, but there will not be any surprise data... A partial exception to 
this might be the use of open-ended questions, but even such questions are usually not 
asked in such a way as to encourage floods of unanticipated data suggesting new 
variables. In fact the actual workings of survey organisations discourage interviewers 
from recording data not asked for on the forms” (ibid 56).  
Bourgois and Schonberg (2009) recognise additional values that win ethnography a 
preferential status. For them “[p]articipant-observation...has an inherently anti-
institutional transgressive potential because, by definition, it forces academics out of 
their ivory tower and compels them to violate the boundaries of class and cultural 
segregation” (2009:14). Duneier (2001) in acknowledgment of the advantages of 
participant observation, recognises that it was thanks to this method more than 
interviews that he gained the bulk of his data. In the context of his research and social 
and class position as an upper-middle-class male academic writing about poor black 
men and women who belonged to some of the most disadvantaged and stigmatised 
sections of society; and in recognition of the nature of the racialised society at stake, 
as well as questions of trust which result from it, participant observation gained him a 
better understanding of their life. “[I]n the United States, blacks and whites often 
speak differently when they are among people of their own race than when they are in 
the presence of members of another race. As a white person, it would be naïve for me 
to believe that the things blacks will say to me are the same as they would say to a 
black researcher,” he wrote (2001: 352).   
As far as my research project is concerned, other additional aspects pertaining to the 
research and its context win ethnography a preferential status. Although the research 
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is principally concerned with the urban question, hence it is an urban ethnography, it 
is also situated in multiple settings which require a particular attention to the national 
identity of those who are studied. Zureik (2003), in his article ‘Theoretical and 
Methodological Considerations for the Study of Palestinian Society,’ discusses why 
ethnographic approaches are among the most favourable methods to the study of 
Palestinians, who are “a society in conflict and transition” (ibid: 152). His advocacy 
follows on from his analysis of the fragmented reality or the multiple lives as Edward 
Said (1986) had called it, and the different socio-politico and economic conditions the 
Palestinians had to experience after the Nakba of 1948.  
Situating the Palestinians in a wider Arab context, where people live under oppressive 
regimes and where the public has been marginalised as far as shaping public opinion 
is concerned, quantitative methods which include responding to a questionnaire 
interview proves irrelevant. Zureik (2003: 153) argues that such a method assumes a 
relationship of trust between the researcher and the interviewees and that the latter 
opinion counts as far as public life and influence on the course of events is concerned. 
Under conditions of lack of trust there is a tendency to look with suspicion towards 
those who conduct “individual-based information”. Therefore quantitative methods 
prove difficult to pursue. In contrast, qualitative methods such as ethnography and 
oral history, especially in the Palestinian case, have played a role in giving voice and 
agency, thanks to their ability to “capture subjectivities and nuances of the 
phenomenon under investigation” (ibid: 154). 
However, ethnography, particularly photo-ethnography does not go unchallenged. 
While in the field, researchers have to constantly engage in a reflective process. 
Reflexivity includes thoughts about their research, their work and power relations in 
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the field, the risks involved in regarding their own safety and those who are 
researched, and the integrity of those researched, specially when those belong to an 
ostracised, socially excluded and vulnerable section of society. Bourgois and 
Schonberg (2009) whose photo-ethnography spanned over a decade documenting and 
researching the daily struggle for survival of homeless heroin and crack addicts on the 
streets of San Francisco and the structural forces that shaped the addicts’ lives, offer a 
valuable insight into the challenges and ethical questions which arise from this type of 
research. For them ethnography, especially participant observation, “is by definition 
an intensely subjective process requiring systematic self-reflection” (ibid: 11). 
Therefore, they recognise the importance of the recourse to fact-checked official 
records, public archives and newspaper articles to confirm the accuracy of accounts of 
past events (ibid: 12).  
In their case, another set of challenges regarded the integrity of the addicts and their 
fear of objectifying them. Also they had to set the norms of conduct and the 
boundaries of privacy between them and the Edgewater homeless and manage the 
imminent threat to their safety in the form of police harassment and law enforcement. 
“The question of personal privacy of our research subjects is more complicated than 
the immediate practical risk of legal sanctions against them, however. It involves the 
imperative to respect personal dignity and to avoid essentializing difference” (ibid: 9). 
While Bourgois and Schonberg were cautious not to jeopardise the safety and 
integrity of the Edgewater homeless, and said they would have immediately stopped 
the research if their research participants were at risk of arrest, the latter gave 
Schonberg the permission to photograph them in what could be their most intimate 
and undignified moments. They also encouraged them to use their real names. The 
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Edgewater homeless saw this as part of their struggle for respect and visibility. They 
“do not want to be treated as public secrets or hidden subjects of shame. They 
struggle for self-respect and feel that their stories are worth telling” (ibid).  
Why the visual?  
Edward Said (1986), in After the Last Sky, which incorporates photographs taken by 
Jean Muhr (a photographer who for decades had documented Palestinians lives), 
pledges researchers who are concerned with the question of Palestine to make use of 
whatever method available for them in their study of Palestinians. In my case, I am 
passionate about photography. While acknowledging some of its disadvantages, 
which I will discuss later, I believe in its powerful role in conveying messages about 
the quotidian and the mundane, the larger socio-economic and politico context, and in 
providing material evidence, especially when accompanied by and/or embedded in a 
written text. This role becomes even more powerful and crucial in contested and 
politically charged sites, where a battle over existence, narrative and legitimacy 
constitutes part of the context in which photography is taking place. It is against this 
background that I have engaged in a long-term personal commitment to documenting 
Palestinians’ everyday lives, and their vanishing and changing cultural practices. This 
is a feeling that has grown stronger since I moved to London and transgresses the 
scope of this research.  
Methodologically and analytically, in a research context that spans over a period of 
time covering more than a year, photographs could also serve the function of aide 
memoir. They could act as a reference tool for years to come in retrieving even the 
smallest details of the ethnographic experience. Moreover, serving as a data- 
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gathering tool (Collier & Collier 1986), visual images also help guide my analysis of 
the materiality of the city and its socio-politico order. Therefore, their organisational 
and analytical value could form an important part in the writing up and analysis of the 
research.  
In my case for years after the first stage of fieldwork was completed – including 
conducting interviews with locals, and photographing the city’s materiality – the 
photographs continued to play an invaluable role in helping me analyse the semiotics 
of the city’s public space and fill the gap of missed data. Photographs offered 
theoretical and analytical possibilities, and helped construct arguments, when direct 
interviews about certain topics were not covered in the first stage of research. Because 
it was easy to manage, without involving coordinating with people, the camera was of 
great help. To retrieve knowledge retrospectively, it allowed me to perform quick and 
efficient visits to the city whenever I was in Israel and to take photos of signs and 
scenes I had seen while conducting ethnographic work, but did not take photos of at 
the time. This was particularly helpful in trying to analyse public signs, including 
religious signs, and to pose questions about the social and political order that was 
being produced (see chapter 7 on religious identities). 
The general in the particular: helping develop theoretical possibilities   
“Seeing comes before words...” wrote John Berger (2008). However, “[l]etting a 
picture speak its thousand words can result in a thousand deceptions,” if it is viewed 
on its own and out of context (Bourgois and Schonberg 2009: 14, 9). “[E]mbedding 
the photograph in the text allows an appreciation of the effects of social structural 
forces on individuals” (ibid: 9). Their “rich possibilities” as Stuart Hall notes in his 
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preface to Gilroy’s visual book Black Britain: A Photographic History (2007), “not 
only record what happened but…set people, places and events in a wider social and 
political context” (ibid: 5). The potential of visual images lies beyond their 
instrumentality. They illustrate the “general in the particular” (Knowles and 
Sweetman 2004: 7) and bring “into visibility aspects of social life which are beyond 
or behind the headlines” (Gilroy 2007: 7). They are “designed to make us ask 
questions. What do the images tell us about the black experience?” (ibid: 8). While 
the lives of black Britons are different to those in Umm al-Fahem, the gist of the idea 
of bringing those in the margins into visibility, as well as the investigative and 
interrogative properties which visual images present could be universal.99  
Visual images complement and provide a physical form to the written text and work 
as adjuncts to telling and demonstrating the ethnographic experience. They also 
operate as evidence and representations of reality. For Harper (1988: 61-62), while 
not all sociological data can be photographically captured, in the field of social and 
environmental ecology and social interactions the camera plays a superior role to the 
human eye or the written word: “the camera can gather information that cannot be 
gathered with the human eye or other recording devices.” The visual as Marvasti 
(2004: 71) puts it “becomes part data, part illustration, and part analysis.”  
Knowles and Sweetman (2004) reject what they call “the naive realism which 
suggests that images – photographic or otherwise – simply re-present objective and 
already existing realities.” They argue that images have theoretical, analytical and 
                                                
99 For Suchar (1997:34), the “interrogatory principle” of a photograph is what makes it documentary. 
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conceptual possibilities. They have the “capacity to allow for the development of 
theoretical insight or understanding” and “to reveal what is hidden in the inner 
mechanisms of the ordinary and the taken for granted” (Knowles and Sweetman 
2004: 6,7). They “help ‘place’ or ‘ground’ sociological discourse and add another 
dimension to the arguments” pursued in the research (ibid: 3). Visual methods that 
“capture the particular, the local, the personal and the familiar” are particularly apt to 
develop what Mills referred to as the sociological imagination which “links the larger 
historical and social scenes in which lives are set with individual experience and 
biography” (ibid: 8, 7). They offer a way into understanding how the personal is 
social and political and vice versa.   
Power, surveillance, control and other challenges 
Taking photographs does not go uncontested, whether in relation to the subjectivities 
of the photographer him/herself, the claims to objectivity, the representations images 
create, or issues of the personal security of those photographed.  Potentially, visual 
images could be fraught with tension. Arguments around marrying or reconciling the 
objectivity of the camera with the subjective eye of its operator, and where to draw 
the line are inevitable. Photography is an instrument of creation, writes Hall (1997: 
81). The camera, however automatic, remains a tool that is “highly sensitive to the 
attitudes of its operator” (Collier & Collier (1986: 9). “What produces the right 
moment?’... or ... ‘what produces moments dense with meaning?” (Flaes and Harper 
1993: 214), could be a dilemma facing photographers. 
Despite such challenges, for Susan Sontag (2003: 26), the objective and the subjective 
do not work as binary features. They are rather to the advantage of photography. For 
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her: “[p]hotographs had the advantage of uniting two contradictory features. Their 
credentials of objectivity were inbuilt. Yet they always had, necessarily, a point of 
view. They were a record of the real – incontrovertible, as no verbal account, however 
impartial, could be – since a machine was doing the recording. And they bore witness 
to the real – since a person had been there to take them” (ibid).  
The challenging point, however, is the issue of the security of the subjects and objects 
of photography and their instrumental relationship to power, surveillance and control. 
John Tagg (1988) in his collection of essays The Burden of Representation, Ariella 
Azoulay’s (2008) book The Civil Contract of Photography, and Douglas Harper 
(1988) recognise the power of photography and its complicit role in enforcing control, 
surveillance and observation at the hands of the state. Azoulay notes that 
photographers and photography were rapidly co-opted by the sovereign power to 
document, collect and classify data for law enforcement and other governmental 
duties (2008: 133). Harper, in taking the argument further, argues that documentary 
photography also has the potential to expose social problems, and even destabilise a 
regime (1988: 56- 57). 
I would add that, depending on the social and political context, photography is also 
about political control, surveillance and intimidation that sometimes risks personal 
security and livelihood. By its intimidating documentary power, photography is 
recruited as tool that helps create docile bodies. When I was in the field, photography 
generated resistance on the part of a few people in Umm al-Fahem, who wondered 
about the purpose behind taking photographs. Their reservations were grounded in the 
concrete reality of the state’s potential persecution and criminalisation of politically 
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active individuals. The following anecdote illustrates and visualises best such 
concerns and reservation.  
In July 2009, while conducting my ethnographic work, I attended a demonstration 
against house demolition in the city. The demonstration was a joint initiative of 
activist women of Jewish and Palestinian origins and took place at the main entrance 
to the city. Despite being peaceful and non-threatening, the demonstration was video-
recorded by a plainclothes security officer. As the camera was an integral part of my 
fieldwork, I always made sure I had it on me. As I was taking photos of the 
demonstration, I happened to see the plainclothes security officer, oscillating between 
the two sides of the main road, holding a video camera in his hand, trying to take a 
comprehensive shoot of all those who were present. Wearing a gun on his waist gave 
the clear indication that he belonged to security forces. The photos below “State 
surveillance in action” are testimonial to Fahmawis’ feelings on how photography 
speaks to power and is used as an instrument for intimidation and control. 
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State surveillance in action 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: A joint demonstration of Palestinian and Jewish women at the entrance of Umm al-
Fahem against house demolition in the city, 11 July 2009 
 
Figure 6: Plainclothes security officer filming the demonstration 
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Figure 7: Plainclothes security officer, with a pistol on his waist, crossing Wadi Ara Road to 
film women standing on the other side of the road. 11 July 2009  
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Figure 8: Same plainclothes security officer filming demonstrating women across the road 
who are in figure 9 
Figure 9: the shadow of women demonstrating on the other side of the road, opposite city's 
entrance. 
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To conclude, however subjective visual methods are and while it is important to 
reflect on the matter and that of security I believe that their advantages override the 
disadvantages, especially when documentary photos are at stake and where no editing 
and staging is involved. This is particularly important when the research is concerned 
with the socio-spatiality of a city and its residents. As discussed earlier, and in 
reiterating Collier & Collier (1986: 17, 15) argument, the camera is a good tool for 
grasping the ecology and cultural geography of the case study. As Harper (1988: 58) 
puts it: “the camera records spatial relations more efficiently than a written 
description.” 
Despite the argument that, “the camera, the tape recorder, and the written word are 
technologies that have historically lent themselves to surveillance and social 
engineering,” they are also technologies of solidarity (Bourgois and Schonberg 2009: 
14). People who are being photographed in their lived environment, whether in 
righteous dopefiend, Sidewalk or Umm-el-Fahem, recognise the importance of having 
their socio-spatial environment and voices heard and documented. They perceive it as 
part of the struggle to win recognition and to expose the macro socio-political and 
economic forces which shape their very condition. 
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Conducting a research in politicised (post)colonial contexts: Reflections, 
positionality and information sources  
“You must be tajjammu3,” said one of the interviewees.100 Reluctant to expose my 
political identity, I immediately asked: “what made you think I’m tajjamau3?” “Your 
glasses,” he said. “What do you mean? Could you be more explicit?” I asked. “You 
know what I mean, it’s the intellectual look,” he said. “I’m afraid, as a researcher I 
should not and cannot reveal what my political ideology is,” I answered.101  His 
assumption about my political affiliation and the attempt to fit me within one category 
was an important question I had to reflect upon throughout the fieldwork. This was 
particularly important for two reasons. The first was pertaining to the city’s highly 
politicised history. The second reason, which also derives from the first, was because 
of the Islamisation of the city’s political and social scene. Women’s bodies and 
wearing the hijab, in the context of the city’s politics, were identity markers. In some 
cases, though not all and not always, wearing a hijab, especially amongst young 
women, was an informal declaration of being a supporter of the Islamic Movement. 
However, reflecting on my perceived political identity based on gender and sartorial 
practices was not the only concern.   
While in the field, I was constantly stimulated and at times overwhelmed with 
unexpected information, which left me with a state of dissonance, bewilderment and 
excitement. Many of the interviewees were constantly engaged in deconstructing and 
                                                
100  Tajjammu3 or as known by its Hebrew acronym Balad: National Democratic Assembly, is a 
political party set up in 1995 by Palestinian intellectuals from within Israel and was for years headed 
by Dr Azmi Bshara. The conceived image of members of Al-Tajjammu3 is that they are intellectuals 
and the new emerging Palestinian middle class in Israel.  
101 Fieldwork interview, Umm al-Fahem, 24 June 2009.  
 
100	
reconstructing the socio-political history of the city. Sooner or later, and without any 
guidance or hints from me, they would start talking about the shift in the political map 
of the city: before and after 1989. 1989 was the year that ushered in a new era in the 
city’s political map that had ramifications on the city’s social and spatial order.  
Before 1989, the communist-led were in power and ran its local government. After 
1989, the communists were defeated and the Islamic Movement was voted in. When 
talking about the 1989 shift, interviewees would also talk about the state and its role 
in tipping the balance of power and bringing about the weakening of the communists 
and growth of the Islamic Movement. The fieldwork opened a completely new avenue 
that needed further investigation and added a new thread to the argument, which was 
not thought of before. 
At the beginning, I felt I was being diverted off the main topic of establishing whether 
Umm al-Fahem was a city or not. The unexpected data left me grappling with the 
question of how to incorporate it into the project in a coherent way which would give 
voice to interviewees’ experiences and would form a coherent argument. I remember, 
calling my supervisor while in the field asking for advice. I shared with him my 
thrilled, if confused, feelings about the new but challenging material that seemed to 
deserve an entirely new PhD project.  
It took me about two years of thinking and reflection on the field material and the 
other data I managed to collect to figure out that what first seemed to be distracting 
and off the subject was in fact connected and directly linked to the main question. I 
realised that the city’s very materiality and the promotion of identity politics were at 
the centre of this political change and the new power configurations. Moreover, I 
reached a conclusion that determining in a definite way whether Umm al-Fahem was 
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a city was almost irrelevant. The new questions that needed to be addressed were: 
what can be made of the Palestinian city in Israel? And what kind of spatial 
configuration and socio-political and cultural order are being produced and why? 
Based on the ethnographic ground research and the foundational chapters I have 
written, before long and without any previous plans or intentions, I found myself 
engaged in an organic process of theorisation and conceptualisation of the Palestinian 
city. 
In the theorisation process, the state’s role behind this political change needed to be 
addressed. However, going about unravelling the state’s meddling with the city’s 
politics and its deliberate policy towards weakening the communists and enhancing 
the performance of the Islamic Movement made the task difficult and generated 
anxiety and concerns. This was for the simple reason that the research was not about 
the Islamic Movement or the communists per se. Moreover, concerns about being 
biased towards one side over the other was definitely a source of worry, even if I had 
nothing to do with getting interviewees talking about this.  
To address these concerns, interviewees’ accounts were not enough to make a strong 
objective argument, in such a politically-charged context. This is especially important 
in the context of a highly respected Islamic Movement that had won the trust of many 
people. Consulting the Movement’s newspaper and its mouthpiece Sawt Al-Haq wa 
Al-Hurriyyih, as well as providing official state statistics in regard to the local 
authority’s budgets before and after 1989, seemed the best way to provide the 
objective evidence for the interviewees’ account. This was also accompanied by 
performing discourse analysis in relation to statements made by state officials in 
regard to the Movement. Moreover, following interviewees’ recommendations, I 
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reviewed the 1976 Koenig policy report made by Yisrael Koenig, the Northern 
District police commissioner. The report provides insights into the state’s concerns 
about the increasing popularity of the communist party in the 1970s and the need 
therefore to weaken it. 
My inquiring gaze: observations and revelations 
The ethnographic experience was not limited to interviews and data collected through 
them. It was also about my own journey into the city, its activities and events, my 
inquiring gaze, impressions and observations of it, its people, events, streets, mobility, 
buildings, architecture, rhythms, signs and billboards and how telling these are about 
the city. It was about not taking for granted the socio-spatiality of the city, its history, 
it politics and its built-environment. While in the field, I walked through back and 
main streets, the market, its different neighbourhoods, particularly the Mahajnih 
neighbourhood in the heart of the old part of the city, parts of the Mahameed and 
Jabareen neighbourhoods and the Ighbariyih-Mahajnih crossroad. I felt and sensed the 
buzz in town. I also took photographs of things I thought were worth photographing. 
From an urban sociological standpoint, strolling through the streets made it clearer to 
me how the issue of anonymity in the city, the question of heterogeneity, otherness 
and difference barely existed. While locals were not intrusive, but welcoming and 
warm, with spending time in the city I became easily recognisable, to the extent that a 
year after I finished my fieldwork, and while staying in a hotel in Aqabah – Jordan - 
where some Fahmawis happened to be, I heard women walking past me, pointing to 
me and wondering out loud if I was the same woman who a year earlier was in their 
city.  
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With strolling and walking came the inevitable knowledge of the city, confirming 
Simmel’s argument that strangers in the city get to know it more than its local 
residents. One of my collaborators, who was of great help to me and who made both 
herself and her car available, was impressed by my sense of direction in the city and 
how I could navigate my way through the least expected places. “You know more 
places than me,” she said. I would not say and claim I know more than her, as the city 
is not organised in an easily legible way for strangers. Spatial knowledge is very 
vernacular and personalised. Streets have no names and even when they do, they are 
not recognised as such by locals. I found this in itself interesting and revealing about 
the nature and order of the city. One of the women I met, who has been working in 
the city for a number of years, complained that she did not know many parts of the 
city, especially the old labyrinth-like part. I would, however, say that I became 
familiar with the city, its streets, rhythms, senses and smells because I was interested 
and made the effort to do so.  
The camera: observations and revelations 
Reflecting on my experience in the field, the camera as a visible tool of research 
proved to have its social, political, public/private and ethnicised identity. It gave cues 
about the social and political make-up of the city, thus helping with the analysis of the 
ethnographic experience and the city. Taking photographs could not be detached from 
the political, religious and cultural norms of the city. The reactions I received while 
taking photos, with people shouting from their cars, ‘the journalist,’ ‘the 
photographer,’ made me think how the camera in the local context, apart from serving 
journalistic purposes, has a private identity and is used more for private purposes: 
weddings and domestic occasions.  
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In Umm al-Fahem, the camera in its public identity as a documentation tool of the 
urban environment and social life seemed to have been associated with ethnic 
backgrounds other than Arab. It invoked interest that sometimes was blended with 
fear and suspicion. Some locals thought I was not Palestinian. Their impression made 
me reflect on the essence of what a city means, if being different is very visible and 
evokes interest among its residents and if taking photographs is very ethnicised. 
While walking the streets of the city, especially when taking photographs, I was 
approached by people of different ages speaking in Hebrew. Kids would greet me 
with Shalom, just as I and my friends used to do when we were at their age when 
encountering people in the village who did not look like Arabs.102 Often these kids, 
when I greeted them back in Arabic, would immediately ask me to take photos of 
them and some would ask if I was a Muslim or a Christian.  
Other times, when taking photographs of public spaces, signs, or graffiti, which I 
thought were public and therefore neutral, I was stopped and asked in Hebrew why I 
was taking photos. Yet again the suspicious attitude would wash away and turn into 
curiousness, the second I spoke in Arabic with a local accent. When taking close-up 
shoots of workshops, for example, I did ask the permission of people in advance, to 
dispel the why and what questions, which have their roots in the particular political 
reality under which Fahmawis and many Palestinians in Israel live.  The reality is that 
of state harassment, racism and securitisation. In Umm al-Fahem, as in other 
Palestinian localities, there are unauthorised buildings and houses, which are 
threatened with demolition. 
                                                
102 For us as kids being foreign was being Jewish. Shalom is the Hebrew word for hello.  
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Other reasons for why some Fahmawis were reluctant to be photographed could have 
been because of security reasons (see figures above) or simply because people did not 
like being photographed. It could have been related to the conservative culture of the 
city, especially when it involved women. Apart from these incidents, people were 
keen to get their environment and themselves photographed, especially when I told 
them it was for research purposes. Their agreement, and in some cases encouragement 
to take photos, seemed like a political commitment on their side and a tacit 
recognition of the importance of getting the condition of their urban environment 
communicated.  
Methodological, contextual and positional challenges 
In addition to the challenges deriving from managing field data, there are three other 
sets of challenges that seem to be separate but are in fact interconnected. One set is 
methodological and relates to the production of objective knowledge in a context of a 
qualitative urban ethnographic research. The second is contextual and corresponds to 
challenges emanating from conducting a research project about and in a city that is 
embedded in multiple power structures and is under (post)colonial conditions. The 
third challenge relates to my multiple identities.  
As far as ethnographic research is concerned, the task of producing objective research 
that is conducted in a highly politicised context, without compromising field 
interviewees’ accounts of their experiences and views of their city, becomes a 
challenge that requires further investigation. As discussed earlier, to avoid a situation 
where the research would be dismissed for being too subjective and critical, I had to 
consult additional sources and use additional methods. Archival research of 
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newspaper and magazines articles, official statistics, official statements as quoted by 
nationally recognised newspapers, and official master plans, as well as taking 
photographs of the city’s materiality and signs, were all mobilised to help cross-check 
events narrated by interviewees and to provide external evidence to their arguments 
and accounts.  
By questions of context, I refer to the multiple contexts in which the case study is 
embedded, the complexities that arise from their (post)colonial characteristics and my 
own positionality in relation to these contexts.103 One context relates to Umm al-
Fahem itself and its character, or in other words the research being conducted in the 
city itself. In this context, my personal multiple identities: academic, gendered and 
cultural, become part of the challenge. Some of those challenges pertain to what 
sometimes feel like the binary nature of the city; being a political hub and home for 
religious and secular nationalist, political movements.  
In the context of an Islamised public space and Islamised bodies, the challenge lay in 
the fact that I do not wear the hijab and therefore, by default, could be judged as 
belonging to a secular political movement and as such could be perceived as 
representing a secular trend. The potential challenge here is to what extent the 
different political voices are equally represented in the research and to what extent 
interviewees felt comfortable with expressing their opinions. In answer to this, the 
research does not attempt to represent any political tendency. It does, nevertheless, 
                                                
103 See introduction chapter, footnote number 38, on what is meant by postcoloniality. 
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aim to reflect the stories and voices that emerged from the field. And that some of my 
interviewees were active supporters of the Movement.  
The second context relates to the question of the state that the city, or in the other 
words to the fact that the research is about the city under (post)colonial conditions and 
the structural and political forces that shape it. Here again my multiple identities come 
into question in regard to the associated tensions between their different components. 
The tension arose in relation to my researcher and national identities, being a 
researcher who belongs to the larger subaltern researched group and being critical of 
the state’s (urban) policies towards this group. The tension brings into question issues 
around subjectivity and objectivity of the research, and requires a special attention 
when criticism of Israel is at stake.  
This concern is not mine alone. Academics who are engaged in critical research share 
it as well. Edward Said (1992), Ella Shohat and Yehuda Shenhav (2006), amongst 
others, have shown that critical studies of Israel’s policies and of Zionism have 
normally been dismissed as anti-Semitic. Shenhav (2006), for example, in his critical 
book, The Arab Jews: A Postcolonial Reading of Nationalism, Religion and Ethnicity, 
tells the story of how this challenge is not exclusionary of Israeli Jewish academics, 
mainly those of Arab origins, known as Mizraheem, who wish to contest the status 
quo of the Ashkinazi’s western hegemonic character of Israel. Israeli society, he 
argues, “had placed a taboo on any discussion of the Mizrahi question as a political 
issue (as distinct from a folkloristic phenomenon) (2006: 70) and therefore, tried to 
keep such intra-Jewish ethnicity invisible. Academics who question those taboos are 
accused of “disseminating hatred” and “rage,” creating “antagonism between 
communities” and are cast as “extremist’ and sick” (ibid: 8). 
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To conclude, I draw on Bourdieu’s (2004) advice on conducting research in a 
politically and socially complex site. As he would suggest, a researcher should be 
aware of issues of reflexivity, the social world of the researched group, subjectivity, 
objectivity, methodology and the role of the researcher in society, and the crucial role 
all these play in the production of knowledge. Therefore, I had to engage in what he 
calls “critical vigilance” (ibid: 427) where nothing is taken for granted or self-evident 
and everything is constantly called into question, even if I belong to the larger 
researched group. For me the two elements of my identity of being a researcher and a 
Palestinian were not mutually exclusive. My allegiance was to respecting the integrity 
of the research and to producing an objective, well-researched piece of work, without 
compromising either the subjective experiences of the residents of Umm al-Fahem, 
the research credibility, or my subjective interest and passion about the topic. 
Employing reflexivity throughout the research project and questioning my 
positionality has been indispensable to converting what Bourdieu (ibid) called 
“political impulses into scientific endeavours.” 
Breaking boundaries and gaining trust 
Before setting off, I had to think about the best way of getting started, given that I 
hardly had personal contacts or acquaintances. My family’s neighbourhood baker was 
the only one I knew. All I had in mind was the image of the city being conservative, 
religious, political and home to some of the most active students at the Hebrew 
University, where I did my undergraduate studies. My first encounter with Fahmawis 
was during my studies at the Hebrew University in mid 1990s. They were very 
politically active, conscious and vocal students. Their impact on Palestinian students’ 
life was greater than their proportionately small numbers, compared to other students 
 
109	
from other localities and certainly those from my village. Ever since, and thanks to 
them, Umm al-Fahem has been a site which has provoked my interest and curiosity.  
Prior to the fieldwork, I had to think about tools which would make me welcomed and 
trusted, especially so that I could be perceived as different in relation to my 
appearance and non-conformist life-choices.104 Being a woman who unlike many of 
the women in the city, does not wear a hijab, studying and living abroad and being 
married to an English man, wearing big glasses and having what could be perceived 
as messy curly hair (a type of hair which is not very desirable in a society which tends 
to prefer it long and straight) and my ethnographer/photographer image: carrying 
conspicuous research tools: the camera and the A3 drawing book, were all part of 
what could potentially constitute a barrier between me and the potential interviewees. 
 The major imaginary, if real barrier, however, was the challenge of gaining the trust 
of people, where fear of state harassment, as shown in the pictures above (figures 5,6, 
7, 8 & 9) is a reality and state security equals control even in the most sacred spheres 
of life such as the family and breadwinning.105 In this regard, Umm al-Fahem bears a 
special consideration for its revolutionary history, the recent persecution of some of 
its Islamic leaders, and the monstrous image of the city constructed by the Israeli 
media.  
                                                
104 Being familiar with our society, where marriage is supreme, I knew that interviewees would ask me 
personal questions, especially about my marital status and why I live abroad. While in the field I was 
asked by some if I was a girl or a woman?  Being a girl, regardless of age, means that a woman is not 
married. Being a woman, regardless of age again, means she is married.  
105  For further details on state control of the most scared aspects of private life, see introduction 
chapter.  
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To break such imaginary barriers, I decided to consciously dress modestly and to 
accentuate my local accent, using the chaf instead of Kaf, the qaf/kaf instead of the 
aal. In the Palestinian context these letters are symbols of class, urban/rural and 
regional divide. The chaf and qaf/kaf, although regional, are associated with the 
village and working class accent. The kaf and aal, in contrast, are mostly spoken in 
established urban centres and villages in the Galilee. In the Wadi Ara region where 
Umm al-Fahem is, it is mostly the middle-class and university graduates milieu that 
have adopted the kaf to be their accent.106  
Speaking with the local accent proved to be the right decision. Some of the random 
people who were either part of the research or got chatted to while walking the streets 
showed their respect that I was still ‘adhering’ to the local accent. It made them feel I 
was one of them. “The chaf feels more comfortable,” said a young Fahmawi who runs 
a little shop/food stall, called Guevara Kiosk. Another incident was with a 100-year-
old woman, who before 1948 had lived in the city of Haifa. Because I was not 
wearing a hijab she thought I was a city-girl when she first saw me. “I thought you 
were madaniyyih [city girl],” she said. When she heard my chaf, acknowledging her 
misjudgement, she said: “you are indeed a fallahah [peasant].” However, immediately 
after clarifying my urban/rural identity, and despite my modest clothing, she asked 
why I was not wearing a hijab. 
                                                
106 In Iraq, for example, big urban centres such as Baghdad, the chaf is the norm and is not a symbol of 
class-urban and regional divides as in the Palestinian case.   
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In the Palestinian culture, especially among the older generation, it is almost a 
tradition that upon meeting a stranger for the first time, they try to establish where 
s/he comes from, particularly when coming from the same geographical region. In 
mapping out the social network one belongs to, they first ask about the family name, 
then more specifically the father’s name, other relatives, or neighbours even. 
Conscious of my neutrality as a researcher, I was reluctant to give details about my 
family’s background. However, in certain situations when meeting some old men who 
revealed their communist identity and as part of the identification process, it was 
inevitable that I talked about my brother, who was a communist and had lots of 
comrades in the city. He was also the physics teacher in the city’s high school until 
1989. Those emotionally touching moments left us in tears because of my brother’s 
sudden death in 2004. Such a connection did contribute to a greater trust and made me 
feel welcomed.  
To conclude, not only did the imaginary boundaries break down as soon as I started 
the research, in certain situations, especially after spending intensive periods of time 
in the city, they provoked interest in what I was doing in the city. At times, 
boundaries needed to be created, especially when interviewees wanted to share their 
personal domestic stories. I had to show sympathy but remind them why I was there. 
On the whole, the city, the people, the interviewees, regardless of their political 
affiliations and regardless of age and gender all felt welcoming and collaborative. 
Their reactions showed the agency of my gender and education, which for them 
represented a sense of pride that Palestinian women have ambitions, are educated and 
independent.  
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My interviewees made themselves available and were flexible with time, generously 
spending hours giving me formal and informal talks about the city, its history, 
politics, art and its pressing issues. They opened their houses and private archives and 
provided a reference point and were a source of information, whenever needed. In 
some cases, we strolled through the streets together and they even drove me around 
with their cars and sometimes gave me a lift home.107 I felt privileged and honoured 
to have chosen their city and to have come to know them and learn about their history. 
They were keen, proud and appreciative to tell the story of their city and to have their 
voices heard. 
Conclusion  
The chapter started by sharing a vignette from my first few moments in the field that 
illustrated how the unplanned usage of the camera as an entry point into securing 
access to field interviewees proved successful. It showed how within less than 10 
minutes of my stay in Umm al-Fahem, the question of accessing random residents 
was resolved thanks to the camera creating the moment of brief encounter. This 
moment proved crucial, as before embarking on fieldwork the research had identified 
                                                
107 Hospitality towards non-Fahmawis, regardless of their ethnic or religious origins and as long as they 
are not racist or have the intention to inflict violence on the city, is a characteristic that Fahmawis feel 
proud of. It was a recurrent theme in many interviews, where people talked enthusiastically about it. 
For them, retaining such an image is very important, especially when discussing racist attacks on the 
city. Only racists are not welcomed in the city. Hashim Mahameed, mayor of the city in the 1980s and 
a member of Knesset until the mid 1990s, wrote in an article to Yediot Ahronot on 22 Nov 2007 “it is 
ludicrous that some [Jewish] institutions and firms refrain from offering their services in the city 
without armed security escort, creating by this a frightening impression that the city is under 
occupation. This is in contrast to the well-known fact that Umm-el-Fahem is a city which welcomes its 
visitors with respect, regardless of their origins. Our guests encounter a population which does not 
know how to hate, but does know how to defend itself against hatred and racism“ (Mahameed, H. 
(2007) ‘Makes One Think of a Village: Neglected by the State’, Yediot Ahronot, 22 November 2007, p. 
9) [Hebrew].  
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that interviewing random residents of the city was indispensable to addressing the 
research questions and, thereafter, the production of the substantive part of the 
research.  
The chapter then moved on to discuss how the project’s questions and methodology 
had developed organically according to material that emerged from the initial 
ethnographic experience in the city. It described the different stages of research, the 
additional methods that needed to be adopted and the rationale behind using them in 
the process of what the chapter referred to as deconstructing for constructing. Trying 
to form an understanding of the Palestinian city in Israel, its materiality, the semiotics 
of its public space and its socio-spatiality, the way it was perceived by its residents, 
and the social and political actors involved in its production and (un)making was what 
guides this process.  
Moreover, the chapter discussed how, as well as investigating residents’ subjective 
accounts and experiences of their city and the historical and structural forces that 
shape and produce the Palestinian city, allowing room for my own inquiring gaze 
while in the field was no less important in the deconstructing for constructing process. 
Embedding myself in the city, strolling its streets, taking photographs of its built-
environment and grasping its materiality and semiotics were all part of the process.  
Being open, flexible, and attentive to unexpected material all through the 
ethnographic experience was my strategy, despite its subsequent methodological, 
thematic, and theoretical challenges and anxieties. The chapter described how I felt I 
was being distracted by some of the unexpected material that emerged. This was 
particularly in relation to the socio-political history of the city and the 1989 shift in its 
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political map. Allowing time for reflection, careful data analysis and thought-
provoking conversations with my supervisor helped me realise that what initially 
seemed distracting and off the subject was in fact related, if not foundational to my 
research.  The chapter described how before long, and without having any previous 
plans, I found myself engaged in an organic process of theorisation and 
conceptualisation of the Palestinian city in Israel.  
The chapter then discussed how conducting research in a highly politicised context 
required a special attention to methodological, positional and contextual challenges. 
At the heart of these challenges, that are also interconnected, stood the question of 
how to produce objective knowledge in a context of qualitative urban ethnography, in 
a politicised context, and without compromising field interviewees’ accounts of their 
experiences of their city. The use of additional methods proved indispensable in this 
case. Archival research of newspaper and magazine articles, official state statistics, 
official statements by voices from within the establishment quoted by nationally 
recognised newspapers, official master plans, as well as taking photographs of the 
city's built-environment were all mobilised to help cross-check events narrated by 
interviews and to provide external objective evidence of their arguments and 
accounts.    
The chapter ended with a description of the strategy I chose in gaining the trust of my 
field interviewees. Trust forms an important aspect, if not the base, of ethnographic 
work, especially when conducted in politicised contexts. Paying attention to sartorial 
modesty, ensuring modesty and clarity of speech, speaking with the local accent, as 
well as radiating confidence and professionalism all paid off in gaining trust and 
breaking boundaries.  
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Chapter 3 
The city and the public space 
 
Neither cities nor places in them are unordered, unplanned; the 
question is only whose order, whose planning, for what purpose.  
  (Marcus 1995: 244, quoted in Yacobi 2009:5) 
This short chapter lays down one of the thesis’ main theoretical foundations, that is 
the question of the city, urbanity and material public space. Its overall objective is to 
anchor the Palestinian city in the wider context of what makes a city and to address 
meta-questions of why the city and why public space. In a crude rudimentary fashion, 
the chapter introduces the three different concepts and their indispensable role in 
enhancing citizenship, politics and public life, as well as in providing space for 
culture and personal freedoms to flourish and be materialised. It discusses their 
potentialities and challenges and puts forward the argument that both cities and public 
spaces are produced and constructed and therefore reflect, embody, and reproduce 
social, economic and political relations.  
The city and public space as exclusionary-exclusive sites are discussed. Although the 
chapter traces this feature back to the ancient Greek polis and agora, it is modern 
times that occupy the bulk of this argument as discussed in the subchapter of 
ageographical cities. It illuminates the argument by drawing on the growing body of 
literature concerned with the changing meaning of cities and the increasing erosion of 
public space under neoliberalism. Elaborating on Mike Davis’ (1992) account of the 
transformation of Los Angeles into an urban desert, the subchapter seeks to show how 
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the exclusion of the undesirable classed and racialised urban poor is performed in and 
through space.  
Moving to describe de-urbanisation of black South Africans under apartheid, the 
chapter illustrates how from the colonial state perspective crowd control stands at the 
core of the urban question. The chapter then concludes that regardless of the state’s 
character and nature, whether it is capitalist, post-industrialist, or colonialist, urban 
space, public space and the undesirables are perceived as a threat that needs to be 
fragmented and controlled.  
As far as literature is concerned the chapter draws on literature from urban, 
sociological and (post)colonial disciplines. It features mostly works by Hannah 
Arendt, Henri Lefebvre, Louis Wirth, Georg Simmel, Richard Sennett, Mike Davis, 
Robert Caro, Marshall Berman, Paul Gilroy, Don Mitchell, Mitchell Duneier, David 
Harvey, Mahmood Mamdani, Paul Rabinow and Frantz Fanon.   
Cities: citizenship, politics and urbanity  
 “Cities are civilisation” (LeGates and Stout 1996:15). They are the “incubators and 
sustainers of advanced culture” (ibid). In ancient Greece, for example, it was within 
the vibrant urban life of the city, the polis, that writing, theatre, culture, art, 
mathematics and politics flourished, and where the concepts of urban citizenship and 
self-government emerged. Politics and cities were inextricably linked. The polis was 
the context within which citizens could be public and political, learn the art of speech 
and negotiation and where matters were decided through such avenues, rather than 
force. As Arendt (1998[1958]: 26) notes: “[t]o be political, to live in a polis, meant 
that everything was decided through words and persuasion and not through force and 
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violence.” Persuasion was designated to the polis while force belonged to the private 
sphere, the home and family “where the household head ruled with uncontested, 
despotic powers” (1998: 27). 
“[T]he polis was for the Greeks, as the res publica was for the Romans, first of all 
their guarantee against the futility of individual life” (ibid: 56).108 Therefore, it was in 
the polis that political organisation, which is inherently public, could be realised. 
“According to Greek thought, the human capacity for political organization is not 
only different from but stands in direct opposition to the natural association whose 
center is the home (oikia) and the family” (ibid 24). For Aristotle, the polis had a 
distinct political way of life “in which speech and only speech made sense and where 
the central concern of all citizens was to talk with each other.”  The non-citizens; 
slaves and barbarians who lived outside of the polis were aneu logou, that is deprived 
of the way of life that facilitated speech (ibid 27). 
So what is a city? And what makes it into a unique space? The answer to such 
somewhat generic question has an interdisciplinary dimension and could be examined 
from many different angles and at two different levels. The two levels are the macro, 
which is structural, and the micro, that is urbanity, the way of living and city 
dwellers’ agency. The macro could encompass the political character of the state in 
which the city resides, its history, structure, demographics, ethnic and cultural 
composition, power relations, ecology, geo-politics, built environment, function, 
                                                
108 For Sennett (2002: 3-4) res publica “stands in general for those bonds of association and mutual 
commitment which exist between people who are not joined together by ties of family or intimate 
association; it is the bond of a crowd, of a “people,” of a polity, rather than the bonds of family or 
friends.”  
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architecture, art, semiotics, religion, politics, socio-economic developments and urban 
policies. 
While recognising that cities and their trajectories do not subscribe to the category of 
sameness, but are rather influenced by macro structural processes and characteristics 
internal to their societies as well as external social and political formations, such as 
war and colonialism, there is however a rudimentary sociological definition which 
could have claims to universality. Louis Wirth (1938: 8), for example, refers to the 
city as a social entity and defines it as “a relatively large, dense, and permanent 
settlement of socially heterogeneous individuals.”109 For Lewis Mumford “it is art, 
culture and political purpose, not numbers, that define a city” (quoted in LeGates and 
Stout 1996: 32). Richard Sennett (2002: 264) defines it as “that human settlement in 
which strangers are most likely to meet.” It is “an instrument of impersonal life, the 
mold in which diversity and complexity of persons, interests, and tastes become 
available as social experience” (ibid: 339).  
The city is also an important context for the development of social movements 
(Tonkiss 2005: 65) and is central to the operations of power. Some urbanists such as 
Goonewardena and Kipfer (2007: 25) and Wirth (1938: 5) attribute its dominance and 
importance to its ability to centralise military, political and economic activities, as 
well as being the hub for administrative facilities, commercial, financial, 
transportation, communication, recreational, higher education, religious and welfare 
                                                
109 When discussing urbanism, Wirth (1938:4) recognises that numbers and size of the city could not be 
the sole criterion of urbanity. 
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institution and infrastructure. Others, however, focus on the distinct way of life in the 
city that is urbanism and how that shapes social orders. 
In his book Writing on the City (1996), Henri Lefebvre argues that urban life is an 
indicator and a gauge against which the development of society is measured. For him, 
its development “can only be conceived...by the realisation of urban society” (1996: 
176). To exclude the urban from groups, classes and individuals is to deprive them 
from civilisation, if not from society itself (ibid: 195). The urban in this context 
means the place of encounter, assemblage, heterogeneity and priority to use value, of 
which the cafe, the commercial centre, the street and cultural amenities constitute a 
few examples (ibid: 80). It is within this understanding of the urban that he coined 
“the right to the city,” a right which became celebrated and advocated by geographers 
and urbanists such as David Harvey (2008, 2012) and Don Mitchell (2003). 
For Lefebvre, the right to the city is not “a simple visiting right or as a return to 
traditional cities.” It is rather the right “...to renewed centrality, to places of encounter 
and exchange, to life rhythms and time uses, enabling the full and complete usage of 
these moments and places” (ibid: 158, 179). The right to the city is that of “gathering 
together instead of a fragmentation” (ibid: 195). It is a right that should be enshrined 
as a human right: “the freedom to make and remake our cities and ourselves is one of 
the most precious yet most neglected of our human rights” (Harvey 2008: 23). 
Another feature of the city which sociology is concerned with is the nature of human 
relations. Sociologists agree that in the city, these relations are not of primary 
connections. They are rather impersonal and secondary. The city breaks up traditional 
organised units resting on kinship. Social bonds in this context, as Durkheim would 
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note, are forged through commonalities of belief, custom, rituals, routines, etc. As 
well as existing or potential opportunities for meeting, conversing and organising with 
others with whom one shares commonalities and interests, whether political, 
ideological or cultural, cities are also places of anonymity. In the city, Wirth (1938), 
who draws on Max Weber and Georg Simmel, argues that while the physical and 
face-to-face contact might be close, the social contact, however, is distant. One could 
enjoy a certain degree of emancipation or freedom from the personal and emotional 
controls and expectations of intimate groups (ibid), the tyrannies of intimacy, as 
Sennett (2002) calls it.  
Simmel (1903) in the Metropolis and Mental Life describes life in the city as being 
characterised by intensive sensory stimuli that involve sight, smell and sound. The 
country in contrast has a much slower rhythm of life and sensory imagery. City 
dwellers also have to be more rational and calculated in the way they conduct their 
life and are generally more attuned to time. The hectic rhythms of the city and the 
constant bombardment of such stimuli encourage a type of behaviour which he calls 
the blasé, that is the incapacity to react to new sensations and the ability to 
emotionally disengage from the happenings around, especially when those are 
emotionally distant and do not involve intimate relationships.  
Such conditions make the city a space where individual freedoms, liberties and 
desires have the potential to be fulfilled, where otherness and difference reside and 
where a cosmopolitan culture and creativity have the potential to emerge and flourish. 
It is in this context that one can understand why Marx and Engels (1848) in the 
Communist Manifesto deplored the idiocy of the countryside. Not because people are 
stupid but because of the nature of the closed, insular community which creates 
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homogenous groups, and the conformity and control that limit creativity and bring to 
scrutiny the actions of those who seek to break out of it. As the medieval saying goes 
“[c]ity air makes people free,” (Sorkin 1992: xv). 
Material public space  
Cities, however, are not abstract spaces. Rather, they are material and it is in public 
space that public life and activities, whether cultural, social, economic or political, are 
performed. Material public space is a prerequisite for public life. As Arendt (1998: 
194-195) put it: “[b]efore men began to act, a definite space had to be secured and a 
structure built where all subsequent actions could take place...” In ancient Greece, this 
definite space was the agora, that is the public space of the polis where public life 
was materialised. The agora functioned as “the place of citizenship, an open space 
where public affairs and legal disputes were conducted...it was also the marketplace, a 
place of the pleasurable jostling, where citizens’ bodies, words, actions, and produce 
were literally on mutual display, and where judgments, decisions, and bargains were 
made” (Mitchell 1995: 116). 
The agora was the place where “the citizen could realise his spiritual, moral and 
intellectual capacities” (Kitto 1996: 31). It was also the space of appearance and 
visibility, a component which for Arendt is indispensable to being: “the space where I 
appear to others as others appear to me, where men exist not merely like other living 
or inanimate things make their appearance explicitly...To men the reality of the world 
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is guaranteed by the presence of others, by its appearing to all; ‘for what appears to 
all, this we call Being” (Arendt: 198-99).110  
Public space that is material, unmediated, and free of exclusive access rights is 
indicative of the democratic nature of society and is an indispensable component of it. 
It is in and through public space that democratic rights, and the struggle to achieve 
such rights, are exercised and where alternative movements have the potential to arise 
and contest issues of citizenship and democracy. As Mitchell (1995:123) observes, 
social movements must and do occupy material public space in the city: “these 
movements are premised on the notion that democratic (and certainly revolutionary) 
politics are impossible without the simultaneous creation and control of material 
space.”  
Visibility, which is by definition a vocal demand and a statement of public 
recognition and legitimacy, is one of the most important features of democratic public 
space. The “...public space is a place within which political movements can stake out 
the territory that allows them to be seen (and heard)” (Mitchell 2003: 129 [original 
emphasis and brackets]). However, to be seen and heard extends beyond political 
movements. The vulnerable sections of society, those on the margins of society or 
those who are not located within its hetero-normative order, as well as demanding 
their socio-economic rights be recognised, demand to be seen and heard. The sexual 
citizenship and gay rights struggle is partly, but importantly, a struggle for visibility 
and to gain legitimacy in public space. 
                                                
110 Quoting Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics. 
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Mitchell (1995), while acknowledging the important role electronic space could play 
in political movements and revolutions, argues that no revolution has been conducted 
in such spaces. For him revolutions involve taking to the streets and occupying public 
space. “Political movements must create the space in which they can be represented” 
(ibid: 124). His argument is squarely relevant to contemporary discussions around the 
2011 Egyptian revolution in particular and other public protests, whether in the streets 
of London in the summer of 2011, or those of Bahrain, Yemen, the Occupy 
movement of Wall Street New York, St Paul’s London, Spain and others. 
Many analysts, hyped about facebook and social media networks, hailed them as the 
catalyst behind the Egyptian revolution. Without getting into details about the 
material conditions and the tyrannical, oppressive and repressive regime, the extremes 
of poverty and wealth and deepened socio-economic polarisation under which many 
Egyptians live and which they sought to radically change, it was Tahrir Square, the 
persistent present of Egyptians in their millions and the battles around its open streets 
that made Egyptians visible. Tahrir Square, referred to as the beating heart of the 
revolution (Grondahl and Mohyeldin 2011), became iconic of the Egyptian uprising. 
Its symbolism became an inspiration to the many demonstrations and peoples’ 
assemblies that swept across the globe in 2011 (see figure 10 below). The materiality 
of public space, as Gilroy (2010: 22) would argue, in a different context nonetheless, 
synchronises collective experiences of oppression, creating therefore the potential for 
public protest or “acting in concert” as he calls it. 
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Figure 10: Tahrir Square street sign, London Stock Exchange Occupation in St Paul's (LSX) 
21 October 2011 
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Cities and their public spaces do not exist in a vacuum, neither are they static. 
Lefebvre asks the questions “Who produces?’, ‘What?’, ‘How?’, ‘Why and for 
whom?” (1991: 69). He argues that not only is space constructed and produced, it also 
embodies social and political relations and reproduces them. Space also works as a 
tool for the analysis of society (ibid: 26-27). Literature on cities, from Engels’ (1984 
[1844]) writings on The Conditions of the Working Class in England, particularly his 
essay ‘The Great Town,’ in which he reveals how class apartheid is demonstrated in 
the built-environment of Manchester, to the ghettoisation of Los Angles (Davis 1992 
[1990]), the Haussmannisation of Paris in the nineteenth century (Harvey 2005, 
Sennett 2002), the active privatisation of human life (Sennett 2002) to writings on the 
deliberate fragmentation of black communities in apartheid South Africa through 
policies of ethnic homelands and influx control (Dawson 2005: 134), are all but a few 
examples of how political, economic, social and class realities, as well as  power 
relations are manifested and performed in the built-environment. 
 Foucault (1998: 237), characterising the present epoch as being primarily “the epoch 
of space,” suggests that the organisation of space is a form of exercising power and 
control over those who occupy the space. To prove his argument, he took the example 
of the panopticon, a model first introduced by Jeremy Bentham, as an institution in 
which the use of coercion and commands to control a population was replaced by the 
partition of space, the isolation of individuals, and their systematic yet unseen 
surveillance, where they can be seen but not see. 
Cities and public spaces, however, as well as being spaces of heterogeneity and 
otherness, spaces of potentialities, culture and politics, liberties and desires, activities 
and organisation, productivity and employment, pleasure and creativity, are also 
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places of fear, oppression, repression, exclusion and power relations. Even the highly 
celebrated and romanticised agora of ancient Greece was a site of exclusive and 
exclusionary properties. Although it provided a meeting point where strangers and 
people from all walks of life could physically share the same public space and where 
politics, commerce and spectacle were juxtaposed (Mitchell 1995), enjoyment of 
public life and citizenship rights in the polis were restricted to a narrow and privileged 
social class, known as the free citizens. Women, slaves and foreigners were excluded 
from enjoying such rights (Arendt 1998; Low and Smith 2006; Mitchell 1995, 2003). 
Citizenship rights were awarded to a carefully selected homogenous social class of 
“those with power, standing, and respectability” (Mitchell 1995: 116).111 To conclude, 
both cities and public spaces are contested spaces “within which dominant power 
holders try to stipulate ‘normative ecologies’ of who ‘belongs’ (and who does not) 
where and when within the urban fabric” (Norris and Armstrong 1999, quoted in 
Graham and Marvin 2001: 232). 
Ageographical cities: neoliberalism, segregation, control and the changing 
meaning of the city and its public space  
In modern times, particularly those under the dictates of a neoliberal social order, 
commodity fetishism, privatisation, and the rise of the private home and property and 
its protection to an unprecedented sanctuary value, urbanists and sociologists alike are 
increasingly concerned and occupied with the meaning of the city and its public 
space. There exists a growing body of literature (Berman 1983; Davis 1992 ; Duneier 
                                                
111 These exclusionary features aside, the agora provides a prototype of what a public space and 
participatory citizenship should and could look like. 
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2001; Harvey 2012; Graham and Marvin 2001; Lefebvre 1991; Low and Smith 2005; 
Mitchell 1995, 2003; Sennett 2002; Sorkin 1992) 112  that is concerned with the 
progressive erosion of public space, its appropriation by corporate and real-estate 
developers and the radical transformation of its meaning and function, its subjection 
to increased surveillance, securitisation and control, the homogenisation of urban 
design and those who have access rights to public space, the transformation of 
urbanity, the attack on democratic rights, the suburbanisation of cities and their 
radical transformation into what Sorkin (1992: xi) calls the ageographical cities. Such 
phenomena are mostly experienced in advanced capitalist and post-industrial cities, 
especially those in the United States of America.  
The clampdown on public space on the one hand, and the promotion of pseudo public 
space, on the other, assume an accelerated rate under the political climate of 
neoliberalism, which encourages, legitimises and allows such changes and attacks to 
happen. This pseudo public space is geared towards consumption and what Gilroy 
(2010) would call consumerist citizenship. Leisure and recreational space ruled by 
classed-access and racialised regulations, where only those who can afford to pay can 
enjoy it, stands at the heart of it. This process intensified in the name of public safety 
and national security (Low and smith 2005:1) since the 9/11 terrorist attack on the 
Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York City. 
                                                
112 This by no means serves as an exhaustive list of authors concerned with the urban question and 
public space.  
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At the heart of such clampdown and transformations is the isolation and exclusion of 
the undesirables or what Davis (1992) calls the urban pariah; the poor Latino families 
and immigrants, young black men, the homeless, from public space and public sight. 
The ultimate objection is the maximisation of control, whether through surveillance or 
reducing social interactions to a minimum, all in the defence of the corporate edifices 
and the middle and upper-class life style of exuberant consumption (Davis 1992; 
Sorkin 1992; Mitchell 1995).  
Mike Davis (1992) in his book City of Quartz on Los Angeles’ (LA’s) urban desert, 
tells the story of a city as one of commodification, privatisation, militarisation, 
securitisation, corporatisation, ghettoisation, urban segregation, racialisation, South-
Africanisation of spatial relations, and social and class polarisation that resulted in the 
radical transformation of the city’s urban and public space on one hand, and the 
exclusion, demonisation and criminalisation of the undesirable and impoverished 
sections of society on the other. The constellation of private capital, greedy real-estate 
developers and LA Police Department (LAPD) converge in their interest to 
appropriate and control public space by waging a class and race war on the urban 
pariah.113 
The battleground for this war is in and through architecture and urban design. LAPD, 
for example, sits on the design board of at least one major Downtown redevelopment 
                                                
113 The real-estate developers not only transform the socio-spatiality of the city ruthlessly, displacing 
and further attacking the poor but are willing to uproot and clean whatever comes on their way which 
could obstruct their developments. Nature is no exception to their brutality. When necessary it is also 
razed to the ground: “the region’s major natural wonder, a Joshua tree forest containing individual 
specimens often thirty feet high and older than the Domesday Book, is being bulldozed into oblivion” 
(Davis 1992:4).  
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project. The city in its repressive class war even invokes cold war idioms by 
promoting the “containment’ of the homeless,” with public toilets being “the real 
Eastern Front of the Downtown war on the poor” (1992: 232-233). In Skid Row, the 
Community Redevelopment Agency, following the advice of the LAPD, bulldozed 
the remaining public toilets, justifying its actions through the “quasi-public 
restrooms,’ – meaning toilets in restaurants, art galleries and office buildings - which 
can be made available to tourists and office workers while being denied to vagrants 
and other unsuitables” (ibid: 234). As a result of such deliberate policies, LA has 
fewer available public toilets than any major North American city (ibid: 233). As 
evinced in Duneier’s (2001) photo-ethnographic book Sidewalk, ‘taking a piss’ with 
dignity, which is one of the most fundamental things in life, becomes difficult if not 
impossible for a homeless in the streets of New York’s affluent neighbourhoods.  
The crusade to secure the city is the de facto destruction of accessible public space 
(Davis 1992: 226). It turns public facilities and spaces as “unliveable’ as possible for 
the homeless and the poor” (ibid: 232). The proliferation of pseudo-public spaces, 
where public activity is mostly anti-pedestrian and internalised, and is subject to 
surveillance and under the panopticon gaze, seen but not sees, is taking over. Such 
spaces are the norm and they share the common interest of driving the undesirable 
away. “[T]he sumptuary malls, office centers, culture acropolises, and so on - are full 
of invisible signs warning off the underclass ‘Other”(ibid: 226). Their unwritten 
access regulations, which set behavioural rules of what is accepted and what is not 
(Mitchell 1995), extend to include streets, public parks, even public benches. The 
once vibrant pedestrian streets are turned into “traffic sewers” and public parks are 
transformed into “temporary receptacles for the homeless and wretched" (Davis 1992: 
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226). The class and race war is also manifested in increasingly dwindling public 
amenities, closure of playgrounds and libraries, derelict parks, segregated beaches and 
criminalisation of youth whose ordinary congregations are banned.  
The affluent and luxurious side of LA, however, represents a diametrically opposed 
reality, where segregation and privatisation are the desirable and sought-after 
commodities. They represent the epitome of urban enclavisation. The contrast 
between the two invokes South Africanisation of spatial relations where urban space 
is increasingly taking on the Manichaeism of a racial colonial and apartheid order. 
The obsession with security is rampant in those luxurious gated communities which 
are becoming fortress cities with encompassing visible and invisible walls, restricted 
entry points with guard posts, and “passport control’ on outsiders” (ibid: 244-46). 
They have their own private armed security guards and private residential parks. 
Security, however, is less about personal safety than insulation, whether in residential, 
work and travel environments. It is “a prestige symbol,” “a positional good defined by 
income access to private ‘protective services’ and membership in some hardened 
residential enclave or restricted suburb” (ibid: 224). It is in fact another commodity to 
consume that is in high demand and which yields a lucrative industry. 
Davis concludes that the aims behind the manipulation of architecture converge with 
police interest around the problem of crowd control (ibid: 257). Not only does 
architecture serve the function of keeping the crowd under control but also 
homogenises it by filtering out the undesirables. LA’s “contemporary Downtown 
‘renaissance’ is designed to make” the once heterogeneous space of “mixed crowds of 
Anglo Black and Latino pedestrians of different ages and classes” virtually impossible 
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(ibid: 231). LA “once-upon-a-time a demi-paradise of free beaches, luxurious parks, 
and ‘cruising strips’, genuinely democratic space is all but extinct” (ibid: 227). 
In a similar vein, Mitchell (1995), who asks whether public space has come to an end, 
concludes that the struggle over public space is a struggle over opposing ideologies, 
conflicting desires, needs and visions for public space and the different ways 
members of society conceptualise its meaning. Those in power speak the language of 
order and those in the margins speak the language of rights and democratic rights. For 
activists who defend the rights to unregulated accessible public spaces as in the case 
of People’s Park in Berkeley, the park “was a place where the rights of citizenship 
could be expanded to the most disenfranchised segment of contemporary American 
democracy: the homeless. People’s Park provided the space for representing the 
legitimacy of homeless people within ‘the public” (Mitchell 1995: 117). Hence, 
restricting the homeless access to public space is to deny them social legitimacy. 
Spatial segregation along racial and/or class lines and the manipulation of architecture 
and urban design is not a new phenomenon. Haussmann’s urban restructuring of Paris 
was, among other things, geared to achieve such an effect. Marshall Berman (1983) in 
his book All That Is Solid Melts Into Air, and Robert Caro’s (1974) The Power 
Broker: Robert Moses and the Fall of New York, analyse the classed and racialised 
character of the destruction of the Bronx in New York for building the Cross Bronx 
Expressway by the architect Robert Moses (who is known as the Haussmann of New 
York), and its impact on the urban experience. The radical transformation of the 
environment prioritised the commodity fetish of the automobile, speed and 
consumerism and the interests of the rich. It was often at the expense of the poor, the 
non-whites, and the working class who witnessed the destruction of their traditional 
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neighbourhoods, the corner shops and streets and their evictions in tens of thousands. 
Moses who destroyed those communities “built parks and playgrounds with a lavish 
hand, but they were parks and playgrounds for the rich and comfortable. Recreational 
facilities for the poor he doled out like a miser” (Caro 1974: 20). When he built 
houses and flats for the poor these were not only bleak and cheap, but also in 
locations that contributed to their further racial and class ghettoisation (ibid).  
The colonial city: different contexts similar currency 
The urban question, the militarisation of public space and systems of racialised spatial 
exclusion and control justified by demonising the other, assume a more profound, 
conspicuous, Manichaean and repressive tone in colonial contexts. In advanced 
capitalist cities, the undesirable others are the poor, the working class and the 
underclass who are also racialised. In a colonial context the other is the colonised. 
Despite the difference in their circumstances, the undesirables in both contexts are 
subject to a similar currency of racialised socio-spatial polarisation and deliberate 
fragmentation that is aimed at keeping the threat they are thought to pose at bay.  
Whether it is advanced capitalism, colonialism or postcolonialism, these systems 
conceive of urban space, public space, and the undesirables as a threat that needs to be 
fragmented and controlled. In a colonial context, however, spatial segregation is 
enforced by the power of the gun and law made to fit the ruling class. Those who do 
not conform are faced with criminalisation and punishment. Mahmood Mamdani’s 
(1996) book Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late 
Colonialism, which revolves around the fundamental question of how to ensure the 
rule of a colonial minority over a majority native population, shows that managing the 
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urban question in Apartheid South Africa was key to keeping black Africans under 
control. Influx control and pass laws, introduced before but consolidated under 
Apartheid, were rigidly enforced against black Africans’ movement when present in 
white areas. They were instrumental in maintaining the Apartheid regime.    
Mamdani (1996) notes that already before Apartheid was formally institutionalised, 
the colonial government, which had pursued territorial segregation, recognised the 
threat of black South Africans urbanisation. Their urbanisation threatened to break 
away from the traditional customary system through which the colonial government 
ensured the natives subordination. Urbanisation embodied the threat of their 
detribalisation, which meant a destabilisation of the colonial government. “So long as 
the native family home is not with the white man but in his own area, so long the 
native organization will not be materially affected”(1996: 6), urbanisation, in Smuts 
words, was under control.  
It is only when segregation breaks down, when the whole family 
migrates from the tribal home and out of the tribal jurisdiction to the 
white man’s farm or the white man’s town, that the tribal bond is 
snapped, and the traditional system falls in decay. And it is this 
migration of the native family, of the females and children, to the 
farms and the towns which should be prevented.  
   (quoted ibid) 
The rapid structural changes in the economy, its industrialisation and the demand for 
cheap labour, resulted in the inevitable urbanisation of black South Africans. This, 
however, posed a challenge to the colonial government that was faced with the labour 
question on one hand, and the native or the demographic, on the other. The presence 
of large numbers of black people in white cities, whose objective conditions were of 
exploitation and deprivation at the hands of the ruling white minority that enjoyed the 
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privileges of their work, was a recipe for potential violence, and a threat to the 
regime’s status quo. 
Apartheid, Mamdani (1996: 27) argues, was the answer for mitigating such a tension. 
Apartheid, for him, was a form of rule over the native, which “like the indirect rule 
colonial state - fractured the ranks of the ruled along a double divide: ethnic on the 
one hand, rural-urban on the other.” It was “the result of a reform in the mode of rule 
which attempted to contain a growing urban-based revolt, first by repackaging the 
native population under the immediate constellation of autonomous Native 
Authorities so as to fragment it, and then by policing its movement between country 
and town so as to freeze the division between the two” (ibid: 31).  
Therefore, the fragmentation of communities along ethnic and racial lines and the 
control over black South Africans’ spatialisation and their movement were a 
necessary control mechanism. When in urban places, they were temporary residents 
restricted to their migrant status. They were migrant workers. Key to controlling them 
was to spatially confine them and cut them off from the surrounding townships on one 
hand, and employing indirect rule, on the other. The control over them was also 
gendered. When in the single sex hostels, black rural migrants were subject to the 
control of their respective Native Authorities, where they had their families. “Every 
effort was made to turn urban hostels in which migrants lived into enclaves shut off 
socially and physically from surrounding townships, just as an effort was made to 
subordinate migrants inside hostels to a regime of indirect rule” (ibid: 220). 
To be in the city, the indigenous black population had to be legally entitled to be 
there. Only employed workers could be in the city and those were subject to a regime 
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of restrictions and pass laws. Those who were caught in the city “for staying longer 
than seventy-two hours without the requisite permission or for failing to produce their 
passbooks on demand” were criminalised and sent to prison. An estimated seventeen 
and a half million black migrants were prosecuted under the pass laws between 1916 
and 1981 (ibid: 228). In addition, black South Africans were subject to what Mamdani 
(ibid: 29) called the artificial de-urbanisation and brutal forced removals of their 
growing urban population. However, such attempts by the Apartheid regime had 
failed to weaken the strength of urban-based black South Africans. “One testimony to 
the strength of the black civil society was the urban uprising that built wave upon 
wave following Soweto 1976 and that was at the basis the shift in the paradigm of 
resistance from armed to popular struggle” (ibid: 29).  
In North Africa, French colonial urbanism employed unequal urban policies. One 
reinforced tradition and another endorsed modernity. Culture was invoked to justify 
such racialised policies. For the colonial officers, Europeans and Muslims had 
different cultural practices. They claimed that modernising the medina - the 
traditional town where Moroccans lived - by introducing wide streets and modern 
architecture of water and sewer, would ruin its charm (Rabinow 1989: 301). For 
Huber Lyautey, head of the protectorate of Morocco, however important the aesthetic 
of urban design was, “appearance was functionally equivalent to being,” it was social 
hierarchy that was central to his rule over the colonised (ibid: 284, 282). His strategy 
“emphasized the necessity of reorganizing power relations among social groups” 
which was to be achieved through urban planning (ibid: 288). The dual city, building 
modern French cities adjacent to Morocco's older picturesque madinas, was the form 
that this hierarchy took (ibid: 286). The duality guaranteed that the two cities were 
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close yet separate. The overarching objective behind it, apart from its touristic and 
therefore economic value, was political (Rabinow 1989; Wright 1997). 
Duality was used as a control mechanism that aimed to prevent resistance to colonial 
authority. The colonial officials “hoped to preserve an established sense of hierarchy 
and propriety, buttressing it with what they perceived to be traditional rituals, spatial 
patterns, and architectural ornament, believing that this would reinforce their own 
super-imposed order” (Wright 1997: 323). Lyautey and his head of urbanism, Henri 
Prost, designed policies which were conducive to their colonial needs. Policies which 
“could effectively quell the possibility of social unrest and encourage economic 
development” (ibid: 326) and meet military ends (Rabinow 1989: 298). Policies that 
would guarantee surveillance and domination. Janet Abu-Lughud (1980) 
characterised such spatial policies as a theatre of urban Apartheid. 
Frantz Fanon (1969 [1961]), in The Wretched of the Earth, provides a graphic 
representation of the spatial Manichaean and dual order of colonialism: the European 
settler city and the native town divided by frontiers of military presence in the shape 
of barracks and police stations. The Manichaean order, which is built on, reinforced 
and maintained by the power of the gun, is inescapably visible in space.  
The colonial world is a world divided into compartments...the 
existence of native quarters and European quarters...schools for 
natives and schools for Europeans...The colonial world is a world 
cut in two. The dividing line, the frontiers are shown by barracks 
and police stations. In the colonies it is the policeman and the 
soldier who are the official, instituted go-between...This world cut 
in two is inhabited by two different species...When you examine at 
close quarters the colonial context, it is evident that what parcels out 
the world is to begin with the fact of belonging to or not belonging 
to a given race, a given species. Fanon (1969:29-31) 
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Such diametrically opposed duality is irreconcilable and is reciprocally exclusive. 
“The zone where the natives live is not complementary to the zone inhabited by the 
settlers. The two zones are opposed, but not in the service of a higher unity. Obedient 
to the rules of pure Aristotelian logic, they both follow the principle of reciprocal 
exclusivity. No conciliation is possible, for of the two terms, one of superfluous” 
(ibid: 30). Fanon carries on to describe the binaries and polarities of the colonial city 
not only as manifested in function but also as embedded in its socio-economic, 
spatiality, architecture and hygiene. It is the contrast between being made to look 
modern on one side, and deliberate negligence on the other.      
The settler’s town is a strongly-built town, all made of stone and 
steel. It is brightly-lit town; the streets are covered with asphalt, and 
the garbage-cans swallow all the leavings, unseen, unknown and 
hardly thought about. The settler’s feet are never visible, except 
perhaps in the sea; but there you’re never close enough to see them. 
His feet are protected by strong shoes although the streets of his 
town are clean and even, with no holes or stones. The settler’s town 
is a well-fed town, an easy-going town; its belly is always full of 
good things. The settler’s town is a town of white people, of 
foreigners.  
 
The town belonging to the colonized people, or at least the native 
town, the Negro village, the medina, the reservation, is a place of ill 
fame, peopled by men of evil repute. They are born there, it matters 
little where or how; they die there, it matters not where, nor how. It 
is a world without spaciousness; men live there on top of each other, 
and their huts are built one on top of the other. The native town is a 
hungry town, starved of bread, of meat, of shoes, of coal, of light. 
The native town is a crouching village, a town on its knees, a town 
wallowing in the mire. It is a town of niggers and dirty arabs. 
(Ibid: 30) 
 
138	
Conclusion  
By introducing the concepts of the city and the material public space, their 
potentialities, challenges, and the anxieties they create for the state if not controlled, 
the chapter laid down one aspect of the thesis’ theoretical foundation. The chapter 
started by tracing the two concepts back to ancient Greece. It introduced the polis and 
the agora as the centrepiece of public life and how they played an indispensable role 
in enhancing citizenship, and in allowing culture and politics to come into shape. The 
polis and the agora however were also exclusionary-exclusive types of sites. 
Although they were meeting points for people from all walks of life, exercising 
citizenship and public life was exclusive to a very privileged section of society, called 
the free citizens. Women and slaves, for example, were excluded from enjoying 
public life, or taking an active role in shaping politics and citizenship.  
The chapter then moved to introducing the city as a site of potentialities and personal 
freedoms. It discussed how the city as a site of urbanity, heterogeneous mingling and 
impersonal relationships allows personal liberties to be exercised and social control to 
be less visible. Therefore, creativity and freedom of association with one’s like-
minded individuals and groups are more likely to be materialised.  
Moreover, the chapter discussed how neither cities nor public spaces exist in a 
vacuum. Rather, they are constructed and produced. They embody and reproduce 
social, economic and political relations and therefore could be used as a tool for 
analysing society. Far from being perfect and ideal, cities are also sites of oppression, 
repression, exclusion and control. This is particularly true for modern times, which 
are characterised by vicious unprecedented neoliberalism, commodity fetish and 
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corporatisation. It is against this context that the chapter moved to discuss the 
changing meaning of cities and the increasing erosion of public space, especially but 
not solely, in post-industrial capitalist states.  
Turning cities and public spaces into homogenised, corporatised exclusionary-
exclusive sites is the trend that is in the ascendant. With examples from LA as 
described by Mike Davis (1992), the chapter illustrated how architectural design is 
employed as a technology to exclude the undesirables, who are often classed and 
racialised. The aim of this process is to keep public space exclusive to those who can 
pay and those who can conform to the consumerist, leisure-led public life. In this 
context, surveillance and crowd control become indispensable to defending 
consumerist citizenship, to promoting the corporatised pseudo public spaces and the 
increasing ghettoised segregated cities.   
The chapter finally discussed how the exclusionary-exclusive properties of a city and 
public space assume similar functions, though sometimes more accentuated under 
colonial conditions. The undesirables, whether under capitalist/post-industrial regimes 
or colonial control, are subject to a similar currency of racialised socio-spatial 
polarisation and deliberate fragmentation that is aimed at keeping the threat they are 
thought to pose at bay. Regardless of the state’s character and nature, urban space, 
public space and the undesirables are perceived as a threat that needs to be 
fragmented and controlled, To illustrate the argument, the chapter drew on the black 
South-Africans under apartheid, as discussed by Mamdani, and Fanon’s Wretched of 
the earth.  
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While the subject of the colonial state and its relationship to the city, citizenship and 
public space was touched on throughout this chapter, the next chapter will discuss in 
more detail, the structural and macro historical forces that shape the making of the 
Palestinian city. It discusses the thesis’ second theoretical foundation, that it is Israel’s 
colonial nomos, which impinges on and shapes both the very essence of the 
Palestinian city and citizenship, and their (un)making.  
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Chapter 4 
Israel’s colonial nomos: Manichaeism in the making 
 
Our story is political. Politics permeate every aspect of our lives: the 
social, the economic, the financial … Our conflict is with Zionism. 
Everything is a derivative of it … What defines our existence is the 
conflict … everything revolves around it, including the question of 
the city and urbanism. 
Adil, Umm al-Fahem, 12 July 2009 
On 17 September 2014, Israel’s Supreme Court dismissed a petition filed by Adalah, 
the Legal Centre for Arab Minority Rights in Israel, the Association for Civil Rights 
in Israel, the Mizrahi Democratic Rainbow, et al, against the “Admission Committees 
Law.” The law, enacted in March 2011, allows about 434 Jewish community 
settlements in the Naqab and the Galilee to operate a screening mechanism against 
applicants for housing on the grounds of “social suitability” and “social and cultural 
fabric” that each settlement sets for itself.114 In other words, the law legalises and 
entrenches racial and class segregation of those perceived as undesirables in about 43 
per cent of all towns in the country.115  
                                                
114 Settlement in this context is not used in reference to the illegal settlements (colonies- Hitanhliyot in 
Hebrew) of 1967 Occupied Palestinian Territories. In Hebrew a community settlement, or a community 
locality is called Yishuv Kihilati.  
115 For more information see Adalah (2014) Israeli Supreme Court upholds \"Admissions Committees 
Law\" that allows Israeli Jewish communities to exclude Palestinian Arab citizens. 17 September 2014. 
Available at: 
http://adalah.org/eng/Articles/2327/%5C%22http://adalah.org/Public/files/Hebrew/Legal_Advocacy/D
ecisions/%5C%22http://www.adalah.org/eng/?mod=articles&ID=1086\%22 . See also: 
Zarchin, T. and Khoury, J. (2012) ‘Israeli AG Defends Controversial Law on Admissions Panels’, 
Haaretz 26 January 2012 [Online].   
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On 1 December 2013, Haaretz newspaper revealed in an exclusive article that the 
settlement division of the World Zionist Organisation (WZO), an executive arm of the 
government in charge of settlement activities in the Galilee and the Naqab, is 
formulating a plan to settle 100,000 Jews in central Galilee. The article reported that 
the former aims to Judaize the Galilee in order to achieve a demographic balance with 
the Arab population and to give “expression to Israeli sovereignty through settlement 
activity,” as stated by the division.116 “Sustaining the area and preserving our hold on 
it requires the continued development…to improve settlement continuity and enhance 
the demographic balance,” wrote the division in its letter to the planning authorities 
(Zafrir 2013).117 
On 5 August 2008, the Housing Minister Ze’ev Boim announced that an accelerated 
plan for building the Ultra-Orthodox Jewish city of Harish in Wadi Ara should be 
underway.118 Four years later, on 27 August 2012, The Marker - Haaretz business, 
finance and real-estate section - reported that the Housing Ministry and the Israel 
Land Administration (ILA) had announced in a press conference that they will start 
                                                
116 Judaizing the Galilee is the term used by Israeli media and Palestinians alike in reference to building 
Jewish settlements and towns. Haaretz article in Hebrew uses the term. The English version of the 
article does not use it. See Zafrir, R. (2013) ’The Settlement Unit Renewing the Judaization Plan for 
the Galilee’, Haaretz 1 December 2013. [Hebrew, online].  
117 The proposed plan for new settlements and the expansion of existing ones goes beyond the limits of 
the national master plan for development. For more information see Zafrir, R. (2013) ‘WZO Pushing 
New Jewish Towns to 'Balance’ Arab Population in Israel's North’, Haaretz, 1 December 2013. 
Available at: http://www.haaretz.com/news/national/.premium-1.561052   
118     The Palestinians of Wadi Ara, who constitute the majority of the region’s population, are against 
the new planned city. They are clear that the main objective behind it is to control and Judaize land 
around Palestinian localities to ghettoise them and reduce the chances of their future spatial expansion. 
The planned city “will turn the Palestinian localities in Wadi Ara into ghettos,” said an interviewee 
from the department of strategic planning in Umm al-Fahem (2 August 2009).  
For more information on the planned city see the website of the Ministry of Construction and Housing: 
The Establishment of the Haredi City of Hareesh. 
http://www.moch.gov.il/spokesman/pages/doverlistitem.aspx?listid=5b390c93-15b2-4841-87e3-
abf31c1af63d&webid=fe384cf7-21cd-49eb-8bbb-71ed64f47de0&itemid=65    [Hebrew]. 
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publishing the first tenders for 5000 housing units in Harish. ILA’s CEO, Bentzi 
Lieberman, declared in the same press conference that the city, with its 10,000 new 
housing units, was built to house the people of Israel. “These tenders belong to the 
entire people of Israel...The people of Israel are blessed that the government 
ministries continue with Zionism...”, said Lieberman (Bousso 2012).119  
In July 2009, the Housing Minister, Ariel Atias, warned against the spread of the 
Palestinian population, or the Arab population as he refers to them. Addressing Israel 
Bar Association which was debating reforming the ILA, the minister said: “I see [it] 
as a national duty to prevent the spread of a population that, to say the least, does not 
love the state of Israel...The mayor of Acre [mixed city of Jews and Arabs] visited me 
yesterday for three hours and asked me how his town could be saved...He told me 
'bring a bunch of Haredis [ultra-orthodox Jews who are known for their high birth 
rate] and we'll save the city, even if I lose my political standing.' He told me that 
Arabs are living in Jewish buildings and running them out,” Haaretz reported 
(Lieberman 2009).120 
Israel’s immediate past furnishes ample examples of its ethnic absolutist Manichaean 
nomos, which is simultaneously exclusive and exclusionary both in ideology and 
                                                
119 As the press conference was taking place members of the already existing 300 households of the 
local secular community of Harish were protesting against the plan, which they say is designed to 
house an ultra-orthodox community. For more information see Bousso, N. (2012) ‘Harish was 
Inaugurated with more than 10,000 Units, Atias: Not just for Haredim’, the Marker, 27 August 2012 
[Hebrew]. Available at: http://www.themarker.com/realestate/1.1810155.   
120  In the same conference Atias called for segregation between religious and secular Jews. In 
promoting his view, the housing minister said: ”I, as an ultra-Orthodox Jew, don't think that religious 
Jews should have to live in the same neighborhood as secular couples, so as to avoid unnecessary 
friction. And since some 5,000 to 6,000 religious couples get married every year, a problem arises 
because they require a certain kind of community life that goes along with their lifestyle" (Lieberman 
2009). 
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practice. The High Court decision in relation to selection committees and Haaretz 
reports are not isolated examples. Rather, they are rooted and informed by Israel’s 
founding Zionist ideology with its Manichaean inscriptions of “Jews only”, which the 
chapter will later elaborate on. The reports illustrate and reveal both the nature and the 
challenges of the unfinished transformative Zionist project, whose underlying 
objective is excluding, compartmentalising and fragmenting the Palestinian existence 
on one hand, and the expansionism and consolidation of Jewish presence and 
domination over the same piece of land, on the other. They reveal the suspended 
dialectic of inclusion-exclusion, citizen-enemy status that Palestinians inside Israel 
inhabit and how they are perceived as a problem that needs to be controlled.121 
Haaretz reports demonstrate Israel’s predicament that in order to survive as a Jewish 
state and a state for the Jews it has to continue with its relentless expansionist and 
colonising process both spatially and demographically.122    
This is the framing political context in which Palestinians, their cities and villages 
found themselves. As illustrated in the opening quotation by a fieldwork interviewee, 
the character of the state and the question of the right to functioning substantive city 
and citizenship are inseparable. The chapter’s departure point is that Umm al-Fahem’s 
urban condition and materiality cannot be read and analysed myopically, that is by 
looking solely into its local history and local forces. While the project recognises that 
a city is an oeuvre as Lefebvre argued, a work in which all of its citizen participate 
                                                
121 By inclusive exclusion I refer to the fact that Palestinians in Israel inhabit a state of the betwixt and 
between. Although they are citizens of the state, hence their inclusion, they are excluded from enjoying 
substantive citizenship. The chapter will elaborate on their exclusion from accessing land.   
122 As mentioned in footnote number 118, in the Israeli discourse the colonising process is often 
referred to as Judaization.   
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(Lefebvre 1991; Mitchell 2003: 17) and, therefore, the residents of Umm al-Fahem 
have their role in the way their city develops, the onus however is on the state as a 
centralised power to create the structural conditions which allow a city to function and 
provide for its residents’ needs. Therefore, investigating Israel’s history, its defining 
character, its ongoing and unfinished settler colonialism as well as its juridico-
political order becomes indispensable to understanding the macro historical and 
structural forces that continue to shape and account for the very essence of the 
Palestinian city and citizenship, and their (un)making. 
To help contextualise and conceptualise the Palestinian city in Israel, the chapter 
draws on Carl Schmitt’s theory of the nomos.123 In his book The Nomos of the Earth 
(2006 [1950]), Schmitt invokes the Greek concept of the nomos, which could also 
mean law, to deconstruct the relationship between the ordering of space, power and 
law. He provides a legal genealogy of the spatial ordering of the earth and elaborates 
on the history of colonial expansionism and how colonialism and power function. He 
explains how the nomos is about conquering the land, as much as it is about division 
of the land.  
For Schmitt, although land-appropriation “constitutes the original spatial order, the 
source of all further concrete order and all further law” (2006: 48), and as such 
produces the possibility for the political, not every seizure of land is a nomos (ibid: 
                                                
123 Although Carl Schmitt will always be remembered for his association with Nazi Germany and that 
his writings on sovereignty, politics and law provided justification for the authoritarian regime (Legg 
2011: i), his concepts of the nomos and the state of exception prove insightful in deconstructing the 
relationship between spatial configurations and power. In recent years, especially after September 11, 
Carl Schmitt’s work specifically around these two concepts gained currency among political theorists.  
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80). Appropriation, distribution and production are what make and define the nomos 
(ibid: 351). The nomos is “the measure by which the land in a particular order is 
divided and situated” (ibid: 70). It provides the concrete framework within which 
decisions of juridical order can be made. As he states “all the subsequent regulations 
of a written or unwritten kind derive their power from...nomos” (ibid: 78).  As such 
the nomos constitutes the political and juridical basis of the state.  
Moreover, Schmitt in his book elaborates on the system of the rayas, represented by 
the “amity line,” which divides the world into two: the civilised on one hand, and no-
man’s-land on the other. In the former, the rule of law, treaties and legal truces are 
found. These exist mainly in Europe and are respected by European powers. In the 
no-man’s-land anarchy and lawlessness rule and every kind of predation is permitted. 
It is within this context that Schmitt’s nomos proves insightful to the way space was 
first imagined by the Zionist ideology, then concretely ordered, organised and legally 
anchored, especially after the establishment of Israel.  
In anchoring its exclusive-exclusionary Manichaean nomos, Israel relied on a plethora 
of strategies and campaigns, which “were at once political and military, economic and 
cultural” (Gregory 2004a: 78). It is, however, beyond the scope of this chapter to 
cover all of the aspects involved.124 In what follows, I discuss the juridico-politico, 
cultural and spatial registers which constitute Israel’s nomos and which account for 
both the absenting of the Palestinian city and the production of what the thesis calls 
                                                
124 Chapter 6, which covers spatial planning and zoning system and policies, provides another example 
of Israel’s Manichaeism. It demonstrates how this system is employed to spatially and demographically 
oppress the Palestinians on one hand, and expand and consolidate Jewish control on the other.    
 
147	
the suspended space and the suspended citizen. I also investigate the role of what 
Gilroy calls “ethnic absolutism”125 plays in creating, legitimising and securing the 
Manichaean exclusive-exclusionary regime of as it unfolds in and through space, and 
which would lead to the tragic ethnic cleansing of Palestine in 1948.126  
As Israel’s nomos is inseparable from the pre-state Zionist project for the colonisation 
of Palestine and is in fact grounded in and informed by it, a historical overview of the 
latter becomes an absolute necessity.127 It was during this period that Palestine was 
constructed and imagined as terra nullius and that Israel’s structure and foundation as 
a Jewish state and a state for the Jews was laid.  Within the history of the pre-state 
Jewish settlement in Palestine, known as the Yishuv, I discuss the performativity of 
the Zionist discourse and ideology and how the constellation of knowledge and power 
worked to radically transform the Palestinian Arab geographical and cultural 
landscape into a Jewish one. I also discuss Tel Aviv, the first Hebrew City. Tel Aviv 
provides an excellent example that embodies not only the Manichaeism and ethnic-
absolutism that govern the Zionist movement, but also relates to the urban question, 
which constitutes another foundational facet of the thesis, as discussed in chapter 3.  
                                                
125 The concept of ethnic absolutism featured in numerous works and public talks by Gilroy, from as 
early as 1990s up to the present date. See for example, Gilroy, P. (1990) ‘Nationalism, History and 
Ethnic Absolutism’, History Workshop Journal, no. 30 (1), pp. 114-120.  
126 Ilan Pappé (2006) in his book Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine argues that 1948 was a premeditated 
war to ethnically cleanse Palestine of its Palestinian Arab population to establish a Jewish state with a 
Jewish majority. 
127  I am fully conscious that some would argue that the approach to the state and Zionism is 
deterministic, in the sense that Israel’s actions and policies follow the exigencies of Zionism, and 
therefore it is reductionist. They might argue that the situation on the ground is more complex, with 
which I agree, but there is a tendency, however, which can be traced back and which is identified and 
informed by the core pillars of Zionism.    
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The historical overview is followed by a discussion on how the newly established 
state of Israel, from 1948 up until the early 1960s, worked to officially 
institutionalise, legalise and therefore legitimise and consolidate its nomos, 
particularly in relation to land and demography. Land, and attracting world Jewry to 
settle in historic Palestine have been and still are the foundational and indispensable 
base for the realisation of Zionism and for maintaining the settler colonial character of 
Israel. These two components constitute the Manichaean essence of Israel’s nomos. 
They inform the very structure which functions to perpetuate the Palestinians’ 
‘inclusive exclusion,’ their suspended dialectic of citizens and enemies and which 
ensures that Israel is not a state for all its citizens. 128 
As far as literature is concerned, the chapter draws mostly on secondary resources 
relating specifically to Israel and Palestine. Six works are particularly useful in this 
regard. These are Theodor Herzl’s (1988 [1896]) The Jewish State, Herzl’s (1958) 
The Diaries, Meron Benvensiti’s (2000) Sacred Landscape: The Buried History of the 
Holy Land Since 1948, Ilan Pappé’s (2006) The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine, Sabri 
Jiryis’ (1976) The Arabs in Israel, and Edward Said’s (1992) The Question of 
Palestine. When put together, the five different authors contribute to the analysis of 
the question of space, power, law, and spatial ordering, each in their own way 
nonetheless. The chapter also engages with critical theory and literature on 
(post)colonialism, performative geography, racism, culture and space. The few 
                                                
128 By inclusive exclusion I refer to the fact that Palestinians in Israel inhabit a state of the betwixt and 
between. Although they are citizens of the state, hence their inclusion, they are excluded from enjoying 
substantive citizenship. The chapter will elaborate on their exclusion from accessing land.   
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primary resources are collected mainly from both Haaretz newspaper website and that 
of the Israeli parliament, the Knesset.  
Zionism: From idea to state: deconstructing Zionist Manichaeism 
Emerging in the late nineteenth century Europe, at a critical historical conjuncture and 
changing global geopolitical configurations, Zionism with its aspirations for territorial 
acquisitions, cast as terra nullius, knew how to seize the opportunity arising from 
such circumstances. Western Europe, at the time, was at the peak of its insatiable 
appetite for colonial expansionism and nationalism. By 1878, western powers, with 
Britain and France in the lead, ruled over 67 per cent of the world’s surface and by 
1914 their direct colonial domination expanded to about 85 per cent of it (Said 1994: 
6; 1995: 41). This era was also characterised by rising anti-Semitism against 
European Jews, culminating in persecution and pogroms, primarily in Russia and 
Poland. Therefore, by expressing the yearning for political self-determination and 
commitment to building a Jewish state, Zionism seemed to offer a neat answer to the 
Jewish question. 
Palestine, occupying a unique spiritual and historical place in Judaism, seemed both 
the desired and most plausible place for the realisation of the idea of Zionism, and the 
establishment of a Jewish homeland. Realising the potential mobilising power of 
religious and spiritual links to the land, the land of Israel, the Zionists anchored their 
chauvinist ideology and discourse in the Old Testament. This allowed them to 
articulate their secular colonial aspirations as an “absolute right to reclaim...ancestral 
patrimony” (Benvenisti 2000: 2). “Palestine is our ever-memorable historic home. 
The very name of Palestine would attract our people with a force of marvellous 
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potency,” wrote Theodor Herzl, the founding father of Zionism, in his book The 
Jewish State (1988 [1896]: 96).129   
Moral and religious claims alone, however, were not enough to help establish their 
state. Palestine possessed additional concrete properties that made it the perfect 
choice for potentially realising their dream. Being geopolitically positioned at a 
crossroad between Asia and Africa, at a time of rising European imperialist powers 
and an ailing Ottoman Empire, Zionist leaders understood that they better align 
themselves with the rising powers, especially Britain. “We should ...remain in contact 
with Europe, which would have to guarantee our existence,” wrote Herzl (ibid: 96).  
To summon support, Herzl embarked on a persuasion campaign that emphasised the 
material benefits Britain would reap from lending its support to the project.130 When 
in 1903 Joseph Chamberlain, Britain’s Colonial Minister, offered Uganda to Herzl as 
the land where a Jewish state could be established, the latter replied “[o]ur base must 
be in or near Palestine” (1958: 383).131  “We shall play the role of a small buffer-state. 
We shall attain this not through the good will but from the jealousy of the Powers. 
                                                
129 Herzl was not the first to articulate the idea of re-establishing a Jewish state in Palestine. He was, 
however, both an intellectual and an activists working to promote the Zionist project and was the first 
to address international political forces as well as the world Jewry. “Herzl...wrote as a Jew who was a 
man of the world, an experienced political observer, a ranking journalist with international horizons; 
and his Jewish State was directed as much to the Bismarcks and Rothschilds as to the common reader,” 
wrote Lowenthal in the introduction to Herzl’s diaries (Herzl, Lowenthal 1958: xx). The Jewish state 
“would have remained one more Zionist tract...had Herzl been a man content with words. He was in 
fact, over and beyond his literary bent, intrinsically a man of action and action on a grand scale...he 
conceived of the Jewish State not as a subject for discourse...but as something to be acted upon by 
others and first of all himself” (ibid:xx-xxi). 
130 For details on Herzl’s efforts at trying to convince European powers to support the Jewish state, see 
Herzl, Th., Lowenthal, M. (1958) The Diaries. London: Gollancz (book translated and edited by 
Marvin Lowenthal).  
131 Chamberlain was “the most talked-of as well as one of the most influential figures in the British 
cabinet” (1958: 373).  
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And when we are under the Union Jack at El Arish, then Palestine too will fall into 
the ‘British sphere of influence,” said Herzl to Chamberlain (ibid 383-384). 132 
Addressing Britain again, Herzl wrote: 
England with her possessions in Asia should be most interested in 
Zionism, for the shortest route to India is by way of Palestine. 
England’s great politicians were the first to recognise the need for 
colonial expansion ... And so I believe in England the idea of 
Zionism, which is a colonial idea, should be easily understood. 
(Quoted in Rose 1986) 
Chaim Weizmann, a Zionist leader and successor of Herzl, continued the campaign to 
secure British political establishment support. Within two years of his relocation to 
England, taking Manchester as his base, he had managed to meet with the former 
Prime Minister, Arthur Balfour; a meeting which within a few years would prove 
decisive in defining and shaping the modern history of Palestine. Speaking the 
language of concrete interests, in 1914, Weizmann wrote a piece for the Manchester 
Guardian, one of the most influential newspapers of the time, stating the role a Jewish 
state in Palestine could play in safeguarding British imperialist interests: 
Should Palestine fall within the British sphere of influence and 
should Britain encourage Jewish settlement there, as a British 
dependency, we could have in twenty to thirty years a million Jews 
out there, perhaps more; they would develop the country, bring back 
civilisation, form a very effective guard for the Suez Canal. 
(Quoted in Quigley 1990: 8) 
                                                
132 This was Herzl’s reply to Chamberlain’s worry that British interests were diminishing in that part of 
the world and that a dispute over the region might arise between France, Germany and Russia which 
would question the fate of the Jewish colony, should it have been established there. For more details 
see Herzl meeting with Chamberlain in London, April 1903 in The Diaries of Theodor Herzl (1958: 
382-384). El Areesh then was under British rule while Palestine was still under the Ottomans.  
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Three years later, in 1917, Balfour who was now Britain’s Foreign Minister had 
formalised his country’s sponsorship of Zionism. After gaining the approval of his 
cabinet, Balfour sent a letter to the powerful Lord Rothschild, head of the Zionist 
Federation in Britain, stating that Britain “viewed with favor the establishment in 
Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people” (Ibid).  
A reservoir of geographical and cultural imaginaries: The production of 
emptiness  
The establishment of a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine would have 
gone unchallenged, if the same piece of land was not already populated by a people 
who had been living there for centuries. The Palestinian Arabs, the inhabitants of the 
desired land, posed a challenge to the realisation of the exclusive-exclusionary 
colonial project.  The Zionists, adhering to and deriving their authority from their 
narrative of Jewish-only righteousness to Palestine; a land promised to them by God, 
set out not only to deny the existence of Palestine, first discursively and then 
materially by following a policy of facts on the grounds, but also to prove that they 
were the ones who knew best how to “make the desert bloom.” 
Following the footsteps of colonial powers, Zionism excelled at manufacturing what 
Mbembe (2003: 24) described as a large reservoir of cultural and spatial imaginaries 
to give meaning and legitimacy to their colonial conquest.133 This proved profitable as 
the Zionists mastered a language that not only appealed to European colonial powers 
                                                
133 One of the differences between the Zionists superior colonial discourse and that of European powers 
lies in the fact that the Zionists saw the land of Palestine as solely belonging to them, with no room for 
its indigenous Palestinian population. The civilising mission for them was aimed at the land, which was 
portrayed as desolate and in a state of negligence, thus awaiting redemption and modernisation.  
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but also was congruent with the way the latter constructed and defined the rest of the 
world. It was a language enmeshed with racial supremacy and hierarchy, and the 
power to define the other as inferior, backward, unworthy of consideration, and even 
non-existent.  
Literature on colonialism affirms the indispensable role such imaginaries played in 
legitimising colonial projects. Carl Schmitt (2006 [1950]) noted in his book The 
Nomos of the Earth how denying indigenous populations human qualities served a 
practical goal. It facilitated the grounds for “obtaining a legal title for the great land-
appropriation” and the “subjugating” of the local populations (Schmitt 2006: 103). 
Edward Said (1994) in Culture and Imperialism also argued that colonialism and 
imperialism are not reducible to the “simple act of accumulation and acquisition” 
(Said 1994: 8) They are legitimated, justified and supported by discursive 
infrastructure and systems of knowledge that are mobilised for the construction of 
cultural and geographical imaginaries which (re)present certain territories and certain 
people in need of domination and redemption. For him “[t]he power to conquer 
territory is only in part a matter of physical force: there is the strong moral and 
intellectual component making the conquest itself secondary to an idea, which 
dignifies (and indeed hastens) pure force with arguments drawn from science, 
morality, ethics, and general philosophy” (Said 1992: 77).  
“A land without a people, for people without a land,” was the Zionist slogan for 
Palestine. This slogan, whether meant literally or rhetorically, not only did it 
epitomise the denial and dehumanisation of the Palestinian presence, but also 
undermined Palestinians’ very right to be there and belong to the land. When 
acknowledging that there was a native population, those were deemed unworthy of 
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being there. They were “ignoble or perhaps dispensable natives” (Said 1992: 81), who 
neglected the land and did not know how to appreciate it. “It seems as if God has 
covered the soil of Palestine with rocks and marshes and sand, so that its beauty can 
only be brought out by those who love it and will devote their lives to healing its 
wounds,” wrote Chaim Weizmann (quoted ibid: 85). For the Zionists, Palestinians 
were “either not there or savages or both” (ibid: 90).  
The production of emptiness went hand in hand with the narrative that Palestine was a 
land awaiting redemption. “[I]t is a poor country, but we mean to make something out 
of it,” said Herzl to Chamberlain (Herzl 1958: 383). A Jewish state in Palestine would 
not only “form a portion of a rampart of Europe against Asia, an outpost of 
civilization as opposed to barbarism,” as Herzl wrote in his book the Jewish State 
(1988: 96) but would also transform the “desolate” “poor land” into a modern 
oasis.134 Its colonisation was discursively presented as “a fact of repetition: The Jews 
were not supplanting, destroying, breaking up a native society.” They were restoring, 
“rebuilding” and “reconstituting” their “lost father land” (Said 1992: 13, 68).135 The 
backward local population was the one at odds with the natural landscape. As 
Winston Churchill put it in his testimony to the Peel Commission in 1937, “[t]he 
                                                
134 Herzl arriving into Palestine in 1898 describes the land as desolate and Jaffa as poor and miserable, 
“full of beggars and spies” (1958: 296). He wrote in his diaries on 27 Oct 1989 “[w]e approached the 
land of our fathers with mingled feelings. It is strange what emotions this desolate country evokes in 
most people...Here we are in Jaffa: again poverty and misery and heat in gay colours. Confusion in the 
streets; at the hotel, not a carriage to be had” (1958: 278-279). On 5 November 1898, Herzl wrote 
about how unsafe and isolated from the world he felt. “Among the unaccustomed circumstances of our 
journey is my ignorance since October 19 of what has been happening in the world. Newspapers are 
non-existent in these parts, telegrams take four or five days, letters are delivered at whim- or not”(ibid: 
296).  
135 In The Jewish State, the founding pamphlet for Zionism and the Zionist state, the Palestinians do not 
feature at all. Ella Shohat (2010) in her book on Israeli and pre-state cinema discusses how the Zionist 
film Oded the wanderer from 1932, presents Palestine as a land empty of its Palestinian population. 
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injustice is when those who live in the country leave it to be desert for thousands of 
years,” (quoted in Gregory 2004a: 82).136  
In what follows, I discuss Tel Aviv, the first Hebrew city to be built in Palestine and 
how it performed the uncompromising, exclusive-exclusionary Manichaean ethos of 
Zionism both discursively and materially this time. The building of Tel Aviv put the 
idea and vision into action. The modern city to be built was articulated not only as the 
complete contrast to the squalor of Jaffa, but also as its competitor, with its ultimate 
aim to overtake it. As Weizmann wrote in Trial and Error, Tel Aviv was to be built 
with the aim “to outstrip, in size and in economic importance, the ancient town of 
Jaffa, and to become one of the metropolitan centres of the eastern Mediterranean” 
(quoted in Said 1992: 93). 
 
 
                                                
136 The Peel Commission was sent to Palestine to investigate the Palestinian Rebellion of 1936. In 
1937, Chaim Weizmann, then president of the World Zionist Organisation, told the Commission that 
the revolt was “...the old war of the desert against civilization...on one side, the forces of destruction, 
the forces of the desert, have arisen, and on the other side stand firm the forces of civilization and 
building” (quoted in Gregory 2004a: 81-81). Such rhetoric of civilisation and modernity left an 
immense impression on Churchill whose position is reflected in the above-mentioned statement that 
appears in the body of the text. For more information on Churchill’s support of Zionism see Gilbert, M. 
(2008) Churchill and the Jews: a Lifelong Friendship. New York: Henry Holt and Co. 
 
156	
Tel Aviv: The First Hebrew City, the building of a modern oasis137  
I did not go to Jerusalem, to Tel Aviv or to any of the coastal cities, but 
everybody speaks of them as part of Europe in the organization, their 
green, their factories, and their produce. They moved forward as fast as 
they could and made sure that we would keep moving backward. 
Barghouti (2005: 147)138 
Azaryahu (2007), in his book Tel Aviv: A Mythography of a City, which is concerned 
with the mythic, symbolic and agency of Tel Aviv and its representation in 
newspapers during the 1920s, 30s and 40s, traces the genesis of the idea of building a 
Jewish-only city to 1904. The idea was first put forward by Eliezer ben-Yehuda, in 
honour of Theodor Herzl, who died in the same year. Ben-Yehuda, known as the 
driving force behind the revival of the Hebrew language, suggested a neighbourhood 
or a town be built in Jerusalem where everyone spoke Hebrew and only Hebrew; “its 
population will be 100 percent Hebrew, Hebrew will be spoken here, where purity 
and cleanliness will reign, and [where] we will not follow the ways of the gentile 
nations” (quoted ibid: 37). 
                                                
137The Hebrew city is not my terminology. It is taken from Azaryahu’s (2007) book. The Hebrew 
character of the city was not only a matter of language but demography as well (Azaryahu 2007: 72).  
Ella Shohat notes that the word Hebrew in the Yishuv era entered the Zionist lexicon to refer to the 
Jews in Palestine,”thus implying a break with Diaspora Jewry, and indicating both a connection to the 
historical past in Eretz Israel and to the renewed nationality with the old/new language,” (2010: 26). At 
that time “Hebrew man” was the predecessor of “Israeli” (ibid).    
138 Mourid Barghouti is a Palestinian poet who was not allowed back into Palestine before 1993. In 
1966, when Barghouti was twenty-two he left his village to continue his studies in Cairo. A year later, 
in 1967, the six-days war broke out and Israel occupied the West Bank and Gaza. Since, as the case 
with the many thousands of Palestinians who happened to be outside of the West Bank before the war, 
Bargouti was denied entry back. Only after the Oslo accords were singed in 1993, Barghouti and others 
were allowed back into their homeland. 
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Two years later, in 1906, Akiva Arieh Weiss wrote in a prospectus urging Jews to buy 
land to build: “let us build us a city in Israel” (ibid: 37),139 “a city, which would be for 
Israel, what New York was to America” (Centennial Celebration of Tel Aviv 
2009).140 The city to be built was not only Jewish but also modern. “[I]n this city we 
will install paved streets with electric lights. Every house will have running water 
installed, which will flow through the pipes just like in any modern European city, 
and a sewage disposal system will also be installed to the benefit of the city and its 
dwellers,” wrote Weiss in his prospectus (quoted in Azaryahu 2007: 58).  
In 1909, the envisioned town to be named Tel Aviv was not built in Jerusalem but 
adjacent to Jaffa: then the only city where “a solid import-export trade was growing 
up with its related branches...” and where a relatively large number of Jewish 
immigrants chose to reside (Katz 1986:45). Starting off as a Jewish suburb of Jaffa, 
Tel Aviv soon witnessed a rapid growth, both spatially and demographically, a 
process that accelerated under the British rule. In less than twenty years, its 
population increased from 15,000 in 1922 to 130,000 in 1939 (Azaryahu 2007: 33). In 
1921, the city had its own Jewish police force, which represented “a realization of the 
rather abstract Jewish National Home promised to the Jews in the Balfour Declaration 
                                                
139 The prospectus was dated Tish’a Be’Av. In Hebrew, this date is symbolic. It commemorates the 
destruction of the Jewish temples in Jerusalem first by the Babylonians in 586 B.C.E., then by the 
Romans 70 C.E. The date, thus, symbolises ”the transition from destruction to redemption, a powerful 
idea in Jewish liturgy” (Azaryahu, 2007: 37).  
140 April 1st, 2009,Conference launches Centennial celebrations, in www.telaviv-fever.com . 
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of 1917” (ibid: 64). A year later, in 1922 it was granted a municipal status and was 
declared a city in 1934.141  
Declaring Tel Aviv a city was not a nominal gesture. It meant that it was now 
politically independent from Jaffa and was run entirely by Jews. For the Zionists this 
also “concretized the Jewish National Home in British Mandate Palestine in territorial 
and institutional terms” (ibid: 35). “Tel Aviv is an epitome, an example and a model, 
and you, the sons of Tel Aviv, are the embodiment, the ideal embodied in the Land of 
Israel. This is a gracious creation of the Zionist spirit... [a] fine symbol of a Jewish 
state ... that proved even to the greatest skeptics that the Jews are able to build a life 
for themselves and to conduct their affairs in an orderly and disciplined manner,” 
asserted journalist and Zionist leader Nachum Sokolov (quoted in Azaryahu: 2007: 
35: 64). 
The political independence was soon to be followed by economic independence. In 
1936, ensuing the Palestinians’ rebellion and Jaffa’s port strike, the Mandate 
government authorised the building of the long-awaited port of Tel Aviv. The port, as 
well as substantively materialising the city’s independence, signified the ascendance 
of Tel Aviv and the decline of Jaffa.  For the Zionists it ushered in a new era and a 
significant development in their national project. The new port, dubbed as “[t]he First 
Hebrew Port,”  “Zion gate,” and “the gate to Zion” (Azaryahu 2007: 65:66) was not 
only of economic value but also of symbolic and potential independence. 
                                                
141 The first Hebrew City was soon recognised by European imperialist countries. In 1925, Dizengoff, 
the mayor of Tel Aviv, as Azaryaho (2007:38) notes, was invited to represent Tel Aviv at an 
international congress of mayors in Paris. 
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For Ben-Gurion, the port represented the “Hebrew access to the sea” and the 
“conquest of the sea,” which was the next phase awaiting the Zionists (ibid 65: 
269). 142  The port opened its gates to passengers in 1938. In 23 February 1938, 
Haaretz wrote: “A port not only for itself [Tel Aviv] and for the country, but also for 
the Diaspora and for those who return to the homeland...” (ibid: 66). Menchaem 
Ussishkin, then head of the JNF, explaining the rational behind the name, said: “I give 
this name to the port that will serve the redeemed on their way to the historical Zion, 
the real Zion, the eternal Zion” (quoted ibid). The port, celebrated by poets, artists, 
intellectuals and post-cards was graphically eternalised in Tel Aviv’s city’s official 
emblem: “[depicting] a lighthouse built as an open gate and spreading rays of light” 
(ibid: 66-67). 
The city of wonders: a concrete answer to a concrete challenge 
The city of Tel Aviv, planned in the spirit of garden cities, was impressively modern. 
Its achievements and uniqueness were reflected in speeches by foreign dignitaries 
who visited the city in 1920s and 1930s. The first British High Commissioner of 
Palestine, Herbert Samuel, praising Tel Aviv in his farewell speech which also took 
place in the city said: “Tel Aviv is Palestine’s city of wonders. One may compare it 
with the miraculous cities of the tales of the Arabian Nights, which blossom overnight 
in the desert” (quoted in Azaryahu: 2007: 39).  
                                                
142 What Ben-Gurion referred to as the “conquest of the sea,” Carl Schmitt in his book The Nomos of 
the Earth called “sea-appropriations,” which “became possible only at a later stage in the development 
of human means of power and human consciousness of space” (Schmitt 2006 [1950]: 44).  
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The success story was, among other things, manifested in its commercial fairs, 
especially that of 1929. In his speech, Meir Dizengoff,143 Tel Aviv’s first mayor, 
addressing the audience which also included the British High Commissioner, said: 
“[t]he time of the exhibition coincides with the twentieth anniversary of Tel Aviv, 
which is a permanent demonstration and a living exhibition of everything that Jewish 
pioneers can accomplish when they enjoy freedom of action while building the 
national home in their homeland” (Azaryahu, 2007: 37, 45). 144 The Jubilee 
celebrations of the city of 1934 were also held at the time of another commercial fair. 
Haaretz reporting the event wrote:  
The Exhibition is a fine framework for the silver jubilee, a superb center 
for the celebrations. The exhibition and the Levant Fair are evidence of 
the power of creation and the future of Tel Aviv, convincing proof of what 
Jewish energy has brought about on the desert sands in this forsaken 
corner of Asia, of the economic and cultural achievements and future 
development. The Tel Aviv festival is a festival of new Hebrew creativity, 
a symbol and guarantee of Hebrew revival in the old-new homeland. 
(Quoted ibid: 46) 
Tel Aviv, however, was not only built to serve as the theatre through which Zionism 
performed its colonial modernity and superiority in Palestine and as a proof that 
Zionists were capable of materialising their dream. The very idea of the city offered a 
concrete answer to a concrete, existential question; that is how best to attract Jews to 
                                                
143Dizengoff was known as “the builder of the First Hebrew City since the destruction of the Second 
Temple” (Azaryahu 2007: 37). 
144The fair was called “Palestine Fair,” despite the conspicuous absence of Palestinian exhibitors, a 
matter which made the Palestinian reporter of the newspaper of Falastin wonder why the fair was not 
called “English and Zionist Fair,” and whether such absence was because of the inferiority of 
Palestinian industry or the lack of competence they had when compared with their Jewish competitors 
(ibid 46).  
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come and settle in Palestine. For without Jewish immigration to Palestine, the project 
could not be materialised.  
As early as the twentieth century when the Zionist immigration into Palestine was 
more ideological with messianic goals, immigrants preferred not to live in the 
agricultural colonies, which for Zionism were considered “the only means of 
strengthening the Jewish foothold in Palestine” (Katz 1986:404). Katz (ibid) notes 
that the Jewish population of the 25 agricultural colonies that were built all over 
Palestine, from 1882 to 1905, did not exceed the total number of 7,000. Meanwhile, 
Jaffa’s Jewish immigrant population of the same period was over 7,000. Jaffa’s 
commercial and social advantages, being an open, cosmopolitan city, were attractive 
to Jewish immigrants. Jaffa ”...unlike Jerusalem, the centre of orthodox Jewry, which 
opposed all new social ideas including Zionism...was not as orthodox as Jerusalem 
and was readier to accept new ideas” (ibid: 45). 
Against this objective reality, the fathers of Zionism soon realised they could not rest 
their national project on agriculture alone and that “trade and industry must be 
developed within a framework of improved urban settlement” (Katz 1986:404) They 
recognised that “the greater part of the potential Jewish immigrants to Palestine were 
urban dwellers who could far more easily be integrated into industry in the towns than 
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into agricultural labor” (ibid). To attract such immigrants, the city was not only to be 
Jewish but also modern, hygienic and with a functioning urban infrastructure.145 
Tel Aviv vs. Jaffa: Manichaean couplets146 
By resorting to a traditional colonial, supremacist portrayal of oriental cities and in 
justification of building a pure modern and hygienic Jewish city, the Zionists 
promoted Jaffa’s housing conditions and infrastructure as not up to European 
standards. As David Smilansky, one of Tel Aviv founders put it: “[t]he narrow lanes 
of Jaffa were infamous for their dirt, where humans and animals resided together. And 
in addition to the dirt were noise and commotion, the shouts of Arabs praising their 
merchandise. Anyone coming from a modern European city found it hard to adjust to 
these living conditions,” (quoted in parts in Katz 1986; in Azaryahu 2007: 58). 
 Meir Dizengoff admitting that ideology alone was not enough of a reason for Jews, 
especially those of middle class backgrounds, to immigrate, said: “life in the narrow, 
dirty lanes was very difficult, and even the burning love for Zion could not distract 
from the dirt and the trachoma and the lack of light” (quoted in Azaryahu 2007: 58). 
The houses to be built would offer “good hygienic conditions for the middle class” 
(ibid). Dizengoff retrospectively commenting on the rationale behind Tel Aviv said: 
                                                
145 Urban centres were and still are even today 66 years after the establishment of Israel and 132 years 
since the first Aliyah in 1882, an answer and a challenge for the settler colonial project. 
146  This subsection takes inspiration from Frantz Fanon’s description of the colonial city and the native 
city. In his canonical book the Wretched of the Earth, Fanon (1969) describes the nature of the 
Manichaean order of colonialism and how it is inscribed in the urban landscape. In this order the 
colonial city is praised for its modernity, spaciousness, hygiene and light, while the other is repulsed 
for its backwardness, crowdedness, filth and darkness. For more detail on the colonial city see chapter 
3 on the city and public space.   
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“[Our aim was] to build a new Hebrew neighbourhood outside the city [Jaffa], with 
all the amenities and comforts that civilized human beings needed” (quoted ibid: 58). 
With the building of Tel Aviv, orientalist Manichaean representations intensified.      
Tel Aviv and Jaffa were articulated as binary opposites. Tel Aviv’s success and 
achievements within a short period of time were often contrasted with the ill fate and 
filthiness of Jaffa. Tel Aviv was “a city that Europe can envy,” and the difference 
between the two [Jaffa and Tel Aviv] was one of “light and darkness, civilization and 
ignorance,” wrote a French journalist in the 1930s (Yediot Iriyat Tel Aviv 1934-1936, 
393, quoted in Azaryahu 2007: 59). “Tel Aviv ... a splinter of Europe has flown away 
and found its way here. And beyond the gates of Tel Aviv a black night is clinging to 
the soil of ancient Arabia,” wrote a journalist in 1920s, who also expressed how 
impressed he was by the electric light and motor cars in the streets of the city (quoted 
ibid: 59). 
The building of the first Hebrew city was politically, symbolically, and materially 
important. But, it was only one part of the project. The Zionist project saw the entire 
Mandatory Palestine as a terrain in need of reclaiming and restoring Jewish 
proprietorship. In what follows I describe another mechanism which was used for 
reinforcing the Zionist narrative and for asserting exclusive rights to the land. The 
constellation of knowledge and power was mobilised to the process of claiming 
proprietorship over land and to manufacturing spatial evidence that Palestine truly 
belonged to the Jewish people.  
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To name is to take: ruling by details 
A land-appropriation is constituted only if the appropriator is able to 
give the land a name.  
(Schmitt 2006 [1950]: 348) 
In a name and in name-giving, a third orientation of power takes 
effect: the tendency to visibility, publicity, and ceremony. 
(Ibid: 349) 
After all, naming is a declaration of exclusive proprietorship, and 
making such a claim over one’s homeland is the essence of 
nationalism. 
(Benvenisti: 2000: 47) 
Motivated by an ideology governed by ethnic absolutism, the Zionists engaged in 
campaigns with the ultimate aim of radically eradicating the existing human and 
physical geography and the creation instead of a new spatial reality on the ground. 
Almost three decades before the lead up to the violent ethnic cleansing of Palestine in 
1948, they started to methodologically survey the landscape to create a body of, 
mainly but not solely geographical, knowledge about the ancestral land. The 
underlying aim was to establish an exclusively Jewish proprietorship over the land 
and to domesticate it for military and political purposes.  
Aware of the power cartography can possess; symbolically and politically as well as 
militarily, they began to clandestinely work on two separate but not mutually 
exclusive projects. The first project, started in the 1920s, was the production of a 
Hebrew map of the land that would include assigning Hebrew names to topography 
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and settlements. Here again Schmitt proves insightful. As quoted above (2006: 348-
9), conquering a territory is not enough to make it the property of its conqueror. 
Naming it is what gives it legitimacy and visibility. It is the essence of nationalism, as 
put by Benvenisti (ibid). The second project was the meticulous study and 
documentation of almost every Palestinian village: its physical and social structure, 
economy, political activism, and the smallest detail of its way of life; a project which 
started in 1930s and intensified throughout the 1940s.  
The Hebrew map147 
The production of the Hebrew map was a strategic decision. It was not a technical 
exercise but “an act of establishing proprietorship” (Benvenisti 2000: 14). The map 
was instrumental to the transition from the discursive symbolic possession of land to a 
tangible, material possession. The Zionists, who were ideologically motivated and in 
a position of power in terms of possessing the necessary knowledge of surveying the 
land, understood that maps were not only a representation of a spatial reality but could 
also anticipate and create the desired reality.148 They understood that they were a 
model for rather than a model of what they claimed to represent, and as such had 
                                                
147 The title is taken from Meron Benvenisti’s (2000) book.  
148 On the power of the map and territorial codification and their role in anticipating and creating 
spatial realities and the building of a modern nation: see Winichakul Th. (1994) Siam Mapped: History 
of the Geo-Body of a Nation. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Through invoking the concept of 
geo-body Winichakul shows that the map is not objective. It is a man-made invention that creates a 
supposed spatial reality not vice versa.  In the context of Siam, mapping “created a new Siam- a new 
entity whose geo-body had never existed before” (1994:130). He asserts that the geo-body actively 
takes part in producing new ideas, new values, and new culture and goes even beyond its primary task 
of spatial definition (ibid: 137).  
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performative qualities, that is producing the effects they name.149  Operating in a 
colonial context where those who had the power to survey and define also had the 
power to appropriate, dispossess and claim ownership, made it easier for the Zionists 
to pursue their plans.150 
To Hebraise the landscape, joining British Mandatory official surveying offices and 
setting up exclusively Jewish mechanisms allowed them to carry out the task. In 1914, 
the Society for the Reclamation of Antiques, later named, Israel Exploration Society 
(IES), was established. Its members included professional geographers, cartographers, 
historians and archaeologists as well as high-ranking political leaders (Benvenisti 
2000:11). Its declared objective was “to further historical, geographical and 
archaeological research concerning the Land of Israel” (Israel Exploration Society 
2014). 151  Its undeclared objectives, however, were clearly political. Its members 
sought to “articulate the Jewish ambition to lay claim to the ancestral land” and 
provide not only a “concrete documentation of the continuity of a historical thread 
that remained unbroken from the time of Johua Bun Nun...” (Benvenisti: 12), but also 
“to concretize the military, political, and symbolic possession of the patrimony of the 
Jewish people” (ibid: 14).  
                                                
149 On geographical performativity see Gregory, D. (2004a) Colonial Present and Gregory D. (2004b) 
‘Palestine and the War on Terror’, Comparative studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, 
24:1: 183-195. 
150 There exists a body of literature that takes a critical approach to dealing with the role cartography 
played in colonial expansionism and domination. See, for example, Godlewska A. & Smith, N. (1994) 
Geography and Empire, Burnett, D. (2000) Masters of all they surveyed.  
151 For more information see: http://israelexplorationsociety.huji.ac.il .  
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In 1920, shortly after the British assumed authority over Palestine, two Zionist 
scholars joined the survey departments of the British Mandatory government and the 
British army as advisors “on all matters relating to the assignment of Hebrew 
names...” (Benvenisti 2000: 12). For them, working at offices with strategic 
importance was a prime Zionist act. They fought hard to convince the British 
authorities “to restore biblical Hebrew place-names to the map of the country in place 
of the Arabic ones” which were in use (ibid). When their efforts were limited in 
success, they set about identifying biblical and post-biblical sites to put them on 
Hebrew maps, which were being clandestinely produced. In addition to this 
invaluable task, their work had also allowed them to access military data, which they 
then passed to the Jewish underground militia, the Haganah. The received data was 
copied in clandestine cartographic offices to produce Hebrew maps that would be 
available for the Haganah military operations.   
The Jewish National Fund (JNF), the key organisation with the purpose of acquiring 
land in Palestine by any means necessary, was another mechanism through which the 
Judaizing task was to be fulfilled. In 1925, the JNF set up its own Naming 
Committee. The committee was recognised by the British authorities, but was allowed 
to give Hebrew names only to communities established on land owned by the JNF. 
The JNF, despite its efforts to persuade the Mandatory authorities to “redeem the 
ancient Hebrew names,” managed to give Hebrew names to only 5 per cent of the 
names appearing on official Mandatory maps (Benvenisti 2000: 25). The remaining 
95 per cent were all in Arabic. With maps being both symbols and instruments of 
power, it was not surprising that during the British Mandate the authority to draw 
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official maps and assign names to topographical features was kept as a British 
exclusive right. 
After the establishment of Israel in 1948, members of the IES and the JNF naming 
committee, together with the two scholars who were working for the British surveying 
office would all play an invaluable role in the official Judaizing project. This time not 
clandestinely but proudly under the official support of the newly established state. In 
July 1949, shortly after the Israeli army had consolidated its control over the Naqab 
and the Arava, Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion summoned nine scholars to his 
office, who were associated with the pre-state naming mechanisms, to set up the 
Negev Naming Committee (NNC). In a letter sent to the chair of the committee, Ben-
Gurion wrote: “[w]e are obliged to remove the Arabic names for reasons of state. Just 
as we do not recognize the Arabs’ political proprietorship of the land, so also do we 
not recognize their spiritual proprietorship and their names” (quoted in Benvenisti 
2000: 14).  
Within the space of ten months, the committee managed to compile the entire map 
and present it to the public (ibid). The sense of urgency with which the members of 
NNC worked was indicative of the importance of both the map and the (re)naming of 
sites in establishing facts on the ground, asserting ownership and providing the new 
colonial order with visibility and legitimacy. As Schmitt insightfully notes, land-
appropriation is concretised only when the appropriator is able to give it a name 
(Schmitt 2006: 248). With naming as he puts it: “abstractions cease to exist and the 
situation becomes concrete,” (ibid: 349). For the Palestinians, the Zionist (re)naming 
of the landscape concretised their dispossession and obliterated both their physical 
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and symbolic existence on the land, even if the majority of the new Hebrew names 
had their roots in Arabic. 
The village dossiers: preparing for the glorious day 
Edward Said noted in the Question of Palestine that the effectiveness of Zionism lay 
in its ability to see “not only what was there, but what could be there” and “in its 
being a policy of detail, not simply a general colonial vision” (Said 1992: 94-95 
[original emphasis]). This “discipline of detail” was something the Palestinians had 
no answer to. The Palestinians, who spoke a language of generalities, assumed that by 
living there and by legally owning their land, this would simply guarantee that the 
land was theirs and that they would live there forever.  
Knowledge, yet again, was mobilised to promote the Zionist project and to help 
transform it from a vision into reality. This time this was to be achieved through 
working towards domesticating the Palestinian Arab landscape by studying it and 
producing a body of knowledge about it. The Zionists understood that they could not 
afford to keep the land terra incognita. Therefore, as well as establishing facts on the 
ground, a policy which had been part of Zionism’s modus operandi, they engaged in 
the village files’ project to document the Palestinian way of life so that when the 
opportunity would arise to materialise their exclusively Jewish state, they would be 
prepared. 
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The village files’ project was suggested by Ben-Zion Luria, a historian from the 
Hebrew University, who also worked for the Jewish Agency.152 He suggested that the 
JNF undertake the responsibility of carrying out a detailed inventory of Palestinian 
villages. The proposed project, as he put in a letter to the JNF, “would greatly help the 
redemption of the land” (quoted in Pappé 2006:17). Yitzhak Ben-Zvi, a historian and 
a prominent Zionist leader who would become the second president of Israel, wrote in 
a letter to the Jewish Agency that the project should also include exposing the 
“Hebraic origins” of each village (ibid: 18). The JNF was more than happy to endorse 
the idea and declare it a “national project” (ibid: 18).  
Professionals were summoned to carry out the project. One of them, also from the 
Hebrew University, was a cartographer who worked for the Mandatory surveying 
department. He suggested recruiting professional photographers who would also take 
aerial photographs of the villages. The project included not only mapping the 
topographical location and features, including access to roads and quality of land, but 
recording every single aspect of the villages’ socio-political and economic life. 
Descriptions of husbandry, cultivated land and workshops were all included. 
Particular attention was also given to levels of hostility towards Zionism and 
engagement in 1936 rebellion (Pappé 2006).   
                                                
152  The Hebrew University, founded in 1918 and officially opened in 1925 (www.huji.ac.il), was 
established to serve political objectives. Menachem Ussishkin (1863-1941), who was at the time head 
of the JNF and the driving force behind the establishment of the university, wrote: “[n]ot for the sake 
of a spiritual center did I make my call, but for the political strengthening of our position in this land. A 
spiritual center without a political center is a head without a body” (quoted in Benvenisti 2000: 26).   
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Domesticating the landscape through the village dossiers had clear military 
objectives. The Yishuv’s intelligence services, alarmed by the inadequate available 
material on the Palestinian community, were among those who pushed for “the 
systematic in-depth study of the Arab community of Eretz Israel/Palestine in all 
aspects of its life and livelihood” (quoted in Benvenisti 2000: 71). A member of the 
Haganah, Moshe Pasternal, who took an active part in collecting data, recalled:  
We had to study the basic structure of the Arab village. This means 
the structure and how best to attack it. In the military schools, I had 
been taught how to attack a modern European city, not a primitive 
village in the Near East....  
(Quoted in Pappé 2006: 19).  
It was thanks to the detailed knowledge of the happenings in each village that the 
Zionist military command concluded in November 1947 “that the Palestine Arabs had 
nobody to organise them properly,” and the British were the only obstacle at the time 
for the Zionists to fully materialise their project (quoted in Pappé 2006:23). In 
December 1947 and throughout the first half of 1948, the completed village files’ 
project proved instrumental to the active displacement and expulsion of the 
Palestinians, or the ethnic cleansing of Palestine as Pappé (2006) prefers to call it, 
which facilitated the creation of a Jewish state with an absolute Jewish majority.  
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 The unmaking of Palestine: the making of the Jewish state 
Every new age and every new epoch in the coexistence of peoples, 
empires, and countries, of rulers and power formations of every sort, 
is founded on new spatial divisions, new enclosures, and new spatial 
orders of the earth.        
(Schmitt 2006:79) 
1948 ushered into the world a new nomos. This nomos simultaneously introduced a 
rupture in the existing socio-spatial and political order and laid the foundation for a 
new one. Palestine existed no more, and Israel was founded on its ruins. By the end of 
the 1948 ethnic cleansing of Palestine about 800,000 Palestinians, who made up more 
than half of the native population, had been displaced, 531 villages had been uprooted 
and destroyed and about eleven urban centres had been emptied (Pappé 2006: xiii).153 
The newly declared Jewish state, as a result, was now in control of 78 per cent of 
British Mandate Palestine (Kedar 2000-2001: 945; Yiftachel 2006: 137). However, 
only 13.5 per cent of the land, inherited from Jewish organisations and individuals as 
well as British Mandatory authorities, was under state or Jewish ownership (ibid).  
As a newly founded state and the internationally recognised sole sovereign of the 
land, Israel set out to officially and concretely institutionalise and legalise its 
Manichaean nomos, with little or no concern of being legally or politically 
challenged. Securing its exclusive control over the seized land, and ensuring an 
absolute Jewish majority, thus transforming both the physical and human landscape, 
                                                
153 Although there is no exact figure of how many villages were destroyed, many agree that the number 
was over 400. Jiryis (1976: 79) notes that 45 per cent of all Palestinian localities disappeared after the 
creation of Israel.  
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were its overall guiding objectives. More specifically these objectives included the 
following: dispossessing the Palestinians, including those who remained, of their land 
and transferring it to state and Jewish hands in ways that would make it difficult, or 
even impossible for the former to claim the land back, preventing the return of 
Palestinian refugees, and ensuring that Israel would always be a Jewish state and a 
state of the Jews, not a state of all its citizens. In what follows, I describe some of the 
key laws which constitute the legal apparatus that Israel created to support, legitimise 
and anchor its nomos in line with those objectives. 
Jewish state: Jewish land: the legal consolidation of Israel’s Manichaean nomos 
We, members of the people’s council, representatives of the Jewish 
community of Eretz-Israel and the Zionist movement, are here 
assembled on the day of the termination of the British Mandate over 
Eretz-Israel and by virtue of our natural and historic right and on the 
strength of the resolution of the united Nations General Assembly, 
hereby declare the establishment of a Jewish state in Eretz-israel, to 
be known as the state of Israel … We appeal to the Jewish people 
throughout the diaspora to rally around the Jews of Eretz-Israel in 
the tasks of immigration and upbuilding and to stand by them in the 
great struggle for the realization of the age-old dream, the 
redemption of Israel.   
Israel’s declaration of independence154 
By defining itself a Jewish state and a state for the Jews, Israel set the boundaries of 
membership to be exclusively in the Jewish people, thus structurally hierarchising and 
racialising both space and citizenship. The production of boundaries in such 
irreconcilable form was institutionalised soon after the establishment of Israel in a 
                                                
154  To view the entire declaration please visit: 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/peace/guide/pages/declaration%20of%20establishment%20of
%20state%20of%20israel.aspx 
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number of laws which simultaneously secured the structural exclusion of the 
Palestinians, on one hand, and the permanent inclusion of the world Jewry into the 
very being of the state and its regime, on the other. Notable among these laws are the 
following three: the 1950 Law of Return, the 1985 amendment to Basic Law: the 
Knesset, and the 1952 World Zionist Organization – Jewish Agency (Status) Law.155  
The Law of Return grants automatic citizenship to Jews who immigrate to the country 
so that a Jewish majority is maintained. This law reflects the unfinished and ongoing 
character of Zionism, which is essential to maintaining the settler colonial character of 
the state. The Basic Law: the Knesset (amendment no. 9 section 7A which was passed 
on 31 July 1985) as well as reflecting the same characters of the Law of Return, 
institutionalises the definition of Israel as the state of the Jews. The law prevents the 
participation of candidates in Knesset elections if they deny the existence of Israel as 
the state of the Jewish people (Knesset 1985).156 
The status of the extraterritorial and exclusively Jewish organisations; the World 
Zionist Organisation and the Jewish Agency, was officially recognised in a law that 
was enacted in 1952. According to the law, the two bodies, which represent world 
Jewry and as such are accountable solely to the Jewish people rather than the citizens 
of the state, were authorised to continue with their pre-state functions in areas of 
                                                
155 More than 90 laws relate directly and indirectly to the Jewish character of the state (see Dahlih, M.  
(2005) ‘The essence of collective rights and the conditions to materialise them’, in Jamal, A. (ed.) 
Contributions about Collective Rights and the Nation State, Haifa: Mada al-Karmel, p.103 (quoted in 
Mustafa M. and Subhi M. (2005) Without a Permit: the Policy of Arab House Demolition in Israel. 
Umm al-Fahem: Centre for Contemporary Studies, p 16 [Arabic]. 
156For more details on the law and its amendments see:  
http://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic2_eng.htm .   
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immigrants’ absorption, land and settlement as well as the coordination among Israeli 
institutions, in charge of handling them.157 
The ethnic-absolutism which governs the three laws, and which previously led to the 
tragic ethnic cleansing of Palestine, perpetuates anxieties around demography and the 
urgent need to Judaize the land and secure Jewish majority and presence over land. It 
generates racial discourses and policies that construct the Palestinians as the enemy, 
the ticking bomb and the terrorists who need to be contained.158 In the past, this logic 
contributed to legitimising and normalising the placing of Palestinians under military 
rule and occupation and in spaces of exception where violations of their human rights 
mattered less.159  
The land regime: the creation of a legal mechanism for dispossession and 
exclusion  
To assert Jewish control over the newly seized land, and to prevent Palestinians from 
reclaiming their lost land, Israel, within a relatively short period of time, between 
                                                
157 For more details see: http://jafi.org/JewishAgency/English/About/History,  and 
http://www.knesset.gov.il/lexicon/eng/wzo_eng.htm    
158 On 22 March 2002, Ephraim Eitam, the leader of the National Religious Party and member of 
government, told Haaretz, that “the Arabs in Israel are a ticking bomb...They resemble a cancerous 
growth. ...We shall have to consider the ability of the Israeli democracy to continue the Arabs’ 
participation” (quoted in Yiftachel 2006: 184). Benjamin Netanyahu, Minister of Finance and former 
Prime Minster echoing his concern about the Palestinian presence in Israel said in December of 2003: 
“If there is a demographic problem, and there is, it is with the Israeli Arabs who will remain Israeli 
citizens. If Israel’s Arabs become well integrated and reach 35-40 percent of the population, there will 
no longer be a Jewish state but a binational one … The Declaration of Independence said Israel should 
be a Jewish and democratic state ...Therefore a policy is needed that will balance the two.” Haaretz 18 
December 2003 (quoted ibid).  
159 The next chapter shows how the Palestinians in Israel were placed under a military regime from 
1948-1966, despite being citizens of the state. For more literature on the current brutal occupation of 
the 1967 Palestinian territories and the inhumane treatment of Palestinians, even the legitimisation of 
their killing see: Mbembe, A. (2003) ‘Necropolitics’, Public Culture 15 (1), pp. 11-40, Gregory, D. 
(2004b) ‘Palestine and the War on Terror’, Comparative studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle 
East, 24:1, pp. 183-195. 
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1949 and the early 1960s, crafted a legal apparatus which would legalise and 
consolidate the dispossession of Palestinians and ensure the transfer of their land to 
Jewish and state control. At the conclusion of this legal marathon, about 93 per cent 
of Israel’s land - within the pre-1967 occupation of the West Bank and Gaza - was 
owned, controlled and managed by the state or the JNF. In what follows, I discuss 
some of the major laws that legalised the dispossession of Palestinians and gave 
extensive powers to the authorities to continue expropriating land that was still under 
Palestinian ownership.160   
The Defence and Emergency Regulations 
Upon its establishment, Israel inherited the Emergency Regulations that were 
introduced by the British Mandatory authorities in 1945. Although at the time of their 
introduction by the British these draconian measures were heavily criticised by the 
Zionists, the newly established state used them as the basis for its military rule which 
it imposed on its Palestinian citizens from 1948 until 1966.161 Article 125 was the 
most relevant in terms of land dispossession. The article authorised the military 
commander, for security discretions, to declare land to be a “closed area.” A person 
who wished to enter the area could only do so with a written authorisation from the 
military governor. Failing to obtain a permit would mean a criminal offence.   
                                                
160 Up until the 1990s, Israel enacted about thirty laws, which transferred land from private Arab hands 
to state ownership (Yiftachel 1992: 86). 
161 Chapter 5 on the historical sociology of Umm al-Fahem discusses at length the military rule 1948-
1966 and the role it played in land dispossession and fragmentation of Palestinian presence.  
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Another law, on which the military rule was based, was the Emergency Regulations, 
5709-1949. This law provided the Minister of Defence the power to designate large 
tracts of land as a “security zone.” Once a land declared as such no one could live in it 
permanently, enter it or be in it without a permit.  Although similar to article 125, this 
law gave the Minister of Defence and Israeli authorities further powers to expel the 
inhabitants of any Arab village that was within the confines of a security zone (Jiryis 
1976: 90-91).162 These regulations, which Schmitt would classify as the violation of 
law through law, rendered Palestinians trespassers on their own land, which 
consequently, led to their dispossession and even criminalisation of those who did not 
obey by the rules.  
The Absentee Property Law (1950)  
The mass expropriation of Palestinian land was achieved during and shortly after the 
1948 war. This was carried out either on the basis of temporary emergency 
regulations or without any formal legal justification (Kedar 2000-2001: 948). To 
legalise the seizure, Israel introduced the Absentee Property Law of 1950, which 
according to Jiryis (1976:85) was the cruellest of all the expropriation measures. The 
law was central in dispossessing Palestinians both retroactively and prospectively 
(Schechla 2001:21), as it allowed the state to confiscate properties from anyone 
classified as an absentee, therefore banning them from returning to their properties. 
                                                
162 See Jiryis (1976: 90-94) on the case of the villages of Iqrith and Birim in the upper Galilee whose 
inhabitants were ordered to leave the villages initially for two weeks. Despite their initial winning at 
the High Court of Justice, the villagers were not allowed to return. The village of Khasas, also in upper 
Galilee, was served with an eviction notice and when the residents appealed to the High Court of 
Justice, the latter said the authorities that issued evacuation orders have an absolute authority and 
therefore the court cannot interfere in annulling such an order, despite ruling in favour of their return.   
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Article 1 (iii) of the law defines an absentee as anyone who “was a Palestinian citizen 
and left his ordinary place of residence in Palestine (a) for a place outside Palestine 
before the 27th Av, 5708 (1st of September, 1948); or (b) for a place in Palestine held 
at the time by forces that sought to prevent the establishment of the State of Israel or 
that fought against its establishment” (Knesset 1950: 68).163 Moreover, an absentee 
could be an Israeli citizen who was present in Israel, but not at his property, at the 
time of the census, deeming his property absentees’ property (Kimmerling 2002: 
1134). This is why the law is referred to as the “law of the present absentees” (Jiryis 
1976: 85).  
According to the law, the Custodian of Absentees’ Property, is the legal holder of all 
absentees’ property and has extensive power to decide not only what to classify as 
absentees’ property but also to expel occupants whom he thinks are illegally 
occupying a property. Paragraph 30 of the law stipulates: “(a) [w]here the Custodian 
has certified in writing that a person or body of persons is an absentee, that person or 
body of persons shall, so long as the contrary has not been proved, be regarded as an 
absentee. (b) Where the Custodian has certified in writing that some property is 
absentees’ property, that property shall, so long as the contrary has not been proved, 
be regarded as absentees’ property” (Knesset 1950: 80) 
                                                
163 For more details see Absentees’ Property Law, 5710-1950, see: 
https://www.knesset.gov.il/review/ReviewPage.aspx?kns=1&lng=3. 
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The Land Acquisition Law (1953) 
Because much of the land that was expropriated through the above-mentioned laws 
was still officially the property of its original owners, the state needed to settle the 
question of land seizure and secure that ownership was transferred to its bodies. The 
Land Acquisition Law of 1953 for Public Purposes was designed to give answer to 
these concerns. The law, which is the epitome of its predecessors, as Jiryis (1976: 96) 
put it, empowers the Minister of Finance to transfer the seized land to state hands. Its 
aim was to retrospectively legalise all prior land expropriations, and “any seizure of 
property” including those “without justification” (Jiryis 1976: 97; Kimmerling 2002: 
1135). The purpose of the law, as put by the Minister of Finance who proposed the 
bill to the Knesset, was: 
[T]o legalize certain actions taken during the war and after it. 
...When the government began to take over absentee property for 
security reasons or for necessary development projects, other 
expanses of land were seized for the same purpose, essentially in 
agricultural areas where the rights of ownership were not 
sufficiently clearly defined. There are reasons connected with 
national security and necessary projects that make it impossible to 
return these lands to their owners  
(Quoted in Jiryis 1976: 96).   
 
The Prescription Law (1958) 
By the end of the 1950s, the state had managed to expropriate the vast majority of the 
land. Its insatiable appetite for Judaizing and redeeming the land, however, was not 
fully satisfied. This time, through the use of technology in validating and establishing 
ownership, the state sought new avenues to continue the dispossession of Palestinians 
and to prevent them from seizing what it called state land. 
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The danger of Palestinians seizing land arose from the fact that large swaths of land, 
where a sizable Palestinian community was still living, had not been surveyed. 
According to Ottoman and British laws which were still in effect, in the event of a 
land survey, the farmers had the right to claim ownership over the land they were 
farming. To contain the danger, Israel enacted the Prescription Law, 5718-1958. The 
law stipulated that to establish ownership over land, farmers had to prove they had 
been cultivating the surveyed land for fifteen consecutive years before the enactment 
of the law (Jiryis 1976: 112-113).164 
The Israeli authorities in seeking a concrete proof to determine whether the land in 
question was cultivated or not resorted to aerial photographs taken by the British Air 
Force in 1944 and early 1945. As a consequence, land that appeared neglected on the 
day the photograph was taken was automatically considered state land, even if “its 
owners may have turned it into first-class farmland in the intervening years” 
(ibid:115). The survey of land and the resulting settlement of title provided the state 
with an opportunity “for looting every conceivable plot of land remaining in Arab 
hands” (ibid: 116). 85 per cent of the settlement of title cases were decided in favour 
of the state. As a result, Palestinians lost hundreds of thousands of dunums to the state 
(Kedar 2000-2001: 952).  
                                                
164 The period of cultivation had to be twenty years for those who started to cultivate the land after 1 
March 1943. See Jiryis (1976:113) for more details. 
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State land: Jewish land165 
Some theorists in the Hebrew public think that since the state was 
created, it controls all land...and therefore the land problem was 
solved by itself... and the land was redeemed...The land is indeed 
state land, but there is one flaw with it. ...Rights to that land belong 
to all the state’s citizens, including the Arabs. ...In this situation, we 
must ensure that most land will belong to Jews ... and therefore we 
must continue with land redemption.  
Yosef Weitz, head of JNF, 1950(quoted in Yiftachel 2006: 137) 
The ownership of Israel lands, being the lands in Israel of the State, 
the Development Authority or the Keren Kayemet Le-Israel, shall 
not be transferred either by sale or in any other manner. 
Basic Law: Israel Lands (Knesset 1960)166 
Now that the state had ensured that 93 per cent of land had successfully come under 
its control, the remaining task was to ensure that Palestinians were excluded from 
accessing it. Weitz as quoted above was right to indicate that Palestinians, as citizens 
of Israel, are de jure entitled to equal access to state land. To avoid this, and to 
entrench the pre-state Jewish alienability to land, legal avenues were again called 
upon to deliver. This time, however, the story was not as straightforward as in the 
case of land expropriation. The Basic Law: Israel Lands (1960) does not specify that 
all state land is Jewish land.  
                                                
165 The title is inspired by my MSc thesis: ‘State land – Jewish Land: Can Israel’s Legal Framework of 
Land and Planning Policies be Characterized as Racist?’ The thesis was written in 2006 as part of 
completing an MSc in Human Rights at the London School of Economics.  
166 Keren Kayement Le-Israel is the JNF in Hebrew. For the rest of the law see: 
http://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic13_eng.htm   
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To circumvent the law, Israel had to create an infrastructure of organisations and 
intricate decision-making mechanisms which ensured that the JNF and the Jewish 
Agency, two extra-territorial and exclusively Jewish agencies, were legally 
incorporated in land allocation policies. This allowed the state to simultaneously 
perpetuate the exclusion of Palestinians from having equal access to land, and ensure 
that land was exclusively Jewish. The intricate infrastructure helped absolve the state 
of accountability to the exclusionary and racialised policies of such organisations and 
mechanisms, thus contributing to maintaining the façade of being a democratic state. 
In what follows, I discuss the role of three important bodies: The Development 
Authority, Israel Lands Administration (ILA) and the JNF and the relationship 
between them.  
The Development Authority 
To ensure the legality of the transfer of the absentees’ properties to state and Jewish 
ownership a law was designed to establish a Development Authority. Article 19 of the 
Absentees Property Law (1950) states that “if a Development Authority is established 
under a law of the Knesset it shall be lawful for the custodian to sell the property to 
that Development Authority” (Jiryis 1981: 95). After four months of the enactment of 
the Absentees Law, the Knesset passed the Development Authority (Transfer of 
Property) Law of 1950. The law empowers the Development Authority to buy and 
exploit real estate in a manner that it saw fit for the development of public utilities in 
Israel. With the establishment of the Development Authority the Custodian of 
Absentees’ Property started to transfer to it all the property that was at his disposal 
(Jiryis 1981:85). In 1953 all of the absentees’ land was formally sold to the Authority 
(Hussain and McKay 2003: 149).   
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The Development Authority, however, was restricted by the following rules: First, 
any sale required the consent of the government. Second, sale of land could be 
effected only to (a) the state, (b) the JNF, (c) local authorities, if it was urban land and 
on a condition that the JNF was offered the land first, (d) a proposed “institution for 
settling landless Arabs” (Lehn and Davis 1988: 131).167 Jiryis (1981: 86) contends 
that this particular means of transferring the ownership from one Israeli body to the 
other seemed to have been the suggestion of the JNF which wanted to acquire the land 
in legal manners, and which according to (Lehn and Davis 1988: 132) would 
guarantee Jewish ownership. As put by Lehn and Davis: “[t]he JNF argued…that it 
and not the state should become the holder of all of the abandoned lands, first, 
because the government had other demands…And second, because only the JNF 
could guarantee ownership by the Jewish people, since the state ‘in the current 
composition of population [including non-Jews] cannot be an adequate guarantor of 
Jewish ownership” (1988: 131-132). By this, the JNF would have also secured a legal 
shield for both itself and the state. This arrangement would shelter it from lawsuits 
and would offer the state a protection against accusations of racism. The state could 
argue: “such discrimination was being done by an institution set up to settle Jews, not 
by the government itself” (Jiryis 1981: 86). 
Israel Land Administration 
Israel Land Administration Law 1960 (ILA Law), established the ILA which is a 
government authority set up to administer the land owned by the state, the JNF and 
                                                
167 An institution for settling landless Arabs, as stipulated by the law, was never established (Lehn and 
Davis 1988:131). 
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the Development Authority. On its website, ILA states that its land policy is based on 
four legal cornerstones. These include: Basic Law establishing the ILA (1960), Israel 
Lands Law (1960), Israel Land Administration (1960) and Covenant between the 
State of Israel and the World Zionist Organization (Jewish National Fund) (1960) 
(Israel Land Authority 2014).  
The status of the JNF, an organ of the WZO, was determined by the 1952 World 
Zionist Organization – Jewish Agency (Status) Law. This law along with the 1960 
covenant recognises that these pre-state bodies will continue to operate in Israel for 
the development of Israel, absorption of Jewish immigrants from the diaspora and 
settling them on Israel’s lands, thus functioning as quasi-governmental bodies. 
Moreover, at the representation and decision-making level the JNF plays an important 
role. As stated on the Israel Land Authority website, the policy of the ILA is 
determined by the Israel Land Council. The Council is made up of 22 members, 12 of 
which represent government ministries and 10 represent the JNF (Israel Land 
Authority 2014).  
To conclude, it is obvious that the dominancy of the JNF as a landowner and in the 
decision making body is not negligible. Its pre-state Jews-only inscriptions decided in 
the sixth Zionist congress in 1903 and which stipulates the inalienable right of the 
Jews to land and that, the territory could be leased only to Jews, were retained, 
institutionalised and protected by law.  
Conclusion 
The chapter has discussed how Israel’s colonial nomos is predicated on Manichaean 
and racialised foundations. As a Jewish state and a state of the Jews, Israel can never 
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be a state of all its citizens. Its very nomos is governed by exclusive-exclusionary 
ethnic absolutism that seeks at every opportunity to assert and consolidate the Jewish 
exclusive right to the state, thus structurally and institutionally excluding all those 
defined as non-Jews. As such, this very nomos and its ongoing settler-colonialism 
perpetuates the exclusion of the Palestinians who are seen as a problem in need of 
control and is therefore accountable for absenting the Palestinian city and the 
production of what the thesis calls suspended cities and suspended citizens.  
To deconstruct Israel’s nomos, the chapter was divided along two historical eras: 
before and after the establishment of the state in 1948. Before 1948 the chapter sought 
to unpack Zionism, which constitutes the ideological foundation of the state. It started 
by situating Zionism as a colonial ideology emerging in Western Europe at the peak 
of European colonialism of the late nineteenth century and at a time characterised by 
intensified anti-Semitism against European Jewry. It discussed how, in seeking to 
give a neat answer to the Jewish question and the Jews’ right to self-determination in 
Palestine, Zionism mobilised religion, diplomacy and discourse as the bases for 
legitimising its territorial claim.  
Diplomatically, the Zionist movement sought to mobilise Britain to its aid by 
concretely offering to be a geopolitical safeguard to British imperialist interests in the 
Middle East. Discursively, it presented itself as a modern European movement and 
constructed Palestine as terra nullius in need of redemption. It also manufactured a 
reservoir of cultural and spatial imaginaries that produced the indigenous Palestinians 
as unworthy of Palestine and the Zionists as the ones who knew best how to take care 
of the land and make it blossom and flourish.  
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The chapter then went to describe how the Zionist movement moved to concretely 
realise its colonial transformative project. Tel Aviv, the first colonial city to be built 
in Palestine, was discussed as an example for the ethnic absolutism and Manichaeism 
that govern Zionism. Moreover, understanding Tel Aviv’s role in consolidating 
Zionism, both symbolically and concretely, as well as its political and economic role 
in nation building, is important when put in the context of the thesis’s concern with 
the Palestinian city and the urban question under (post)colonialism.  
Building on Carl Schmitt’s insightful analysis of the indispensable role naming plays 
in establishing proprietorship over land, the chapter discussed the production of the 
Hebrew map and its performative political properties. The Hebrew map not only 
sought to create a new narrative, but also to erase and deny the existence of the rival 
Palestine narrative and reality. Moreover, together with the village dossiers project 
that worked towards producing a comprehensive documentation of Palestinian 
villages, the Hebrew map played an important role in domesticating the terrain for 
military and political objectives. Domesticating the land proved crucial for carrying 
out the ethnic cleansing of Palestine in 1948.  
The chapter then moved on to discuss the second historical era, from 1948 up until the 
early 1960s. This was the defining era that has institutionalised and legalised Israel’s 
nomos. The chapter discussed how Israel, soon after its establishment, worked to 
legitimate and consolidate its exclusive-exclusionary Manichaean nomos through 
legal avenues and manipulations. This was discussed particularly in relation to 
demography and land. In the process the chapter also exposed how law making was 
manipulated to serve political objectives and to cover up a system that is 
foundationally and institutionally racist. The pivotal role of the extraterritorial quasi-
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governmental exclusively Jewish organisation, the JNF and the Jewish agency, was 
discussed in this context.  
The next chapter, through deconstructing the workings of (post)colonial 
governmentality in Umm al-Fahem and the way the state sought to render Fahamwis 
governable from the time the village came under Israeli control until it was declared a 
city in 1985, indirectly engages with Israel’s nomos and how it has shaped Umm al-
Fahem’s history.  
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Part II 
Deconstructing for constructing:  
The case of Umm al-Fahem 
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Chapter 5 
Historical sociology of Umm al-Fahem: control, repression 
and defiance 
 
Through employing historical analysis this chapter sheds light onto almost 40 years of 
historical sociology of Umm al-Fahem between 1949 when it was handed over to 
Israel, to the mid 1980s when it was declared a city. Three main and interconnected 
themes run through this chapter: governmentality, Fahmawis’ response to it, and the 
very materiality of the village/city. The chapter deconstructs the workings of 
(post)colonial governmentality in the way the state sought to render Fahmawis and 
their village governable on one hand, and Fahmawis’ resilience, defiance, agency and 
determination to achieve a substantive citizenship, and to build a village/city buzzing 
with culture, creativity and solidarity, on the other.  
It puts forward the argument that the underlying objectives of the different 
technologies that constitute governmentality, whether direct military rule, co-option, 
material incentives, divide and rule, criminalisation of resisting political activists, 
(in)direct intervention into local politics, state withdrawal from the provision of 
services and negligence of urban infrastructure, or perpetuating a state of suspension, 
is to control Umm al-Fahem and render Fahmawis docile, domesticated and in a state 
of suspension. The chapter’s overall objective is to discuss some of the historical 
factors that shape the making of the city, to help unravel the nature of citizenship and 
the city, and how the latter responds under (post)colonial conditions.  
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Starting with Umm al-Fahem’s very recent history in relation to a political proposal 
made by a senior Israeli government official to annex the city to the Palestinian 
Authority, the chapter brings to the fore the subject of living in suspension and 
precariousness. It then moves back to 1949 onwards, to chronologically deconstruct 
the village/city historical sociology that is roughly divided into three periods: 1949-
1966, 1960s - mid 1970s, mid 1970s – mid 1980s. The years 1949 - 1966 describe an 
important part of the history of the city. These were the years of an oppressive and at 
times repressive direct colonial military government imposed on Umm al-Fahem. 
Throughout this era, the chapter discusses Umm al-Fahem’s socio-economic and 
political conditions and how the military government spatially confined Palestinians 
to their villages and brought almost every aspect of their everyday life under scrutiny, 
surveillance and control. It also discusses the different technologies the government 
used to socially, politically and spatially fragment them. Fahmawis’ defiance and 
struggle for rights, amidst the harsh repressive conditions, are an integral part of this 
history.  
The chapter then moves to discuss the second historical period from the early 1960s 
to roughly the mid 1970s. This period is characterised by the struggle to achieve an 
independent democratic local government, free of direct political interference as 
manifested in undemocratically appointed leaders. It then moves to discuss the third 
period, the mid 1970s to the mid 1980s when Umm al-Fahem was governed by a 
democratically elected local government. Throughout this period the chapter 
examines three main subjects. These are the socio-economics of the village, the 
agency of Fahmawis as illustrated by the voluntary work brigades organised by 
leading political forces to tackle the issue of poor urban infrastructure and the struggle 
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to earn the official recognition of a city. It also discusses a locally-led cultural project 
whose aim was to address the severe shortages in the provision of facilities for 
cultural activities. The chapter ends with declaring Umm al-Fahem a city in 1985.   
This historical and sociological analysis draws mostly on primary and archival 
material gathered through the ethnographic work in the city. It includes Arabic 
newspapers and magazines and other newspapers in Hebrew and English collected 
from two Israeli universities’ archives: Haifa and Jerusalem. Local biographies, 
interviews as well as secondary literature all contribute to deconstructing the history 
of Umm al-Fahem throughout that period.   
Umm al-Fahem: a frontier city, “in” yesterday, “out” today 
“To be able to control Wadi Ara, we have to seize Umm al-Fahem.” 
  
 Ben-Gurion, 31 October 1948 (quoted in Jameel 2007:34 1998: 63) 
‘Disengage from Umm al-Fahem,’ read huge billboards on key locations and artery 
roads in Israel, including the Tel Aviv-Jerusalem and Wadi Ara roads. This was 
Avigdor Lieberman’s response to Israel’s disengagement from the occupied Gaza 
strip in 2005.168 This, however, was not an isolated response. Rather, it constitutes 
part of his political proposal of land and population swaps in heavily populated 
Palestinian areas inside Israel with settlements in the 1967 Occupied Palestinian 
                                                
168 Lieberman was a fierce opponent of Ariel Sharon’s plan to disengage from Gaza. To pursue his 
plan, Sharon, then Prime Minister, dismissed Lieberman who was the Minister of Transportation. For 
more detail see: (Myre 2004) of the New York Times from 4 June 2004. 
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Territories. Shifting boundaries where communities could remain intact is the 
suggested mechanism for materialising the proposal. 
Addressing the United Nations General Assembly on 28 September 2010, Lieberman, 
then Israel’s Foreign Minister, said: “A final agreement between Israel and the 
Palestinians has to be based on a program of exchange of territory and populations… 
We are not talking about population transfer but about defining borders so as best to 
reflect the demographic reality” (Ravid 2010).169 "The best solution is separation 
between the nations and the creation of homogenous states...,” he told the New York 
Times on 6 November 2006 (Myer 2006). 
At the heart of Lieberman’s proposal for racial purity stands the ethnic absolutist logic 
that governs Zionist Manichaeism, where space is mobilised again to serve political 
ends. Shifting boundaries offers a spatial solution for a very biopolitical problem to 
use Foucault’s terminology and illustrates best what Eyal Weizman (2007: 6) has 
dubbed as “elastic geography” in relation to the “ebbing and flowing” border between 
the Occupied Territories and Israel. Moreover, it encapsulates the state of suspension 
and precariousness imposed on Palestinians, and Fahmawis in this case, and questions 
both the very essence of their citizenship and their right to the city.  
The residents of Umm al-Fahem are categorically opposed to the plan. For Hashim 
Abdel Rahman, the then Mayor of Umm al-Fahem, the plan was “racist and 
                                                
169 For more details see Ravid, B. (2010) ‘Lieberman presents plans for population exchange at UN’, 
Haaretz, 28 September 2010, available at:  
 http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/lieberman-presents-plans-for-population-exchange-
at-un-1.316197 . 
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unacceptable” (Benn 2005).170 “Umm-el-Fahem is not a commodity, neither is it a 
precarious patch, but rather an integral part of the homeland’s climate, heritage, 
history, existence, identity and destiny,” wrote a local resident in a newspaper article 
(Mahameed 2006). In 2008, when the plan was being debated as part of the final 
status talks between the Palestinian Authority and Israel, the city had simultaneously 
convened a symposium, to which they invited progressive Jewish activists and local 
active academics to discuss what they called “the danger of the population swap” 
(Ighbariyih 2008). Legal experts from the city concluded that transferring a 
population against its will is a war crime under international law (ibid). 
Only six decades earlier, however, the political and spatial map was diametrically 
opposed. Umm al-Fahem, as a frontier mountainous village located on the border 
between the West Bank and Israel and overlooking the strategic road of Wadi Ara 
which became under Israeli control, was a desired geopolitical territory that the newly 
established state desperately needed for strategic reasons. On 14 May 1948, Israel’s 
first Independence Day, Umm el- Fahem was not yet part of the newly declared state. 
Umm al-Fahem managed to defeat the Zionist armed forces with fierce resistance, 
despite the latter military supremacy. “To be able to control Wadi Ara, we have to 
seize Umm al-Fahem,” wrote David Ben-Gurion in his memoir on 31 October 1948 
(quoted in Jameel 2007: 34, 1998: 63). 
                                                
170 For further details see interview of the mayor by Haaretz correspondent Aluf Benn (2005) in an 
article that appeared in the Washington Post on 14 August 2005 under the title ‘Trading Places: Can a 
Land Swap Keep Jews From Being a Minority in Their Own State?’, available at: 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2005/08/13/AR2005081300091_pf.html . 
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“Land with Arabs on it and land without Arabs on it are two very different types of 
land,” Ben-Gurion told his party’s central committee on 16 March 1949 (Segev 1998: 
28), just two weeks before the demarcation of the borders between the West Bank and 
Israel. Certain of their aim to annex the geopolitically strategic village of Umm al-
Fahem and Wadi Ara, but unwilling to include its Palestinian population, the Zionists 
tried five times to occupy the area but were defeated. In an attempt to inject some 
hope and invoke victorious feelings among the Zionist soldiers, the last operation to 
occupy the village was called “Restoring our Glorious Past.” The people of Umm al-
Fahem yet again resisted and managed to inflect defeat on the army (Pappé 2006: 
195).  
However, what the Zionists failed to achieve through military occupation, they 
achieved through striking a deal with the Jordanians, who were in charge of the West 
Bank at the time, including Umm al-Fahem. On 3 April 1949, Umm al-Fahem, and 15 
other frontier villages in what is known as the Little Triangle were all annexed to 
Israel, within the Rhodes agreements signed between Israel and Jordan. 171   The 
agreement shifted those villages to the west of what became known as the Green Line. 
The Little Triangle was ceded to Israel in May of that year (Jameel 2007).   
                                                
171 Despite being rectangular in shape, the area is called the Triangle because it was part of the Jenin-
Nablus-Tulkarm Triangle, which was not within the boundaries of newly established state of Israel on 
14 May 1948 (Jiryis 1976: 5) 
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Colonial military government: between policing the transition and the 
fight back172 
We call upon... the sons of the Arab people, the inhabitants of the 
state of Israel, to keep the peace and take part in the building of the 
state on the basis of full and equal citizenship... 
 Ben-Gurion 14 May 1948, Declaration of Independence173 
Soon after the Rhodes agreements, Fahmawis were called upon to gather in Al-
Meedan.174 “It has been decided to hand Umm al-Fahem and the Triangle over to 
Israel,” Fahmawis were told by the Jordanian General Abdulla Al-Tal. 175  For 
Fahmawis the decision came as a shock. It was met with resentment, especially by 
those engaged in armed resistance against the Zionists. “For God sake, how could you 
do this? What will be our fate, especially those armed among us?” responded Ali Al-
Faris, a prominent resistance fighter who thereafter left the country for Syria (Jameel 
1998: 72). On 20 May 1949, the Israeli Army forces entered Umm al-Fahem with 
armed vehicles. Upon their arrival they met with the village traditional leaders - 
makhateer.176  After the meeting was finished Fahmawis were called upon to gather in 
Al-Meedan. All those who had guns were ordered to hand them over to the Israeli 
                                                
172 This chapter situates the history of Umm al-Fahem as part of the history of the Palestinians in Israel. 
Therefore, in the historical background about the military government it refers not only to the 
Fahmawis but Palestinians in general as well.  
173  To view the rest of the declaration see (Knesset 2014). Available at: 
http://www.knesset.gov.il/docs/heb/megilat.htm [Hebrew]. 
174 Al- Meedan means the square in Arabic. It used to be the main gathering area in the village. It is 
located at the junction of the four neighbourhoods that make up the old part of the village.  Chapter 7 
includes a section on Al-Meedan as an urban space that is quintessential of the political, cultural and 
spatial transformations which the city has undergone.   
175 During the 1948 war, Umm al-Fahem was under the Arab Army, first the Iraqi regiment which had 
its base there and later under the Jordanians.  
176 At the time, the village had four different makhateer-chiefs, representing its four big families and 
their respective neighbourhood.  
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authorities present at the scene (see figure 11). The army message to Umm al-Fahem 
was:  
To the people of Umm-el-Fahem, the war is over, the fight has 
ceased. It is time for peace and security, we are now one country, 
we are two fraternal peoples in one country, we will live together 
and build an honoured future together. Hand over your arms and no 
harm will be inflicted on you.  
(quoted in Ighbariyih 1988: 79; Jameel 2007: 51) 
 
 
Figure 11: A Fahmawi handing his gun over to the army, courtesy of IDF archive 
From that day on, Umm al-Fahem was placed under a direct military government and 
was to be ruled by a military governor. Meanwhile, not only were the locals 
traumatised by the events and the feelings of betrayal at the hands of the Arab army, 
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they were forced to celebrate and stage their content for the arrival of the Israeli 
forces (see figure 12). They had to clap to the state Zionist anthem of hatikvah that 
has no mention whatsoever of their existence. Under the headline ‘The Israeli flag is 
waving over Umm al-Fahem,’ the Israeli newspaper of Il-Yom reported: “On Friday 
20 May 1949, the first phase of handing over Wadi Ara, in the Triangle, to the Israeli 
forces had been accomplished ... at about two thirty in the afternoon, the Israeli flag 
was raised over the house which the military governor had taken over to be his 
headquarters in the village of Umm al-Fahem. The flag was raised after completing a 
military parade in the village’s square that ended by hatikvah anthem and crowds’ 
chanting and clapping,” (Il Yom, 22 May 1949, quoted in Jameel 2007: 54-55).  
 
Figure 12: Fahmawis celebrating the arrival of military forces, courtesy of IDF archives 
 
Faithful to colonial rule strategies of fostering traditional leadership, the first step that 
both the regional and Umm al-Fahem’s military governors took after the parade 
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finished was to convene a meeting with the village makhateer and notables. The 
introductory meeting set the rules of conduct between Fahmawis and the military 
government. Locals were asked to calm down and collaborate with the new regime to 
achieve peace and order. They were ordered to hand over all their arms as well. The 
permit regime was partially introduced and warnings against hiding or assisting 
refugees were made.177 They were also told that foreigners, i.e. refugees would not be 
recognised and that those failing to follow instructions would be punished. Il-Yom 
newspaper also reported that the military government would safeguard residents’ 
rights and that “anyone who does not feel he can fulfil his duties can leave to 
territories which are on other side of the Israeli borders” (quoted ibid).178   
The promise of peace and security soon proved to be empty rhetoric. The military 
regime imposed on Umm al-Fahem and the entire Palestinian community inside Israel 
was repressive and controlling. It entrusted military governors to rule with almost 
absolute power and impunity.179 It confined Palestinians to their villages and towns 
and subjected them to a regime of permits. Under this regime they had to ask the 
military governor’s permission to leave their village. Permits had to be in writing. 
Failing to obtain a permit put Fahmawis under a constant threat of criminalisation for 
                                                
177 The point about the refugees was particularly important as Umm al-Fahem before becoming part of 
Israel was a sanctuary for Palestinian refugees who were fleeing and forced to flee their villages in 
1948. About one-fifth of the village’s population were landless refugees. 
178 The Arabic newspaper Al-Difaa, of 23 May 1949, reported the same but with different rhetoric: 
“The Jewish military governor had met with the makhateer of occupied Umm al-Fahem and had asked 
them to set up a committee made of the extended families dignitaries representatives, who would be the 
link between the authorities and the people. The committee which included eight representatives in 
addition to the four makhateer met on the same day with the military governor, who handed them a list 
of some of those who did not hand their guns over. The makhateer and the committee had ensured him 
that all the guns had been handed over. The governor, then, asked them to sign a paper which held 
them responsible in case any guns were found....’ (cited in Jameel 2007: 54).  
179 The police was in charge of all matters relating to Palestinians living in cities, while military 
governors were in charge of Palestinians elsewhere (Jiryis 1976: 16).   
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daily practices as normal and banal as visiting a family member or a doctor outside of 
their village or even possessing non-rationed food or clothes.  
The military government, formally and legally established in January 1950, was based 
on the 1945 Defence (emergency) regulations inherited from the British rule (Jiryis 
1976: 16). The regulations were worded in great detail and gave extensive power to 
the authorities to interfere in almost every aspect of Palestinian life, “from control 
over the freedom of speech, movement, and the press to the regulation of the 
possession of arms, the expropriation of property and the control of the means of 
transportation” (ibid). They also “gave the military governors the power to appoint 
military commanders, while the judicial powers were entrusted to military courts 
appointed by the army chief of staff” (ibid).180  The Israeli government’s Central 
Committee for Security, the highest body dealing with Arabs, directed the military 
government’s modus operandi. Members of the committee included the commander 
of the military government, the commander of the secret intelligence Arab unit, the 
police, and the Prime Minister’s Advisor on Arab Affairs (Boymel 2002: 135).  
Of the 162 Mandatory Regulations, Ozacky-Lazar (2002: 105) argues five were fully 
enforced. These were as follows: Article 109 which allowed the military government 
to ban anyone from being present in certain areas. Article 110 which stated 
individuals were subject to police supervision with banishment entitlement. Article 
                                                
180  Ozacky-Lazar (2002:105) notes that the military government was imposed mainly in Arab 
populated areas: the Galilee, the Triangle, the Naqab and the cities of Ramlih, Lydd, Jaffa and 
Ashkilon.  In the Triangle it covered the armistice ceasefire line with Jordan, with the length of 55-60 
km from Majjido in the North, down to Wadi Ara under Kufur Qasim. The area included 30 Arab 
localities which spanned over 320,000 dunum.  
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111 which allowed administrative detention for anyone thought to be a threat to 
public security. Article 124 imposing curfew and Article 125, which for Jiryis (1976: 
17) was the most notorious of all. Article 125 granted the military governor the power 
to proclaim any area or place a forbidden [closed] area where no one is allowed to 
enter or leave without a written permit issued by him or his deputy. Failing to follow 
the order was a punishable crime. 181  In addition, Jiryis quotes Article 108 as 
particularly important. It entitled the military governor the power to decide whether to 
enforce the above-mentioned restrictions “at any time he considered it necessary for 
securing the public safety, the defence of Israel, the maintenance of public order, or 
the suppression of mutiny, rebellion or riot” (ibid: 19-20).  
Under this regime the Palestinians had very limited, if any, recourse to hold the 
military authorities to account judicially. Moreover, unlike their fellow Jewish 
citizens, Palestinians were not tried in civil courts but in military ones set up to ensure 
compliance with articles of the emergency regulations (Jiryis 1976:19). The judges in 
those courts were from the military and as such not necessarily equipped with 
juridical knowledge (Ozacky-Lazar 2002: 105). The authorities were “omnipotent” in 
areas they controlled (Jiryis 1976: 20; Ozacky-Lazar ibid), with absolute freedom to 
act exactly as they chose, unhampered by administrative restraints. Judicial control 
was restricted to the possibility of appealing to the Supreme Court of Justice to 
challenge the legality of the military government’s actions. However, time proved that 
“the Supreme Court made it a rule not to interfere with the military government when 
                                                
181 See Chapter on Israel’s colonial nomos where Article 125 is discussed as another mechanism for 
land expropriation.  
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its actions were based on ‘security reasons” (Jiryis 1976: 20) and that “the military 
governor was not to be brought to court… as this might affect national security” 
(Ozacky-Lazar 2002: 105).182 
Objectives and rationale183  
For Ben-Gurion “the military government came into existence to protect the right of 
Jewish settlement in all parts of the state” (Knesset Debates, 20 Feb. 1963, p 1217, 
quoted in Jiryis 1976: 53). Academic texts agree that its objectives included the 
exclusion of the Palestinians from enjoying full citizenship, allowing the state further 
land expropriation, consolidating Jewish control, and preventing Palestinian refugees 
from returning. For example, for Kimmerling and Migdal (2003: 177) the real 
objective behind restricting the Palestinians in what they called a “territorial enclave” 
was to exclude them from “the broader labour market so they could not compete with 
the Jewish immigrants who were flooding into the state and preventing them from 
resisting appropriation of their lands.” For Ozacky-Lazar (2002: 107) the main 
rationale was to maintain the new status quo so that the Arabs who left would not 
return.  
Ridding the country of its Palestinian population was another objective. Boymel 
(2002), who looked into official documents, including those of the ruling party of 
Mapai, documents from the Prime Minister’s Office, the police, the Shabak - secret 
                                                
182 Jiryis (1976:22) argues that the Supreme Court did not challenge the military government and had in 
fact allowed ample space for the authorities to act under the pretext of security reasons, and “at times 
doing its best to legally justify the government actions.” 
183 Objectives and rationale as revealed in some academic texts on the military government.  
 
202	
intelligence services - and documents from the Prime Minister’s Advisor on Arab 
Affairs, revealed that the military government was necessary for the state as long as 
the Palestinians existence was hoped to be temporary (2002: 156). For Boymel, this 
regime was also the main mechanism that ensured the exclusion of Palestinians from 
state apparatuses, and allowed for what he calls the Judaization of the state (ibid: 
134).  
For Jiryis (1976: 16) the military government with its draconian regulations was “a 
typical example of the traditional imperialist attitude in dealing with the native 
population of a colony.” It constituted a state within a state that had its own judicial, 
legislative and executive powers. In a colonial setting repressive policies and 
criminalisation are the norm, not the exception. The double standards and the binary 
systems are part of what Fanon (1969) in the Wretched of the Earth called the 
Manichaean world cut into compartments and propped up by the power of the gun.  
Everyday coloniality, everyday Manichaeism  
Space under the military government with its regime of permits became highly 
racialised and ghettoised. In mixed cities, Palestinians were confined to their 
neighbourhoods, to which they referred as ghettos. Fouzi el-Asmar, a Palestinian poet, 
journalist and academic whose work and life provide a prism into the everyday life of 
Palestinians, recalls the pain of being confined to the ghetto in the mixed city of il-
Lydd. His experience bears witness to the Manichaean nature and double standards of 
the colonial state in the early years of its establishment.   
[N]ot long after the removal of all the furniture from the houses in 
Lydda, Jewish families began to be housed there. They would 
choose a house they liked and move into it. The Arabs were not 
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allowed to leave their own ghetto without a permit from the 
authorities, and the most infuriating thing for us was that our area 
and other areas in Lydda which were inhabited by Arabs were under 
military command, while the rest of the city in which Jews lived, 
was not. Until the early 1950s we could not go out without a special 
permit, while the Jews, of course, were free to go anywhere except 
for into our ghetto.  
Fouzi El-Asmar (1975: 23) 
Fahmawis, like other Palestinians, became spatially isolated, and confined to lines and 
areas designated for them by the military authorities. Access to their land was denied 
and much of their fertile land was either declared absentee property or became under 
Jordanian rule after the borders were shifted as part of the Rhodes agreements. This 
was particularly difficult as the majority of Fahmawis relied on agriculture as their 
prime source of living. Those who defied the military orders by smuggling into their 
land to harvest it were criminalised. On 31 March 1950 Al-Ithad newspaper, then the 
only non-state Arabic newspaper covering the conditions under which Palestinians 
lived, reporting on the criminalisation and imprisonment of Fahmawis who crossed 
the lines, wrote:   
Locals are demanding access to their land and to live in dignity in 
their villages. More than 30 farmers who were farming their land 
between il-Lajjoun - in the Jezreel Valley -, and Zalafa - next to 
Umm al-Fahem - were brought to court and have been sentenced 
between one to two months imprisonment for stepping beyond the 
demarcated line for them, and because the land was declared now 
absentee property...the military government is pushing people to 
leave...transfer. (Quoted in Ighbariyih 1988: 85). 
 
As expected, rocketing unemployment, hardship and poverty became part of 
Fahmawis’ everyday reality. For them, the first years of the military rule were 
referred to as “the years of siege and starvation” (Jameel 2007:64). On 28 August 
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1949, Al-Itihad, in an article entitled ‘The Conditions in Umm al-Fahem: Illness, 
Poverty, Unemployment and Military Rule,’ reported:  
The things people complain about the most are: unemployment and 
the military rule that restricts their liberties and movement and 
therefore hamper their living. In Umm al-Fahem there are about 
1200 workers who used to work in Haifa, Jaffa and other places, 
most of whom, if not all, are unemployed. They are struggling to 
make their living after they have spent all their life savings during 
this last year.  
(Al-Ithad 1949) 
Al-Ithad of 29 October 1950 featured another article written by a Fahmawi where he 
described the abject poverty and the repressive measures under which Fahmawis 
found themselves. The article entitled ‘Umm-el-Fahem is in Severe Crisis’ wrote: 
In our village, trade unions are banned by the military government. 
Under the pretext of security, leaving the village in search of work 
is banned, and getting to our land is banned. The only thing 
permitted in the village is either dying of hunger or moving to the 
other side. Those who complain about the conditions are banished 
on the pretext of posing a security threat and for being dangerous 
communists... I would also like to inform you that this letter which 
you are publishing in Al-Itihad will not be read by village residents 
as the military governor has banned Al-Itihad from getting into the 
village … it is expected that the harsh economic conditions are 
leading to an increasing number of people leaving to the Palestinian 
side occupied by Abdullah [of Jordan]...however there is no room 
for despair.  
(Al-Itihad 1950) 
The bread demonstration: repression and resistance 
Against the harsh conditions of oppression, deprivation, isolation and starvation 
Fahmawis started to get organised to resist the iron fist of the military government.  
Led by the communists Ahmad Khadir, Ibraheem Husari and Muhammed Shraydi 
they took to the streets of their village and organised rallies outside the military 
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governor’s house demanding that life essentials such as work and bread were 
provided as well as an end to the military rule.184 On 2 August 1950, 500 unemployed 
workers and 300 school children and women took part in the first bread demonstration 
to be organised under the military government. The demonstrators chanted, “we want 
bread, we want flour, Hey you Minaheem we are hungry” (Jameel 2007; Ighbariyih 
1988: 86).185  
The demonstration was successful in achieving some demands. The gains were in the 
form of 60 work permits, and an increase of flour, sugar and rice rations (Ighbariyih 
1988: 87). The military government, however, had ways to revenge the few 
concessions it had made. Soon after the demonstration, it criminalised the leading 
demonstrators, detaining some for 48 hours and others for months. It also imposed 
taxation on education, penalising those who would not pay by denying them permits 
(ibid).  
Punitive measures and the persecution of activists, especially the communists, were 
common practice. Military government regulations gave the military governor the 
power to banish or administratively detain Palestinians, forcing them to report their 
movements to the police (Jiryis 1976: 18). However, from the point of view of the 
political activists, the harsh restrictions did not deter them from continuing to fight for 
their rights and against the military government.  
                                                
184 These first communists in the village used to work in the port city of Haifa before 1948. It was there 
that they became exposed to the communist party and its literature.  
185 Minaheem was the military governor of Umm al-Fahem. 
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Local biographies of two prominent communists in the village, Muhammed Shraydih 
(1988) and Ibraheem Husari (2005), provide further insights into the everyday 
oppression, harassment, and criminalisation alongside defiance and resilience. 
Although their activism repertoire included mainly democratic activities such as 
collecting signatures, organising rallies, and distributing newspapers that under a 
democratic regime would not be penalised, their biographies reveal they were subject 
to persecution, mostly in the shape of arrest and banishment away from their families. 
After the bread demonstration, Muhammed Shraydih, Ibraheem Husari and Ahmad 
Khadir were all banished to the neighbouring village of Bartaa’ah on the borders of 
the West Bank.186 Shraydih, active both locally and nationally, was only allowed to 
reunite with his family after six months (Ighbariyih 1988: 89-91).  
In 1951, Shraydih was again arrested for 5 months, this time for collecting signatures 
to petition the Knesset against the murder of a local child at the hands of the military 
(ibid: 101). In May 1956, he was sentenced to twelve-month imprisonment for 
insulting the military governor and causing disturbance in his office (Jiryis 1976: 29). 
By 1960, Shraydih would have spent five and a half years in prison. For him, those 
years that deprived him of his liberty did not manage to demoralise him. “Today I’m 
leaving prison more determined to achieve the goals of my communist party, the 
goals of freedom and democracy, peoples’ fraternity, peace and dignified life,” said 
Shraydih in an interview to Al-Itihad on 20 March 1960 (Ighbariyih 1988: 136). The 
                                                
186  Within the Rhodes Agreements, Bartaa’ah was split into two: the West Bank or Arab side as it 
became to be known and the Israeli one. 
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struggle to live “in dignity, for keeping the land, for true and just Jewish-Arab 
fraternity,” remained paramount to him (Shraydih quoted ibid: 134-35). 
Another area of work that the political activists identified as crucial was campaigning 
to convince people to stay where they were. The harsh conditions led some 
Palestinians to leave to the Jordanian side of the border, an act that was welcomed, 
even openly prompted by the military government. For example, in June 1951, Al-
Itihad reported that the military government had asked the makhateer and other 
notables to sign an agreement to transfer poor workers to the Jordanian side. This was 
met with resistance. Political activists demanded work for the unemployed instead of 
tramsfer.187 
The first of May 1958 
The events of the First of May 1958 marked the peak of the political activists’ 
defiance of the military government’s orders. It was particularly special and had been 
etched into the collective memory of Umm al-Fahem. Traditionally, for the 
communists of Umm al-Fahem, the first of May had been an occasion to be 
celebrated. However, May 1958 was also an occasion for mass celebrations in Israel. 
Marking a decade since its establishment, it played an important role in the state’s 
propaganda machine. The entire country, including the Palestinian localities, had to 
                                                
187  See ‘Freedom to Elect, Enough with Terror and Provocation’, Al-Itihad, 23 June 1951. The 
following appeared in the article: “...the military governor had convened the makhateer and notables 
who were asked to sign a paper written in Hebrew agreeing that poor workers be transferred across the 
border...they did sign...thereafter, the governor started calling up those workers who under terror and 
torture were made to sign asking they be transferred to the other side. A movement was formed to 
protest against the governor, “demanding he stop his repressive approach and instead find work for the 
unemployed.” 
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celebrate its achievements as a modern state. Umm al-Fahem was no exception. The 
military governor, using his collaborators, and the power of intimidation had staged 
celebrations in the village (see figure 13).  
 
Figure 13: Umm al-Fahem 1958: girls' choir celebrating the 10th anniversary of the state. 
Government Press Office (courtesy of Umm al-Fahem Art Gallery) 
The communists, however, had a different plan. A few days after the first of May, 
defying the military governor’s orders, Fahmawis managed to smuggle Tawfeeq 
Toubi, then a communist member of Knesset, on a donkey through the mountains to 
take part in their celebrations. When Toubi finally got to the village, hundreds of 
people were waiting for him in a mosque square which some had thereafter called the 
‘First of May’ square. The celebrations started at 11:30 in the morning. As expected, 
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the police aggressively tried to repress the celebrations.188 But Fahmawis did not give 
in. They fought the police. As field interviewees recalled, they even managed to beat 
up the military governor who sought refuge under a lorry, begging them to let him out 
safely.  
Detention of active communist members and dawn raids followed the event. A few 
days later, the military government summoned a meeting with its collaborators and 
the makhateer to condemn the communists. It also invited the press to report the 
meeting.189 However, the battle of the First of May 1958, as referred to by Fahmawis, 
constituted an important landmark in the collective memory of the village and 
communist activism, not only locally but also nationally and for generations to 
come.190  
It is no surprise that undermining the communists’ activities was one of the political 
objectives behind the military government. Ben-Gurion wrote in his diary on 20 
December 1948: “Margovski was appointed as the representative of the military 
government in the Galilee...I gave him two instructions: to prevent the Arabs 
infiltrating the Galilee and to prevent the communists from taking over among the 
Arabs.” This mission, as Umm al-Fahem testifies, had failed. The Communist Party 
took deeper roots among the Palestinians. As Ozacky-Lazar (2002: 107) puts it “the 
                                                
188 For further details see ‘The Police Fire on a Meeting in Umm al-Fahem. The People Defending 
Themselves against the Aggressive Assault’, Al-Itihad  9 May1958, [Arabic]. 
189 See article: ‘Police Launches a Terror Campaign in Umm al-Fahem, and Calls for a Meeting with 
his Collaborators to Stage a Support for the National Oppressive Authorities’, Al-Itihad, 13 May 1958 
[Arabic]. 
190 See Al-Itihad article written 50 years after 1958 May events: Ighbaryih, J. (2008) ‘Umm al-Fahem: 
Prisoners’ Testimonies from the First of May 1958’, 2 May 2008, in: 
http://www.aljabha.org/index.asp?i=34002 [Arabic].  
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Communist Party was never outlawed and gained lots of support among the Arabs in 
the early years of the state.”191  
The Good Arabs, the stooges and the fight for a local government  
“It was through the makhateer, the sheikhs and the heads of the hamulah [extended 
family] that the military government could control an entire community with a small 
number of people,” concluded a report of the Prime Minister Advisor on Arab Affairs 
on ten years of military rule/objectives and achievements (recommendations for 
dealing with the Arab minority in Israel’ September 1959, State of Israel Archive, 2-
926-1959-18, p 12, quoted in Boymel 2002: 135). Following its predecessor’s British 
footsteps and other colonial regimes, from its inception the military government 
believed that key to its rule over the Palestinians would be nurturing the traditional, 
tribal-based leadership, on one hand and the creation of a loyal section of society that 
would be politically tied to the Ben-Gurion ruling party of Mapai, on the other. The 
establishment, mainstream Israelis, policy-makers and academics referred to this 
section as the good Arabs. The goal behind such an alliance and encouragement of 
tribal-based politics headed by the makhateer was that Mapai and other Zionist parties 
could “affect the whole Palestinian question by preventing the formation of any Arab 
organisation not favorable to Israel” (Jiryis 1976: 49). The makhateer also served as 
informers to the authorities, providing the latter with weekly reports on their 
respective villages.  
                                                
191 See chapter 7 on the 1976 Koenig report in relation to the communist party and recommendations to 
neutralise their increasing popularity.  
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This form of indirect rule over the natives through the encouragement of social 
hierarchies is not unique to Israel. Paul Rabinow (1995) discussing Morocco under 
French colonial rule describes similar processes. There, the French colonial officers, 
especially Lyautey, sought to govern the country through first identifying and then 
strengthening existing traditional social forms and practices. Lyautey said:  
Vex not tradition, leave custom be. Never forget that in every 
society there is a class to be governed, and a natural-born ruling 
class upon whom all depends. Link their interests to ours...  
 
Quoted in Rabinow (1995: 285)  
Taking advantage of the dire socio-economic and political conditions of Palestinians 
who had suffered from a political defeat that ruptured their society and were now 
stripped of the most basic of rights, imprisoned in a regime of permits, the military 
government this time through employing divide and rule technologies tried to govern 
its Palestinian population. The technologies were diversified and included co-option, 
economic favouritism and bribery for those willing to collaborate (Jiryis 1976: 50). 
Cohen (2010: 27) noted that providing leases for relatively large tracts of public land 
or absentee property rendered collaboration with the authorities worthwhile. This was 
also profitable as refugees and landless Palestinians could provide cheap labour to 
work the leased lands. This section was also allowed to engage in what the authorities 
considered “legal smuggling business” for goods such as meat (ibid). 
The carrot and stick policy of promising pass permits and nepotism on one hand and 
withdrawal of those permits, internment and house arrest on the other was another 
way for securing many of the Arabs votes went to Mapai. According to Jiryis (1976: 
50), in every Knesset elections Mapai managed to produce four or five Arab members 
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of Knesset who were tied to it. However, such “methods were not reserved only for 
the Knesset elections but were used during the elections of local councils in the Arab 
villages and were eventually applied whenever the military government chose to 
interfere in any popular activity among the Arabs, political or social” (ibid: 50).   
Warning against entrenching the colonial legacy of helping the makhateer get elected 
for local elections, an Al-Itihad article written as early as 14 March 1949 entitled ‘On 
the Election of Village Makhateer: a Method Used by the Mandate which Brought 
Many Catastrophes on the Villages: Reject this Method and Pursue Democracy,’ 
urged people to reject such undemocratic colonial legacy. The article wrote that the 
“makhateer are far from being capable of fulfilling their duties - towards the citizens. 
Many if not all of them come from big landowners families, who were chosen at the 
time of the British rule to secure the government’s interests. A testimony to this is the 
thirty years of British occupation that left the Arab villages in stagnant conditions, 
without even one step forward towards development. Those makhateer were not 
elected by the people. Many of them collaborated with the colonialists against the 
people, and were financially rewarded by the Mandate government ... when the 
massacre against the Palestinians started, this section of people had contributed to the 
transfer of peasants ... the Israelis are carrying on this legacy.” 
The article goes on to describe how the Israeli government, which did allow the Arabs 
to vote for the Knesset, had deprived them the right to elect their own representatives 
in the village, where they could potentially have power over administering their 
affairs. In villages where there were different religions, a policy of divide and rule and 
ethnicisation was pursued. “The military governor, together with the head of the 
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police and a few other officers had gathered the heads of families and asked them to 
nominate candidates for the mukhtar position on a religious basis” (ibid). 
Umm al-Fahem was no exception. As mentioned previously, the first step taken by 
the military governor in the village was to meet with the makhateer who, as the 
numerous reports in Al-Itihad accounted, became tied with an umbilical cord to the 
authorities and in many cases served as a fig leaf for the latter oppressive polices.192 
Not only did they play a crucial role in encouraging the transfer of Palestinians to the 
Jordanian side, they also worked as part of the surveillance regime. For example, 
ballot boxes for Knesset elections were placed in their houses as well as in the 
military government headquarters. Just before the second elections to the Knesset, 
Fahmawis outraged by the undemocratic move, addressed the elections committee to 
place the ballot boxes in neutral places, as required by law (Al-Itihad 23 June 
1951).193  
Another important role assumed by the makhateer and other government beneficiaries 
related to land grabbing. They aided the government by targeting vulnerable, weak 
and despairing sections of society by making them sell their land cheaply. One of the 
research interviewees told the story of how a ‘land pimp’ took advantage of his 
vulnerable conditions; being unemployed, illiterate, with an ill wife whose medical 
                                                
192 In official state ceremonies, the military government made sure its beneficiaries class was being 
invited, as in the case of inaugurating the settlement of Mi-Ami in 1963, which was built on Umm al-
Fahem’s land. See article in ‘A Bit of Shame...You Those who Revive the Barren Land...by Removing 
the Arab Farmers from their Land’, Al-Itihad, 13 December 63  [Arabic]. 
193 See ‘Freedom to Elect, Enough with Terror and Provocation’, Al-Itihad, 23 June 1951 [Arabic].  
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treatment was very expensive.194 Ignorant of the content of the letter, the land pimp 
made him sign to sell his land for a very low price. A letter sent to Al-Ithad 10 March 
1951, attesting to such collaborations reported: “The military government 
committee… still works on luring the citizens, by any means necessary, to sell their 
land to the Jewish National Fund and to transfer them to the Abdullah side. The locals 
refuse such disgusting methods and make it clear they are adhering to their rights as 
citizens.”  
The communists together with other progressive, nationalist anti-tribal political 
groups, such as Al-Ard (The Land) movement resisted such policies. They urged 
locals not to capitulate to policies of starvation and harassment. Graffiti was another 
way to express their outrage, especially against land pimps. “To landowners, do not 
sell your land. Whoever sells his land to the Jews and speculates with them - will die. 
And whoever takes down this placard will also die,” read placards left outside two 
mosques in the village (Cohen 2010:121). These political forces often exposed both 
the military government and their stooges, as they interchangeably called the 
makhateer.  
They also demanded a local council conducted with transparent, fair and democratic 
elections, free of military governor intervention be set up in their village. “The locals 
united to demand elections for the local council be held now, which will not be on 
family-basis but for the village’s interests and development. They refuse attempts to 
                                                
194 Land pimps is what Palestinians call those who worked for the military government buying land 
from Arabs to pass to the state.  
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appoint a local council that will not be any better than the makhateer’s regime.195 The 
people demand their representatives be elected, not appointed by the military 
governor. The people demand they be the sovereign of their local council, working for 
the village’s interest,” Fahmawis wrote in an Al-Itihad article on 19 April 1952.  
Unlike other Palestinian villages that were already granted local councils and despite 
being the largest Palestinian village in Israel, only in June 1960 and after a long 
democratic struggle, was Umm al-Fahem finally allowed to have its own local 
government. Although control over local councils was the main autonomous source of 
power for the Palestinians (Kimmerling and Migdal 2003; Al Haj and Rosenfeld 
1990), attaining this status proved to be the start of a long perpetual battle to achieve 
the right to development, equality and substantive control over their local affairs.  
In Umm al-Fahem, the military government adhering to its legacy of the last decade 
and against the wish of people appointed a Mapai-linked leadership for the local 
council. The leadership was dysfunctional and incompetent, failing to deliver basic 
services to the residents. In 1962, the village of about 8000 (Statistical Abstract of 
Israel 1968 no.19: 30) had only one day-care health centre, with only one General 
Practitioner and two nurses working until three in the afternoon. No qualified midwife 
or doctors were available at night. The village whose vast majority of men worked as 
daily labourers in Jewish towns and cities, and whose students had to go to secondary 
schools in Nazareth and the Jewish city of Afula for the lack of schools in the village, 
suffered from severe shortages in public transport. There was only one bus service 
                                                
195 The local council is what the thesis refers to as the local government or the local authority as well.  
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that operated only once a day traveling to Nazareth and Haifa. Most of the time the 
bus was crammed with between 100 and 150 passengers, including children and 
women. The streets were also in dire conditions, with piles of uncollected rubbish that 
made the entire place stink of bad smell.  
Against this background of negligence and coercive intervention in internal politics 
by the military government, the locals organised themselves in “a popular initiative 
committee” that worked at the grassroots level. They distributed leaflets on the 
squalid conditions of the village and exposed the complicity of the stooge leadership. 
They managed to collect 1,500 signatures from heads of households demanding the 
appointed local government be dismantled and instead have an elected local 
government that would be accountable to its constituency, not serving the interests of 
the military government. Simultaneously, the communist party had, on behalf of the 
locals, petitioned and repeatedly questioned the Knesset along with the Ministry of 
Interior, demanding democratic elections be held in the village (Al-Itihad 14 August 
1962; 7 September 1962). 
When in 1973, the Fahmawis were allowed to have democratic elections, a coalition 
known as “the democratic coalition,” was voted in. The coalition was made up of 
progressive forces that included the communists and Abnaa el-Balad (Sons of the 
Land).  However, in 1975 this coalition was dismantled following a decree from the 
Ministry of Interior which instated one of its close allies instead. Locals, headed by 
the democratic coalition, again led a legal and popular battle against the appointed 
mayor. After a High Court ruling which was in their favour, they managed to hold 
new elections and win the council back with new members joining the coalition (Al-
Ghad February 1977: 4, 5 & 23; Fareed 1978: 10-11).  
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While in office, the coalition, spearheaded by leadership aligned with the 
communists, led a legal battle against the Israel Land Administration (ILA) to win 
land back for public use. The legal battle was successful and within a short time the 
local government managed to win back 2000 dunums from ILA. These were to be 
allocated for tackling the housing problem faced by young couples, poor and big 
landless households, as well as for public projects, including schools, public parks and 
industrial zones. However, the desire for independence in managing the village’s 
affairs proved to be limited. The village was almost completely dependent on state 
financial support and therefore crippled by financial constraints, a situation that just 
kept deteriorating over the years, up until 1989.  
Economically, the village was stripped of the majority of its farming land and had no 
local industries to employ its workforce. Forced proletarianisation was its destiny. 
The vast majority of its workforce became cheap manual workers in the Jewish labour 
market. “They [the Zionists] wanted us to be hewers of wood and drawers of water,” 
said Ghassan, a novelist and retired manual worker.196 Ghassan, from the age of 12, 
had to work in construction, fishery, coffee shops, restaurants and bakeries all over 
the country, from Eilat, in the very south, to Ras Al-Naqurah, in the very North. His 
story is representative of many workers in Umm al-Fahem.  
In terms of urban infrastructure and public hygiene, the local government could not 
radically change the existing conditions. The village was still suffering from poor 
road networks, severe shortage in dustbin lorries, and no sewage system. In 1975, the 
                                                
196 Fieldwork interview, Umm al-Fahem, 7 August 2009.  
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Hebrew newspaper Al Ha-Mishmar reported that the socio-economic and public 
hygiene conditions in the village were still suffering. By 1975 there was a “shortage 
of 62 classrooms, to which 20 more will be added in 1976” (Al Ha-Mishmar 23 June 
1975).197  As sewage became a serious health problem, the local government asked 
the Ministry of Health to interfere to solve the problem by helping fit sewers (ibid). 
Their calls however had been ignored and for years to come sewage was still flowing 
onto the village’s streets.  
On the national political arena, the new coalition, with its progressive politics was a 
champion of Palestinians’ rights. The local government did not confine itself to the 
narrow local politics of running their village. It linked its struggle for attaining its 
rights to the larger Palestinian common cause of achieving equal rights and land rights 
within Israel, and supporting the Palestinians in the West Bank for their right to self-
determination. The coalition was a vocal and leading supporter of designating the 31st 
of March in 1976 as the annual Land Day for the Palestinians in Israel. From that date 
until the 1989, when the Islamist Movement won the local elections, the day was 
annually commemorated by a general strike and a demonstration that marched 
through the city’s streets and was traditionally ended with a cultural and political 
ceremony. 
                                                
197 Al Ha-Mishmar, in the same article, reported that Umm al-Fahem’s head of local government 
complained about the two hospitals of the Jewish towns of Hadera and Afula that refused to accept 
pregnant women from the village to use their birth centres.  
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Voluntary work brigades: an agency for urban generation and resistance  
From 1978 until the mid 1980s, the local government together with Abnaa el-Balad, 
and other politically progressive forces took the lead in organising voluntary work 
brigades in the village. The brigades that used to last for a few days and dubbed by 
locals “public and dignity weddings” emerged to address some of the acute 
deficiencies in public services and urban infrastructure. Their underlying message was 
that Palestinians were capable of constructively taking responsibility for their towns 
and villages. While such brigades did not provide a sustainable radical solution to the 
core reasons behind such problems, they did, however, play a pivotal role in boosting 
people’s morale. In addition to their educational and symbolic value, the brigades 
were an embodiment of people’s agency, creativity, determination, resilience and 
fraternal solidarity. They were an act of citizenship par excellence. 
First started in Nazareth under the communist leadership in 1975, the brigades were a 
political statement against the state’s financial discrimination and its racially 
motivated negligence of Palestinian localities’ infrastructures and public services. “It 
is the authorities’ policy of discrimination and oppression which is the main reason 
for the accumulated problems in our Arab villages. Had the authorities allocated 
enough budget, or given the Arab localities what they deserved, just like what they 
give to Jewish localities, we would not have faced such a crisis in the Arab sector,” 
reported Waild Asliyyih, a lawyer and a member of Umm al-Fahem’s first brigade 
organising committee, to Al-Ghad in May 1979 (Abu Kheit 1979). 
The brigades were led by youngsters, including female activists, who organised 
themselves in a committee that was responsible for liaising with the local government 
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as well as mobilising people to take part in the brigades. In the run-up to the brigades, 
they were in charge of organising public talks on public health and hygiene in the 
village. When the first work brigade took place during the spring holiday of April 
1978, the tasks that were accomplished included “cleaning the village streets of 
rubbish and sewage, painting schools’ walls and drawing murals and building stairs 
and a wall in one of the mosques” (ibid). To cover the costs of construction materials 
and other resources, the brigades mobilised local resources: charity and contributions 
pledged by individuals, businesses and communist branches of other villages and 
towns.  
Young women were particularly visible in the brigade, both as organisers and 
activists. For the organisers this fact was worth publicising and reporting to the press 
considering the gendered-conservative nature of Umm al-Fahem. “...150 young 
women took part in the brigade, challenging the patriarchal norms of society. They 
took part in almost all the activities... No doubt that their participation had given the 
brigade a special character. It was an encouraging factor, despite the fact that those 
women were faced with opposition by some religious sections,” said Hanan Murad, a 
member of the organising committee, commenting on the first brigade (ibid).  
The ensuing yearly brigades took a national, international and cultural dimension, 
crossing age, national, spatial, religious and gender boundaries. They became a 
“national feast” as some of the research interviewees recalled, and were “a public 
meeting point of people from different backgrounds and different nationalities, 
different age and gender groups.” Locals opened their houses to host and welcome 
international solidarity activists who came from different countries, including the 
United States of America, France, Germany, Belgium, Japan, China, the now ex-
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Soviet Union, Israeli Jews and Palestinians from within Israel and the West Bank who 
defied police warnings and restrictions on their participation (Mjalee 1987). As well 
as accomplishing construction projects, in a comradely and collaborative 
environment, the brigades were accompanied by cultural festivities. These included 
theatre, dance performances and patriotic and resistance music events.  
Mufeed Sidawi from Al-Ghad magazine, in May 1985, interviewed a number of 
participants in an attempt to capture the sense of solidarity, commitment and festivity 
of the sixth brigade. A 45- year-old Jewish participant from Ramat-Gan who had been 
taking part for the third time, told him “[n]o doubt that the brigades bring the two 
peoples together...I feel a sense of satisfaction that I’m taking part in the development 
of Umm al-Fahem and I’m happy to have met friends and brothers from across the 
country.” Another participant, a father of four, said of his impression taking part for 
the first time in such an activity: “I’m happy to take part in a collective activity. Such 
work expresses the spirit of challenging the dark forces that wanted Umm al-Fahem to 
be backward. However, with our people’s, brothers’ and sisters’ determination, Umm 
al-Fahem will be the beacon for our people.” A 23-year-old blacksmith from Nazareth 
said: “I’m not only working, but expressing my solidarity with our Arab local 
councils which experience state oppression and under-budgeting, especially Umm al-
Fahem. I took part in all six brigades of Umm al-Fahem and all of those of Nazareth... 
In the first day of this brigade we worked on the sewage project in al-Hawa area...” 
Al-Gad (ibid) reported that the brigade was very festive, with participants working till 
the very late hours of the evening, accomplishing one project after the other, in a very 
comradely and collaborative spirit.  
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The accomplishments of the sixth brigade included the building of a basketball court 
in Omar Ibin Al-Khattab school, tarmacking roads: a 360-metre  of AL-Ghazalat 
road, 150 metre of Al-Thurwa road, and 250 metre of a road at Ein-Al-mghara, fitting 
an iron-gate for the secondary school and planting flowers, grass and an olive tree in 
its garden (Sidawi 1985:10-11). Again, women had a visible role in making the 
brigades successful, with some participating in the field, hand in hand with other 
volunteers, while others assuming more traditional roles: working in the kitchens, 
cooking meals for the hundreds of volunteers.198  
Al-Hadaf: a cultural empire 
Umm al-Fahem of the 1970s and 80s was buzzing with political and cultural 
activities. In 1985, a group of young politically conscious and active graduate 
students of theatre and law, many of whom were affiliated with the leftist nationalist 
movement of Abnaa el-Balad set up an association called Al-Hadaf, the goal.199 Al-
Hadaf was a “cultural empire” in the city, said Muhammed, one of its co-founders.200 
Promoting culture and conscious art was its flagship. Its principal objective was to 
build a cultural, artistic and intellectual base in Umm al-Fahem. Through its activities 
it sought to cross the gender and age divides by incorporating into its work the two 
most marginalised groups in society: women and youngsters. It recognised the 
importance of gender empowerment for women who were under triple oppression: 
                                                
198 Chapter 7 talks about the voluntary Islamic work brigades that the Islamic Movement started to 
organise around mid 1980s.   
199 Al-Hadaf which in Arabic means the goal or the objective, was the name of the Public Front for 
Palestine (PLFP) newsletter.   
200 Fieldwork interview, Umm al-Fahem 12 July 2009.  
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social/patriarchal, economic and national. For Al-Hadaf, those women were the 
mothers of future generations and their emancipation was to be encouraged through 
education and work.   
Within five years, Al-Hadaf managed to set up five cultural centres in the city. These 
included an art centre, a women’s centre, a computer centre, a nursery and a public 
library. The art centre hosted weekly cultural activities: a film screening, art 
exhibitions of local, regional and national Palestinian artists, music and dance events, 
music classes and talks on the history of Palestine, its art and politics. One of the main 
art exhibitions was of the Palestinian political cartoonist Naji Al-Ali, who was noted 
for his criticism of the Arab regimes, the divided tribal Arab mentality and Israel.201  
Setting up a theatre group was one of the art centre’s main activities. The cofounder, 
himself a theatre graduate of the Hebrew University and cofounder of the first 
national Palestinian theatre, trained the group. For him theatre was “one of the most 
sublime of all collective arts…It is a holistic art ... encompassing all in one...” 
Throughout its existence, the centre held regular theatre workshops and training. 
Their aim was to collectively produce theatre work. Its success in this area however 
was limited for the lack of facilities and financial support. “Theatre needs a state...and 
we are stateless,” said Muhammed.202  On the whole, the art centre became very 
popular among people and managed to attract a group of regulars. It demonstrated the 
                                                
201 Naji Al-Ali’s political cartoons cost him his life. He was assassinated in London in 1987.  
 
202 Some of those who were active in the group sought professional university training and became 
leading figures in national theatres.  
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thirst for cultural activities in the city. The secondary school was the venue for its 
extracurricular activities.  
The women’s centre provided varied activities. These included lectures, sports, music 
classes and “know your homeland” trips to uprooted Palestinian villages. The 
computer centre was the first of its kind amongst the entire Palestinian community in 
Israel. In 1985, it had ten computers and within two years it trained at least three 
thousand students. The fees charged were symbolic and affordable to working class 
children. The nursery was founded in 1986 and was among the first in the Palestinian 
community. The aim behind it was twofold: to encourage women to go to work and to 
invest in children’s education. Unemployed women could also send their kids so that 
they would have more free time for themselves. The public library, a modest building, 
had 15,000 books. The books were available for borrowing and reading at the library. 
As well as offering space for reading, the library served as a meeting and planning 
educational space.  
Al-Hadaf was run mostly on voluntary basis. It got its financial support from 
Palestinian funding sources based abroad and from the symbolic fees that were 
collected from the public in return for the services they received. After almost 5 years 
of hard work, two major events brought the cultural empire to an end. The first reason 
was the rise of the Islamic Movement to power, which sought to promote primarily its 
own agenda. For the Islamic Movement, the association presented a counterculture 
which was not congruent with its missionary agenda of building a new society 
according to the Islamic way of life. By refusing to allow Al-Hadaf to use schools for 
its activities, the Movement made it difficult for the former to survive.  
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The second event was the break out of the first Intifada in December 1987.  Foreign 
funding was channelled to the West Bank and Gaza. The money went to provide 
essentials. “Not on bread alone a man can live,” said Muhammed. “A hungry person 
cannot be creative and does not have the time to produce,” he said. “We’re still 
hoping that the Palestinian cause will be resolved... At the time, more than today, 
hope seemed closer to become a reality... there was a revolution ... the Palestinians 
were not the only ones united about their legitimate right for self-determination,” he 
said.  
Umm al-Fahem: “a city without a sewage system... without a cultural 
club... or a public park”203  
On 11 November 1985, Umm al-Fahem was officially declared a city. It was the first 
Palestinian locality to be declared a city under Israel. In the words of Michal Miron of 
the daily Israeli newspaper of Yediot Ahronot (12 Nov 1985) Umm al-Fahem “ceased 
to be the biggest village in the world...” The day was celebrated by Palestinian press, 
as one of festivities. Local people, Palestinian leadership from Israel and Communist 
Party leaders, who since 1979 had spearheaded the struggle in the Knesset to achieve 
the recognition of a city, all participated in the ceremony, which took place in the the 
secondary school courtyard. In his speech at the official ceremony, Hashim 
Mahameed, the city’s mayor, stressed that declaring Umm al-Fahem a city “was not a 
gesture but a right” which “comes at the hardest of all times, never experienced 
before” (Al-Itihad 12 Nov 1985). “The fact that we are a city today is a product of a 
                                                
203 Excerpts from an interview with Umm al-Fahem’s mayor with journalist Miron of Yediot Ahronot 
(12 November 1985). 
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persistent struggle...it is psychologically a nice feeling. I hope the [national] 
government offices will seriously address Umm al-Fahem’s problems as a city. We 
are a city without a sewage system, without a football ground, without a cultural 
club,” Mahameed told Yediot Ahronot reporter Michal Miron (Miron 1985).  
The long-awaited day was boycotted by both the Minister of Interior, Rabbi Peretz, 
and the Minister for Arab Affairs, Uzi Weizman. Even their representative failed to 
arrive on time. “Their miniature district officer, Yusif Qveeti, whom they sent ... had 
arrived late, at 1:45 pm instead of eleven o’clock in the morning, just towards the end 
of the ceremony. The officer had to hand in the documents which officially confer the 
municipal status,” wrote Miron (ibid). Not only did Rabbi Peretz boycott the 
ceremony, he also waged a political smear campaign against the city. His campaign 
was particularly against its leader Hashim Mahameed.  
The grounds for both the official boycott and the ensuing smear campaign were 
politically motivated. According to the ministry’s version, the campaign was 
instigated by a leaflet that Mahameed’s local government distributed in the city on 9 
October 1985 (one month before the declaration) describing the Israeli Army as one 
of “humiliation and oppression.”204  From the local government’s point of view the 
minister de-contextualised the leaflet by concentrating solely on the criticism at the 
conduct of the Israeli Army. The minister ignored the fact that the leaflet was also 
about budget disparities between those allocated to the army and settlements on one 
                                                
204 See (Al-Ghad December 1985, p 4), and (Al-Itihad, 12 November 1985). 
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hand, and those allocated to Umm al-Fahem, on the other (Al- Itihad, 12 Nov 
1985).205   
Mahameed expressing his frustration with financial strangulation and the occupation 
policies that spend millions of US dollars on the settlements enterprise and the 
occupation apparatuses, told Miron “[w]e are asking to double our budget...we have 
got no budget for development. There are disparities between the budgets given to 
Arab localities and those to the settlements. The per-capita budget of Fahmawis is 
one-third of their Jewish fellow citizens. We will not capitulate to the existing 
conditions. We will go on strike. We are demanding to live in this country as equal 
citizens. We would have loved the minister Peretz to have come...the school choir 
sang songs both in Hebrew and Arabic...the occupation cannot be enlightening, polite, 
nor wonderful.”206 
Triumphalism was blended with caution and determination to achieve what locals 
insisted was their right to move on from nominality to content; demanding the 
administrative status of a city was being practically and substantively materialised and 
demonstrated in its urban landscape. The battle for a functional city is a political one. 
It is against the authorities whose aims and objectives and policies, as articulated by 
                                                
205 Budgets have been and still are the living evidence of the discriminatory policy of the state against 
its Palestinian citizens. In the 1985 the Arab local authorities were granted only 2.3 per cent of the total 
local authorities budgets, despite constituting 16 per cent of Israel’s population. For more details see  
(Al-Ghad December 1985).  
206 The sentence which appeared in the leaflet and had outraged the Minister of Interior was ‘Do you as 
a citizen know that the total investment for the development of settlements in the west bank, without 
the general budget allocated to the army of aggression, violence and humiliation, what is called the 
security forces, reach the total of one billion and seven hundred dollar for the years 68 till 84.” $ 
1,700,000,000.  
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the mayor in an interview with Al-Ghad (1985:5) ”are to keep our people starved, ill, 
and living in sewage, without schools and under conditions not fit for human beings.”  
Newspaper articles on the city and fieldwork collaborators all agreed that to fulfil the 
right to the city, the state policy of discrimination and racism had to be profoundly 
transformed. It had to include an increase in allocated budgets, along with a change in 
policies pertaining to land and spatial planning. As Mahameed said in an interview a 
month after the declaration “how could we carry out projects?! The received budgets 
are not enough even for patching the streets of our villages” (ibid: p 5).  
The local historian, Tayseer Ighbariyih in an article to Al-Itihad (18 Nov 1985), 
entitled “We Have Struggled to Achieve the Title, Now it’s Time to Change the 
Content,” 207  wrote: “[w]hen the communists got to power they planned many 
infrastructural projects, such as building schools, paving roads, connecting the city to 
communication and water grids. However, because of the lack of budget, many of 
those projects, such as the sewerage system, could not be completed ...This meant that 
sewage was pouring in the streets and the roads were potholed. The racist and 
discriminatory policies of the authorities are to blame for this as they give their 
budgets in droplets” (Ibid). 
For Fahmawis the way to materialising the right to the city was as challenging as 
ever. As put by Mahameed, “we have struggled to achieve our right to become a city. 
                                                
207  Although Ighbariyih does not explicitly say what he means by content, it is alluded from his 
depiction of the city’s conditions at the time of the declaration. He criticises the policies which curbed 
the fulfilment of planned urban projects. 
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However, we are now up against a battle to achieve both the right and the content of 
what that means,” (Al-Ghad 7 December 1985: 37).208As well as improving the city’s 
inadequate infrastructure, other hurdles had to be overcome. The most acute among 
these are land and spatial planning policies, house demolition and pending demolition 
orders. According to Yediot Ahronot of 22 November (Nevo 1985) about forty per 
cent of Fahmawis lived in unauthorised houses. The next chapter will discuss the 
burning themes of land and planning policies in the city.  
Conclusion   
Through employing historical and sociological analysis, the chapter has discussed the 
workings of (post)colonial governmentality in the way Umm al-Fahem was ruled and 
governed from the time it was handed over to Israel in 1949 up until the mid 1980s 
when it was declared a city. Through discussing the different technologies that made 
up this governmentaltiy, whether the repressive and controlling direct military rule, 
policies of divide and rule, co-option, the carrot and the stick, criminalisation of 
resisting political activists, or political proposals to redesign geographical borders so 
that Umm al-Fahem no longer existed as part of Israel, this chapter aimed to illustrate 
three main objectives. First, to discuss some of the historical factors that shape the 
city. Secondly to demonstrate that the technologies that constituted governmentality, 
including the village/city’s materiality and the negligence of its urban infrastructure 
and public hygiene, were ones of control with the overall objective of producing 
                                                
208 ‘We Are Up Against Screaming Challenges in the Battle for Survival, Equality and Progress: an 
Interview with the Head of Umm al-Fahem’s Municipality,’ Al-Ghad Vol 7, December 1985: 4,5, and 
37. [Arabic] 
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domesticated, docile and suspended citizens and places. Lastly, to expose the 
racialised and Manichaean nature of citizenship and to question what the right to the 
city means.  
The chapter identified three historic periods. All along these periods, defiance, agency 
and determination demonstrated by Fahmawis to achieve substantive citizenship and 
have a functioning local government and city were a parallel thread to the oppressive 
and at times repressive technologies of control. The first period was from 1949 until 
1966. This was the era of direct military rule that sought to control every aspect of 
everyday life of Palestinians. This period was distinctively Manichaean and repressive 
as military rule was only applied to Palestinian-populated areas. The military 
governor who enjoyed almost full impunity could do whatever he thought suitable in 
the name of security and order. Criminalisation of political activists who protested 
against his rule was a common practice. The chapter also discussed the objectives 
behind this rule, which as well as controlling and socially and spatially fragmenting 
the Palestinians had other political ends. These included further land dispossession, 
preventing the return of Palestinian refugees, and securing political support for the 
ruling party of Mapai.  
The second era was roughly from the early 1960s until the mid 1970s. This was the 
era of the struggle to achieve the democratic right for a local government. Umm al-
Fahem despite being the biggest village at the time and unlike other Palestinian 
villages up until the 1960s did not have a local government of its own. When it finally 
did, the military government was the one that appointed leadership which was close to 
it. Fahmawis again launched a campaign asserting their right to a democratically run 
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local government, elected through democratic elections, without the interference of 
the military government.  
The third period was from the mid 1970s until the mid 1980s. This was the era of self-
government through the democratically elected local government. Despite the few 
gains that the local government had achieved, particularly in relation to winning some 
land back from the Israel Land Administration, Fahmawis’ dream of independently 
running their affairs quickly proved to be limited. They were still heavily dependent 
on the state to develop their village/city. The economic dependency and the racially-
motivated policies meant that Umm al-Fahem was still in a state of 
underdevelopment.   
In the face of discriminatory policies and harsh socio-economic conditions that left 
Umm al-Fahem with poor urban infrastructures, and poor public hygiene, Fahmawis’ 
agency and sense of solidarity were invoked again. Through organising voluntary 
work brigades and setting up Al-Hadaf cultural association all independently of the 
state, Fahmawis tried to constructively take responsibility over their citizenship and 
their city. The very materiality of the city was an agent for mobilising people to act 
together and bring their agency and creativity out.  
The chapter ends by discussing the period when Umm al-Fahem was declared a city. 
At the heart of this section stands the question of the materiality of the city and 
citizenship and the relationship the state has to the city. It illustrated that the struggle 
to a substantive right to the city is not divorced from the struggle to substantive 
citizenship. 
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The next chapter deconstructs the subject of land and spatial planning as a technology 
of control and governmentality and the effects they have on the city’s socio-spatiality 
and economy. It demonstrates the Manichaean, racialised nature of the planning 
system that works towards producing controlled, domesticated and suspended city and 
citizens, thus questioning what the right to the city, urbanity and urbanisation mean 
under these conditions.  
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Chapter 6 
Eat, drink, get married: absenting master plans and the production 
of entropy and suspension209 
 
There is no city in the world without a master plan, without the 
potential to develop, without civil service offices, without 
infrastructure...cultural and science centres...places where young 
boys and girls can hang out...instead of driving their cars aimlessly.  
Tayseer, Umm al-Fahem 2009 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 14: Surviving aubergines, demolished site, Umm al-Fahem, July 2009 
 
                                                
209 Eat, drink, get married is inspired by interviewees’ account of their city, its materiality, and the little 
opportunities it offers.    
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 “Last night, late at night and out of the blue we were woken up by phone calls telling 
us to rush to our store as heavily armed police were about to demolish it. We 
immediately rushed there, but were not allowed in. The police surrounded all the 
entrances to the store and refused to let anyone in.210 We begged to no avail to be let 
in to check what was going on. Their refusal made it clear to us that they were 
demolishing the site. For those who wonder why they [the planning authorities] 
wanted to demolish our store, the answer is that we are part and parcel of the Arab 
community which since the establishment of the state has been engaged in the painful, 
costly and unguaranteed struggle of getting building permits.” This was part of what 
Suliman said in an interview with him shortly after his 600 m² fruit and vegetable 
store in the market area of Umm al-Fahem was demolished (figure 14) (field 
interview 3 July 2009).  
Throughout the fieldwork in Umm al-Fahem and while staying with my family in the 
neighbouring town, I felt the heat and tension generated by the unresolved issue of the 
demolition of unauthorised homes/structures (which the state calls illegal), and the 
selective deployment and enforcement of the law.211 As illustrated by the opening 
quote, almost every single field interviewee when asked whether Umm al-Fahem was 
a city would sooner or later bring up the issue of planning and the subsequent house 
                                                
210 Special police units often accompany demolition agents sent by the planning authorities. The units 
are the Israel Border Police and the Special Unit Patrol Police. While Border Police officers receive 
combat training and are trained to deal with riot control, Special Patrol Unit officers come from combat 
units and are therefore recruited from the army and Border Police. Their presence raises a number of 
questions around military force in a (post)colonial setting: what kind of function do they play? And 
why is it that they are always there? Is it a reminder of the repressive nature of the state? Is it an 
assertion of who is in control? Or is it the violent nature of the colonial structure?  
211 I witnessed a high presence of armed forces in my hometown after a site was demolished at night 
and a protest was called for the next morning. As in Umm al-Fahem’s case, the demolished site was 
close to the trans-Israel highway, road number 6.  
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demolition spectre as a major factor which perpetuated the nominal status of their city 
and its arrested development. They believed that spatial planning policies, often 
articulated in terms of absence of a master plan for the city, were one of the main 
obstacles to the city’s development and socio-economic growth. 
Against this brief background, this chapter critically engages with governmentality 
through the subject of spatial planning and land ownership. It deconstructs the subject 
at work under (post)colonial conditions and its socio-spatial and economic 
implications as demonstrated in the case of Umm al-Fahem.212 While the chapter 
acknowledges the importance of theoretically engaging with the subject of planning, 
by elaborating on its system and properties, and its political, philosophical and 
cultural underpinnings, for the purpose of scope, it limits itself to only touching on 
these issues in the passing.213 The chapter’s overall objective is to discuss how both 
planning and land ownership and policies shape the very materiality and character of 
Umm al-Fahem: its present and future trajectory, its everyday life, its socio-spatial 
make-up and the prospects for socio-economic and spatial developments. It seeks to 
illustrate that spatial planning is not abstract and cannot be reduced to lines and 
colours produced on a piece of paper called a map; a master plan or a detailed plan. 
Rather, its interventionist character defines and reflects existential political and 
private questions as large as state-community relations and as small as the individual 
family unit.  
                                                
212 The subject of the land system was discussed in more detail in chapter 4: Israel’s colonial nomos.  
213 For a detailed account on critical reading of the subject of urban and regional planning in relation to 
its impact on social and political relations, power and resources, as well its political, philosophical, 
cultural and material underpinnings, see Yiftachel, O. Little, J. et tal (eds), (2001) The Power of 
Planning: Spaces of Control and Transformation. Dordrecht : Kluwer Academic Publishers.  
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The chapter illustrates how spatial planning in Israel is politicised and racialised. 
Critical reading of the state’s policies and their deployment finds that planning is 
employed to serve political ends, not the wellbeing of all citizens. More specifically 
the chapter argues that the state, through its centralised, comprehensive and 
hierarchised planning system, employs spatial planning as a powerful technology of 
control and governmentality that works towards producing suspended, docile, 
socially-controlled, privatised and atomised Palestinian bodies and spaces. Operating 
in a racialised Manichaean context, this technology with its inevitable coercive 
properties contributes to the state of urbicide by deliberately detaining and 
withholding the economic and spatial growth of the city.  The chapter in other words 
seeks to question and unpack how Palestinians are deprived of the right to the city. 
Hence, the chapter’s title; perhaps there is nothing more representative of the 
materiality of Umm al-Fahem than “eat, drink, get married.” 
The chapter illustrates the arguments through discussing three main subjects that are 
arranged across three sections. First, the production of entropy, that is the state of 
disorder in the city, the shortage in public space, the housing crisis, and the 
implications these have on everyday life in the city and its very meaning. In this 
section, the chapter discusses how, in 2009 Umm al-Fahem was left with no approved 
and up-to-date master plan, and that the only plan available for the city was the 1965 
master plan that the Ministry of Interior put together, without consulting the local 
population, at the time of the military government, when Umm al-Fahem was still a 
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village of about 10,000 residents.214 Although incompatible with the changing reality, 
the plan was still in place. This was despite the existence of an, as yet unapproved, 
updated master plan. The first section of the chapter discusses how the private tenure 
of land passed down through inheritance combines with the private provision of 
housing to affect the very make-up of society, increasing social control and putting 
into question the meaning of the city as a heterogeneous impersonal site.  
The second subject is about the production of reciprocal exclusion and how planning 
is employed to keep communities apart. For this, the chapter visits two master plans: 
Umm al-Fahem’s master plan that was finalised by the city’s local government in the 
1980s but was declined by Haifa’s district planning committee, and the regional 
master plan, TAMAM 6, that was produced by the latter in 2004.215 And the third 
subject is about arrested and racialised development at work. It discusses TAMAM 6 
in relation to Umm al-Fahem and the battle that the latter is leading to amend the plan 
in ways which service the city and its citizens. Two different, even conflicting, 
visions stand at the heart of the dispute between the two sides. One is of arrested 
development, or even de-development, and another of development and insistence on 
getting out of the state of suspension and rudimentariness, that is about living to fulfil 
basic existential functions. Discussing the demolition of the market on one hand, and 
citing examples of development in two Jewish neighbouring areas on the other, 
                                                
214 In 1961 Umm al-Fahem’s population was 7,492 and in 1972 it was 13,382 (Central Bureau of 
Statistics 1995).  
215  The district planning committee is also referred to in this chapter as the regional planning 
committee. The two concepts are used interchangeably. Umm al-Fahem is part of the district of Haifa. 
Therefore, Haifa’s district planning committee is in charge of planning matters pertaining to Umm al-
Fahem. TAMAM is the Hebrew abbreviation for district master plan.    
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constitutes a major part of this section that unravels the racialised character of 
planning. The chapter ends with the resilience and defiance of people in the face of 
controlling planning policies.  
The chapter draws mostly on primary resources. These include interviews with Umm 
al-Fahem’s planning department, and Fahmawis’ experiences as gathered throughout 
the field. It also uses the Ministry of Interior website to collect information about the 
Planning and Building Law and its regulations, as well as to provide an image of 
Haifa’s regional master plan, in relation to Umm al-Fahem. An internal document 
produced by Umm al-Fahem’s planning department regarding its objection to Haifa’s 
regional plan, submitted to the national council for planning in 2004, provides another 
valuable source that helps shed light on the impact of regional planning on the city, 
the dispute between the two different sides, and their respective visions for the city. 
The images used in the chapter, whether photographs or maps, are illustrative and 
complementary to the written text.   
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The production of entropy 
 
Figure 15: Al-Andalus street, Umm al-Fahem  
 
Have you been to al-Andalus street? Asked the strategic planner. “You should go 
there,” he said. A few days later when I met with the city’s architect, I was asked the 
same question and was given the same recommendation. Al-Andalus street (figure 15) 
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is located in one of the four Shikunat, built on land the city has won back from Israel 
Land Administration (ILA) in the 1970s. The legal battle against ILA resulted in 2005 
dunums to the benefit of Umm al-Fahem’s residents. According to the court ruling, 
the land was to be divided between residential and public buildings: 1005 dunums to 
be allocated for housing and 1000 dunums for public buildings. The land for housing 
was to be marketed to local residents as empty plots of land, through a “build your 
house” scheme.216 The winning candidates lease the empty land from ILA for a period 
of 49 years, at a highly subsidised rate.217 The local government prepares detailed 
plans for each Shikun according to regulations set by the 1965 Planning and Building 
Law and does the required infrastructural work, including paving streets and 
connecting to sewage, etc.218 All that is left for winning candidates is to pay for the 
cost of the local authority’s work and build their houses in the way they see fit.219  
Al-Shikunat is the Arabic plural word for Shikun in Hebrew, which means public 
housing. In the context of Umm al-Fahem, they are cited as a living example of what 
the local government and its Fahamawi citizen are capable of achieving when the 
                                                
216 The scheme started to operate in 1990s.  
217 Israel Land Administration has a priority scheme in place for candidates. Those serving in the state 
security services are given first priority, followed by individuals with disabilities, then those who have 
no private land for building their own houses, and, lastly any other members of the public. The local 
government of Umm al-Fahem added one more criterion: any candidate had to have been living in the 
city for at least 5 years prior to placing an application for a piece of land.   
218 A detailed plan is the lowest amongst all plans (national, regional and local master plans). As 
implied by its name, it includes details that are not mentioned in the master plan. According to the 
Ministry of Interior, this plan is authorised to issue building permits and therefore has to include 
instructions in relation to five issues: land use, building size, division into plots for construction, 
building line, and building height. A detailed plan is authorised by a local or regional planning 
committees. For details see: Ministry of Interior website: 
(http://www.mifam.org.il/?CategoryID=1356&ArticleID=1504&SearchParam=תטרופמ+תינכת) 
[Hebrew]. 
219 The terms local authority and local government are used interchangeably. Both refer to Umm al-
Fahem’s municipality.   
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state and its planning authorities are collaborative. The Al-Shikunat are presented in 
complete contrast to the frustrating materiality of the city and its planning nightmare 
chaos caused by the state’s centralised, hierarchised and racialised planning policies 
which render the power the local government has over planning negligible. 220 This 
condition gets even more complicated and more challenging in light of the private 
land tenure in Umm al-Fahem, the private or more specifically the self-provision of 
housing, and the city’s very limited, almost non-existent, access to state land.221  
For Umm al-Fahem’s professional planning team, the Al-Shikunat provided a true 
sense of satisfaction, and an overcoming of the otherwise prevailing feeling of 
impotency and frustration they experienced on regular basis when planning for the 
rest of the city. For them, the Al-Shikunat were sites where scientific planning - that is 
planning for order and the wellbeing of the citizen - was made material. As well as 
being built on state land, the planning authorities, the official state body in charge of 
all issues pertaining to planning including approving plans and issuing building 
permits, were relatively collaborative. The detailed plans the local government 
                                                
220 Israel’s centralised and hierarchised planning system is very comprehensive, controlling everything 
from state-wide strategies to the issuing of building permits at a local level (Planning and Building Law 
1965; Yiftachel 1992). Its upper ranked authorities enjoy extensive power of implementation, while 
local authorities enjoy “only limited autonomy for discretion, which is mainly confined to development 
control issues” (Yiftachel 1992: 93). For more details on this system with its racialised and even non-
transparent mechanism and the power planning authorities enjoy see:  Alexander, E. R., Alterman, R. 
and Law-Yone, H. (1983) ‘Evaluating Plan Implementation: The National Statutory Planning System 
in Israel’, Progress in Planning, 20, pp. 101-172, Yiftachel, O. (1992) Planniing a Mixed Region in 
Israel: the Political Geography of Arab-Jewish Relations in the Galilee. Aldershot: Avebury. Yiftachel 
also wrote about how the planning system through its population dispersal policies worked to 
reproduce social and class divisions within the Israeli Jewish society itself. For more details on this see, 
Yiftachel, O. (2001) ‘The Consequences of Planning Control: Mizrahi Jews in Israel’s ‘Development 
Towns’, in Yiftachel, O., Little, J. et tal (eds) 2001 The Power of Planning: Spaces of Control and 
Transformation. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 117-134.  
221 Generally, Palestinians are deprived of the right to equal access to state land, as discussed in chapter 
4 on Israel’s nomos. Therefore, winning land for public use in Umm al-Fahem is the exception not the 
norm.  
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prepare for these areas get approved relatively quicker and with less hassle compared 
to the rest of the city. “I really enjoy planning on empty land…I feel a sense of 
professional satisfaction. I do everything perfectly…When you enter one of these 
neighbourhoods you feel that it is new, it is organised and planned according to 
modern standards,” said the city’s architect (see figure 15).222  
It does not take long to experience the planning entropy and disorder that both the 
city’s professional team and the city’s residents complain about. By taking a walk or 
driving a car in the city one feels the sharp contrast between the Al-Shikunat and the 
rest of the city. In the latter one feels the claustrophobic effect of (non)planning and 
the preciousness of space. In downtown Umm al-Fahem, the streets are narrow and 
the construction is dense. Buildings are in zero distance from each other and from the 
road. It does not take more than two cars to pass through a road to cause traffic panic 
and disorder. Pedestrians, merchandise stalls, cars, kids and industrial workshops, all 
compete to use the streets, sometimes all at once. As the images below illustrate 
(figures 16-18), washing lines, household gas bottles, people socialising in the street, 
moving and parked cars are all part of everyday street life in the city. Tension is 
inevitable, but learning to collaborate and negotiate the road is also commonplace. In 
certain situations passers-by become simultaneously the traffic police and the traffic 
light, often using available rubbish bins to regulate traffic (see figure 19).  
                                                
222 Interviewed on 22 June 2009 
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Figure 16: Gas bottles, kids, passersby and construction material 
 
Figure 17: Washing line 
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Figure 18: Street life, social life 
 
Figure 19: Rubbish bins and traffic jams 
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So having a pavement to walk on without the prospect of getting disrupted by a 
parked car, enjoying a stroll in the city without the gaze of people sitting outside their 
houses and shops (figure 20), having a place to socialise other than a local shop or the 
side of the street, having enough playgrounds for kids to play and feel safe other than 
the street, having a green area other than the cemetery, or having a cinema and a 
theatre are all but a dream that remains the property of the world of should be. For the 
locals the ‘should be’ state of being they find themselves dreaming about questions 
the very meaning of the city.   
 
Figure 20: Gazing eyes 
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How come these basic activities and basic services are a dream? How come the entire 
city, of which 30.4 per cent of its population is below the age of 9223 has got only two 
playgrounds which are not only very modest but are also located on the edges of the 
city? As the city’s strategic planner put it, “I know that in the civilised people 
language having a playground with few swings for kids to play is not complementary. 
In the reality of Umm al-Fahem it is a dream.”224How come buildings are demolished 
in the city and many others are awaiting pending demolition orders? Why is it that 
some buildings get demolished while others not?  
 
                                                
223 See Local Authorities in Israel 2005; Ministry of Interior publication number 1295 [Hebrew]. 
224 Fieldwork interview, Umm al-Fahem, 9 June 2009.  
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Figure 21: No where to go but to the street 
 
Figure 22: Playground 
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The 1965 master plan: incompatible yet in place 
Again, the answer to these questions lies in the state’s land and planning system and 
policies and the subsequent land and housing conditions in the city. The 
comprehensive centralised and hierarchised planning system, set up by the Planning 
and Building Law 1965, means that any use of land and real-estate (construction, 
demolition, development, etc) requires a permit from the local planning committee.225 
However, the local committee works only according to the master plan and its 
regulations. Therefore the latter, through zoning that is the general designation of land 
use, is the factor that determines what is and is not permitted on a given piece of land, 
how many structures are allowed to be built on it, their location (where in the piece of 
land building is allowed), and even the timing (once all the required conditions are 
met) (Israel’s Ministry of interior; planning administration).226 The plan decides upon 
the what, the where, the how and the when.227 
Under normal conditions, a master plan should take care of the present, future and 
even acknowledges the historical needs of a given population and their city. It is 
                                                
225 Planning and Building Law (1965) is the principal law regulating the activities of the planning 
system. The legislation is based on British law inherited from the mandate era. Over the years the law 
has been modified numerous times. The law sets the foundations for the planning system, its structure, 
types of master plan, issuing permits and penalties for offenders of law. The law includes more than 
350 articles and more than 52,000 word. The Ministry of Interior’s website acknowledges that, because 
of its large scope, not all lawyers are familiar with its details and its related rulings. “Pertaining to 
getting advice for planning and construction matters, it is recommended to address an attorney with 
specialty in the subject,” notes the Ministry of Interior’s website 
http://www.mifam.org.il/?CategoryID=1483&ArticleID=1603 [Hebrew].    
226 See ibid: http://www.mifam.org.il/?CategoryID=1342&ArticleID=1499 [Hebrew]. For further detail 
on zoning see 
http://www.mifam.org.il/?CategoryID=1413&ArticleID=1534&SearchParam=ידועי+עקרקה [Hebrew]. 
227 According to Israel’s Planning and Building Law, any structure that was built without a building 
permit or contrary to the plan is a criminal offence. Therefore the demolition of what it calls illegal 
structures is a relapse and is not a crime. As well as demolition, the offender could also receive a fine. 
See ibid: http://www.moin.gov.il/Subjects/DestructionAndImprisonment/Pages/default.aspx [Hebrew] . 
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designed to address, regulate and solve its infrastructural problems. Through 
examining and assessing existing socio-economic, demographic and spatial conditions 
in the city as a one whole unit, a master plan sets the city’s future trajectory and 
determines its character.  As such a master plan sets the foundations for the very 
wellbeing of citizens.  
In Umm al-Fahem the state of normality does not apply. For over thirty years, the 
local government has been engaged in a fierce battle and dispute with the planning 
authorities over the city’s present, future and even past. Umm al-Fahem in 2009 did 
not have an updated approved master plan. The only approved master plan was the 
1965 plan, produced by the Ministry of Interior when Umm al-Fahem was still a 
village under direct military rule. The plan was too generic. It was nothing more than 
a blue-lined circle drawn around the populated old historic part of the village and its 
satellite land, mostly orchards. Its spatial surface was designed for only 1200 dunums, 
which were not all designated for residential zones, but also green zones, where 
construction is illegal according to law. The plan was designed to fit the existing 
population, at the time numbering less than 10,000, with no reference to future 
population growth and future population needs, or to industrial and commercial zones.  
The 1965 master plan instructions, or constitution as referred to by the city’s strategic 
planner, were no more than two pages in total. These intervened primarily in trivial 
matters such as regulating the minimum height of buildings, the types of buildings 
allowed: that is commercial, residential, etc. Both the plan and its instruction were not 
flexible. They were restrictive. They were not designed to accommodate future 
population needs. “The plan did not include any details or information about 
allocating land for public buildings, roads, transportation, connection to sewage. No 
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regard what so ever for the foundations of planning … If you go downtown, there is 
nothing there. It is one concrete lump. The [1965] map was nothing more than a blue 
line, within which people could just reproduce.  Just like rabbits. It is a cage,” said the 
strategic planner (11 January 2011). 
As the population multiplied rapidly due to a high birth rate, which at the time (1960s 
and 70s) reached an average of 5.7 members per household and sometimes even 10 or 
more, the planning conditions in Umm al-Fahem grew to become increasingly 
burdensome for both the residents and the local authority. Demand for housing 
increased while the residential zone remained constant and private land reserve 
became increasingly scarce.  Individuals, especially young and future heads of family, 
who had land outside of the old centre, which was already densely populated and 
saturated, started to move outwards. Those who had land in the circle closest to the 
old town built their houses there, others moved to wherever their land was located.  
The story of expansionism, however, is not as easy as it sounds. Those individuals 
could move out only if they owned private land and could afford to build a house. 
Owning land and having the money was not enough. The problem arose when their 
plots of land were in zones classified green according to the master plan. Green zones 
mean no building zone, which ultimately means that the construction of houses was 
done with no building permits and therefore under a threat of demolition by the 
planning authorities. Yediot Ahronot (22 November 1985) reported that in the 1980s 
about 40 per cent of residential buildings in the city were unauthorised.  
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The housing problem  
As housing is self-provided in the Palestinian sector and normatively one is expected 
to build his own house on land he or his father owns (mostly through inheritance), 
land for residential purposes was becoming increasingly scarce.228 From the 1970s 
onwards, building a house became conditional for getting married as Qasim notes 
(1985). The norm got entrenched in society and very few brides would accept to share 
a house with their in-laws, as was the case, even norm, before. The pressure for land 
and housing became immense, especially in a society where hetero-marriages fulfilled 
an important aspect of life and provided the only socially acceptable structure where a 
man and woman could build a family and bring children into life. Moreover, up until 
recently (the last decade or so), rented accommodation for newly wedded couples was 
almost non-existent.  
In the absence of public housing and public land available for Palestinians, and with a 
reality of dwindling land reserves, increasing demand for housing and the absence of 
an approved, updated master plan, the tension between private tenure of land and 
planning has become increasingly challenging. The tension is exacerbated by the fact 
that Umm al-Fahem has a distinctively young population, with 51.1 per cent below 
the age of 19 (Local Authorities in Israel 2005). People were and still are forced to 
build on their private land, regardless of zoning regulations. They have no choice but 
to violate the law by building in green zones. In many cases, especially in the old 
                                                
228 Among the Palestinians it is generally the man who is expected to provide for housing, even if land 
inheritance is not always patriarchal. Therefore the body of the text refers to he rather than s/he when 
talking about housing and land.  
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town, land is used to the limit. Allocating land for parking or having a private garden 
were and still are the last and least of the residents’ priorities, let alone giving some of 
their land up for public use. “What they [the residents of Umm-el-Fahem] think about 
is how close to the road their house could be,” said the local authority professional in 
charge of roads and transport.  
Abstractly and under normal conditions, the professional planning team 
acknowledges the regulatory potential of a master plan and the law according to 
which it operates. As put by the strategic planner, “the Planning and Building Law 
does not only take, it gives as well.  It regulates transport. It regulates neighbourly 
relationships regarding duties and rights. It takes into consideration lighting, 
ventilation…It allocates land for public buildings, parks, etc.” 229  The reality, 
however, as described above is that people are pushed to act selfishly. “If someone 
owns one or three dunums of land which he also shares with his brothers and sons, he 
knows that there is no land reserve. People fear for their future. So they hold tight 
onto it… This is why it is painful to confiscate land for public use,” said the city’s 
architect.230 Residents know that the state is not providing for them and therefore they 
have to take care of their own interests. They know that the Al-Shikunat project is the 
exception not the rule. When the planning team presses citizens to allocate land for 
public use, their answer is negative. They ask the local authority to address the state to 
                                                
229 One of the master plan objectives is to make sure that allocating land for public use, including open 
spaces. The plan regulates land use including allocating land for public use (see the Ministry of Interior 
website:  http://www.moin.gov.il/subjectdocuments/kolelaniot_yeshuvim/mkomiot_mitve_2013.pdf) 
[Hebrew]. 
230 Interviewed 22 June 2009. According to the 1965 Planning and Building Law a local government is 
entitled to take up to 40 per cent of a piece of land in private ownership for public use. 
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provide for it instead. The residents are aware of the fact that the state owns land 
within the borders of the city, and therefore should be able to help, if it wishes so.231   
In Jewish towns the issues of master plans and that of private-ownership over land 
and the challenges they pose for both planners and owners alike are resolved. Towns 
and other forms of settlements are built on state or JNF land. Moreover, the state, 
through the Ministry of Housing, the JNF and the Jewish Agency, takes care of the 
growing needs for housing. It studies, assesses both present and future needs and 
builds accordingly. In the Palestinian community, however, this is not the case. “Who 
builds housing for us?” asked the town planner, who brought the example of housing 
in the Jewish sector to contrast it with that in Umm-el-Fahem.  “It is the private 
sector. We build. Not the Ministry of Housing. The organised neighbourhoods in 
Jewish towns are built by the Ministry of Housing. In our situation it is our society 
that assesses its needs privately. Not even the local authority. It is down to the 
individual unit. The citizen in our case just as he is in charge of meeting his basic 
needs of eating and drinking, etc… is also in charge of meeting his housing needs. 
This is only in the Arab sector here. In the Jewish sector it is the different ministries 
which are in charge of doing all this … It is us who have to take care of ourselves…. 
the individuals to their own “ (ibid).  
From an urban point of view, both the private tenure of land and planning policies 
have implications on the socio-spatial make-up of the city and the privatisation and 
                                                
231 Land tenure in Umm al-Fahem is the following: private-ownership, state, JNF, mushaa and Islamic 
Waqf, that is land donated by people for public purposes. Residents however have limited or no access 
to state and JNF land. For more information, see the chapter on Israel’s colonial nomos.  
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atomisation of everyday life in the city. The available housing patterns mean that 
there is little population mobility, more kinship-based neighbourhoods, nothing to 
little choice of where to live, and therefore less heterogeneity. This also means fewer 
personal liberties, more social control and more expectation for reporting one’s 
actions and whereabouts to his/her neighbours, especially if these are cousins, 
brothers and uncles. Here again, the very meaning of a city as a site of heterogeneity, 
diversity and assemblage of different individuals, a site of impersonal life and 
mobility to use Sennett’s (2002) understanding of a city, is called into question.232     
Absenting the master plan and the production of racialised exclusion: The 
Mei Ami dispute  
In 1972 the Ministry of Interior decided to allocate money for preparing an up-to-date 
master plan for the then village of Umm al-Fahem. The aim was that the new plan, if 
approved by the district committee as required by law, would replace the 1965 master 
plan. For this, Umm al-Fahem’s local government chose architect and town planner 
Dov Chernobroda. Chernoboroda produced a master plan according to scientific 
planning principles and within the requirements of the 1965 Planning and Building 
Law. In 1987, after 15 years of work, the plan was finally presented to the district 
committee. The district committee however declined the plan, despite the fact that 
Chernobroda took into consideration present and future population needs and more 
importantly that he planned according to the Zionist vision of separation between 
Jews and Palestinians.  
                                                
232 On the meaning of the city as an urban site see chapter 3.  
 
255	
The grounds for the rejection were political, although not overtly articulated as such. 
The plan’s sin, from the district committee’s perspective, as told by Umm al-Fahem’s 
planning department, was that it planned too big by including Al-Mua’alaqah into its 
jurisdiction. The committee insisted that Al- Mua’alaqah (see marked area in figure 
23), be excluded from the map.   
 
                  Figure 23: Al-Mua'alaqah. Source: Google Maps 2014 
Al-Mua’alaqah for Umm-el-Fahem was not a separate entity but one of its 
neighbourhoods, hence the inclusion into its master plan. For the regional planning 
authorities however the situation was different. For them Al-Mua’alaqah, which as the 
map shows falls beyond road number 6535, is non-existent altogether. The district’s 
position was unwavering. This non-existent status was also incorporated into Haifa’s 
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District Master Plan for 2020, presented to the national planning council in January 
2004. According to the district master plan, known as TAMAM 6, Al-Mua’alaqah 
appears as an unpopulated zone, which means that the already existing neighbourhood 
is illegal and therefore could sooner or later be demolished.  
For the Fahmawis, the Al-Mua’alaqah case reveals more than it hides. For them, both 
the rejection of the proposed master plan and TAMAM 6 send a clear message that 
the planning authorities do not want the city of Umm al-Fahem to have any 
geographical continuity in close proximity to the Jewish settlement of Mei Ami.233 
Mei Ami is the closest Jewish locality to both Umm al-Fahem and Al-Mua’alaqah 
(figure 23). This conclusion is reinforced by a number of correlated issues, including 
zoning polices, building lines, purchase of land and future plans for road number 
6535.  
According to TAMAM 6 (see figure 24), the land adjacent to road number 6535, 
which belongs to residents of Umm al-Fahem in the form of private ownership, is 
designated as an open zone. This means that no construction is allowed. This is 
partially in line with Chernobroda’s master plan which designated the depth of the 
building lines for both Umm al-Fahem and Mei Ami. For Umm al-Fahem, the line 
where no construction whatsoever is allowed was 80 metres inwards towards Umm 
al-Fahem along 6535. The building line for Mei Ami was only 5 metres inwards 
towards the settlement. Moreover, the state had over the years managed to buy Umm 
                                                
233 The word settlement here does not imply the illegal settlement built in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories of 1967.  
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al-Fahem’s privately owned land which was adjacent to the road in exchange for land 
it offered inside the city. For Fahmawis who sold their land to the state this 
represented a lucrative and seductive exchange of land, given that land adjacent to the 
road would have been of no use to them because of zoning policies.  
Umm al-Fahem’s planning department revealed that road number 6535 was planned 
to be the artificial borderline separating the two communities (Umm al-Fahem and 
Mei Ami). The state plans, as appeared in the national road map, TAMA 3, is to turn 
it into a dual carriageway.234 For the people of Umm al-Fahem this was a message of 
separation by geographical means.  
Detailed plans: planning in fragments, planning in retrospect  
As expected, the planning conditions were made more difficult by the absence of an 
approved master plan. Locals started to feel the squeeze. For them this was an 
existential threat. They were left with the choice of either put getting married off, 
potentially indefinitely, or take a chance by building on land not designated for 
residential purposes. As discussed above, getting married is an important event, if not 
the most important event for Fahmawis. Therefore, Fahmawis chose not to wait. They 
were desperate. But they soon were faced with the spectre of demolition, especially 
those whose land was close to the main road of Wadi Ara, road number 65.  
In Ein Ibraheem for example, a neighbourhood to the west of Wadi Ara, every time 
locals put two stones together, they got demolished. So people got organised and 
                                                
234 TAMA in Hebrew stands for National Master Plan.  
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thought that the city’s town planner, Dov Chernoborada at the time, might have the 
answer for their distressing situation. They addressed him and told him they wanted to 
build houses for their sons so that they could get married. Chernoboroda in his turn 
came up with the idea of detailed plans as an answer to the distressing and stressful 
planning conditions. According to the law a detailed plan, which is a fragment of a 
master plan, can issue building permits. For Ein Ibraheem he managed to produce a 
detailed plan called E’in nun 129, which was retrospectively approved by the district 
committee. This meant that the houses, which were built with no initial building 
permit, were no longer under the threat of demolition. The detailed plans he prepared 
were fragments of his two-decades worth of work master plan. 
Retrospective planning, however, does not always work. It entails a lengthy 
perplexing process, and often results in very little success. Through detailed plans, the 
local authority tries to retrospectively change zoning and use of land, which involves 
addressing not only the district committee but the national planning council as well. 
The detailed plan for the already populated Iskandar neighbourhood, for example, has 
been awaiting approval for 19 years (from 1990 to 2009 when the fieldwork was 
underway). Iskandar has been built on land defined as a green zone by the 1965 
master plan. If and by the time the plan gets approved, the spatial reality would not be 
the same and perhaps new buildings would be built. For the time being people are still 
waiting in suspension.  
From the city’s professional planning perspective, planning in a constantly changing 
spatial reality poses an immense pressure. “Planning on existing conditions is the 
most challenging thing in planning…the feeling of planning for a house as it is being 
built…” is very disempowering as the city’s architect put it (22 June 2009). The 
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district committee expects the detailed plans to be all done according to law, without 
taking the existing planning and housing conditions into account. They expect the 
already existing houses, which were built with no building permission, to meet all the 
required planning regulations, pertaining to allocating land for public use, connection 
to the sewage grid, etc. Therefore, both the local authority planning team and the local 
citizen bear the brunt of the absence of approved master plans and the delay in 
approving detailed plans. This frustrating, vicious circle kind of planning 
entanglement perpetuates the state of entropy and leaves both the city’s planning team 
and the residents in a kind of permanent state of suspension.  
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West, North vs. East, South: different shades of green: arrested 
development and the battle over the future of the city 
 
Figure 24: Haifa's District Master Plan in relation to Umm al-Fahem. Source: 
Israel Land Administration235 
 
Al-Mua’alaqah case constitutes only one element of the lingering dispute 
with the planning authorities over the present, future and even the history of Umm al-
Fahem. The local government plans for growth, development and wellbeing for its 
residents, and the national and regional planning authorities plan for strangulation, 
stagnation, even ghettoisation. Umm al-Fahem plans for urban expansionism towards 
the west, that is, road number 65 and the area to the north west of it. And the planning 
                                                
235 The map could be found at the Israel Land Administration website:  
http://www.mmi.gov.il/IturTabotData/tmm/haifa/tasritim/ממת6/טירשת%20ידועי%20עקרק.pdf   
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authorities plan for the city to expand east and south of road number 65, towards the 
West Bank. Umm al-Fahem plans to take advantage of the economic potential of road 
number 65, and the planning authorities plan for an open urban zone. Through both 
regional and national master plans, the planning authorities plan for arrested 
development.  
Through zoning policies, mostly designating potential areas for development as green 
open zones, including forests and regional parks, the planning authorities seek to limit 
development, curb the expansion of the city and the fulfilment of its economic 
potential. Haifa’s regional plan TAMAM 6, produced in January 2004, sums up the 
plans for Umm al-Fahem. Taking no regard whatsoever of the city’s wishes and al-
Roha agreement of understanding made with the government of Israel over the 
possibility of expanding the city’s borders towards north west of road number 65, 
TAMAM 6 has designated most of the area a green zone. The different shades of the 
colour green in the map (figure 24) occupy large swathes of land within Umm al-
Fahem’s existing and suggested borders and therefore generate much of the dispute 
with Haifa’s district planning committee. The dispute is presented in the official 
Objection Document to the Regional Master Plan, TAMAM 6 (2004) which Umm al-
Fahem’s local government has presented to the national council for planning in April 
2004, three months after TAMAM 6 was produced.236   
In December 2000 the state of Israel, represented by the Ministry of Interior, signed 
                                                
236 According to the Planning and Building Law, the national council for planning is the highest body 
in the planning system, which amongst its functions is approving regional master plans. For more 
information about the council see Planning Authorities: Instructions and Procedures, available at the 
Ministry of Interior website:  http://www.moin.gov.il/Publications/Mafamim2702.pdf  [Hebrew]. 
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the Al-Roha agreement of understanding with the public committee for the defence of 
Al-Roha lands and the Arab local governments in Wadi Ara, represented by Umm al-
Fahem and Kufur Qari.237 The agreement came after violent clashes between state 
armed forces and residents of Umm al-Fahem erupted in 1998 over Al-Roha lands. 
The violence was instigated by the military’s chief of staff decision to declare land 
that belonged to Fahmawi families a fire zone.238  
For Umm-el-Fahem and its residents, Al-Roha lands provide the potential for their 
future development. Their vision is to open up towards the area, which covers about 
30 per cent of the city’s jurisdiction. Haifa’s district master plan, however and in 
complete contradiction to the city’s wishes, designated the area north of road number 
65, except for Ein Ibraheem (which appears in the colour orange), as a protected 
open/agricultural zone.239 The colour as marked on the map is light green-blue with a 
black outline .240 In the official Objection Document to TAMAM 6 (2004), 
Umm al-Fahem stated that by designating the land as a protected open/agricultural 
zone, the district planning committee acted against the owners’ wishes. It “brings the 
city’s development to stagnation,” stated the document (Umm al-Fahem’s Local 
                                                
237 Al-Roha covers an area of 42,000 dunums, which are privately owned by Palestinian families from 
Wadi Ara who use it for grazing and growing olives. 
238  The confiscation resulted in a series of violent clashes between the state and the local 
population.The secondary school of Umm-el-Fahem, which is located in a relative proximity to the 
Wadi Ara road, was targeted in the clashes. Residents say that it turned into a battlefield and an 
emergency unit. Many students were injured in the clashes and some people lost their eyes from rubber 
bullets fired at them. 
 
239 Figure 11 does not show the rest of Al-Roha lands that falls beyond its borders, i.e. north of the 
blue-coloured line. The line is the border between Haifa district and northern district.  
240 This is the colour as defined by the master plan’s instruction (2013: 20). For more details on the 
permitted use of land for protected open/agriculture zone, please see, Israel Land Administration: 
http://www.mmi.gov.il/IturTabotData/tmm/haifa/tmm6.pd p20 [Hebrew].  
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Government 2004: 21). It, therefore, demanded land usage is changed to a mixture of 
land uses: to include rural, rural-urban development as well as an open agricultural 
zone (ibid: 20).  
Umm al-Fahem’s local government cites a number of reasons that underpin their 
request to change zoning. These are the following: The area covers a continuous 
expanse of land, covering 5000 dunums, which constitutes about 20 per cent of Umm 
al-Fahem’s jurisdiction. The land connects together the city’s three neighbourhoods, 
which are north of road number 65: Ein Ibraheem, Ein Al-Zatunih, and Li-byaer.241 
Moreover, 70 per cent of the land is in private ownership and the local residents have 
already started to build houses there. From a developmental and planning point of 
view, the land has many advantageous properties. Compared to the mountainous 
terrain of the city, the land does not have steep slopes and has got low environmental 
sensitivity. This makes it suitable for urban development, with relatively little effect 
on the environment, especially on the quality of subterranean waters.242 It is also 
surrounded by an already existing urban infrastructure, including roads, electricity, 
water, sewage, and telecommunication.243  
                                                
241 Apart from Ein Ibraheem, the other two neighbourhoods are non-existent according to the plan. Ein 
El-Zatunih for example, appears as a park zone. In the Objection Document (2004), the local 
government demanded that this status change to rural development zone, which will prevent the 
demolition of the neighbourhood (for more information see,Umm al-Fahem’s Local Government: 23 
[Hebrew]).  
242 The city’s topography poses a challenge for getting building permits. The mountainous terrain 
makes it hard to meet all the requirements pertaining to connection to roads, electricity, water, sewage 
etc. 
243  The consultant for environmental issues who was part of the appointed committee, which the 
Ministry of Interior put together to prepare a conceptual master plan for the city in early 2000s, has 
recommended the area be designated for commerce, trade and industries (see ibid: 13).  
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The light green-blue colour is only one of the different shades of green. The map 
designates a relatively large area of land as a metropolitan park. This is marked by the 
dark green colour with blue dots: . The park falls within the existing and 
proposed city’s borders and covers thousands of dunums of land that are in private 
ownership. The local authority argues that not only does the park impinge on property 
rights, but zoning the area as such blocks the city’s present and future development. It 
therefore suggests that the metropolitan park be changed to accommodate future 
residential neighbourhoods. The local authority also reminded the district committee 
that according to the national master plan for forests and afforestation (TAMA 22), 
about 5000 dunums within the city’s borders have already been designated as forest 
zones.244 “The question that begs itself, is there a need for designating extra thousands 
of dunums for a regional park within the city’s borders? Why not designate the 
already existing forest zones, which are within the city’s borders, as a regional park? 
These questions need to be answered by the planning team,” stated the Objection 
Document (2004: 22-23).245   
 
 
 
                                                
244 The local government is also objecting to the designation of privately owned land according to 
TAMA 22 and TAMAM6 as forest reserve.  
 
245There are about 23,000 dunums of land within Umm al-Fahem’s jurisdiction. So the 5000 dunums 
constitute a big portion of the city’s borders.  
 
265	
 
Hotel city: “work in Tel Aviv and come back to sleep at home”246 
 
Figure 25: Cool lunch boxes: two workers carrying their cool lunch boxes returning to the 
city after work (out of the city) 
 
“How could it be a city when the majority of its working men have to leave the city to 
find work?!” has often been the question posed back to me by field interviewees when 
asked whether Umm al-Fahem is a city. The city’s evening hours are living evidence 
that Umm al-Fahem is truly a commuters’ dormitory city. The scene of workers 
                                                
246 This is a quote from an interview with the city’s architect on 22 June 2009, Umm al-Fahem.  
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carrying their cool lunch boxes (figure 25) either walking in the streets, making their 
way home, or just getting off buses and vehicles is inescapable in the city at that time 
of the day. Lack of industrial and commercial zones were also often cited as evidence 
for the nominal status of their city and the absence of work opportunities in it.  
Both the local government and the residents recognise that in order for a city to 
function it has to have a viable economic base. They are also aware of the huge 
potential for development along the busy road of Wadi Ara (figure 26), road number 
65. Demanding that the district planning committee zone the area for commerce was 
therefore inevitable. Working professionally within the planning regulations and in 
the hope of getting the approval of the planning authorities, the local government 
prepared a detailed plan for a service road, and a commercial zone of 40,000 squared 
metres, in the area adjacent to road number 65. The plan was put together according 
to modern planning standards, sought also to ease the busy traffic in road number 65, 
and respond to environmental concerns.    
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Figure 26: Wadi Ara: busy road 
From the local government’s point of view, having a commercial zone within its 
borders means increasing its income through council tax charges and providing job 
opportunities for residents. This is particularly important as the main available income 
to the city is government budget which is not enough to meet the city’s needs. The 
income generated from other sources, such as council tax, is problematic. This is due 
to the low socio-economic conditions, which mean that households are in council tax 
arrears and many of them are exempt altogether. The arrears are so bad that the local 
authority had to put a huge poster on the main entrance to the city, reminding people 
to pay their taxes. It even equates paying their debts to patriotism and loyalty (figure 
27 below).  
Council tax for non-residential properties is higher in value and generates relatively 
big revenues for the local authority. Therefore, commercial and industrial zones, 
together with civil service offices constitute some of the main demands which the city 
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presents to the state and its planning authorities. Not only do they provide the city 
with work opportunities but they also contribute to its economic development and to 
lifting it out of its hotel status.  
   
Figure 27: Belonging and patriotism= paying tax, let's pay our debt to the local government 
 
Haifa’s district committee, however, declined the plan. Its justification was that 
designating the stretch of land along the road as commercial was against national 
master plans, particularly the integrated national master plan for construction, 
development and preservation, known as TAMA 35, and the national map for roads, 
TAMA 3.247 According to TAMA 35, the requested area is designated a green zone.  
                                                
247 TAMA 35 was approved by a government decision in 2005.  
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The national master plan for roads indicates that the building line for that strip of land 
is 100 metres. TAMAM 6 reinforced the national plans by designating the area as an 
open urban zone, marked by the colour green: .248 For Fahmawis, this sends 
a message of blockage and limitation on racialised grounds. It also sends a message of 
entrenching the state of dependency on Jewish towns and the national government. 
Their conclusion is reinforced by the existing reality in Jewish localities, where 
commercial zones are allowed in almost zero distance from road number 65 (see 
figure 28). 
 
Figure 28: Gan Shmuel. Source: Google Maps 2014 
                                                
248 This is the description of the colour as it appears in the master plan’s instruction (2013:22). For 
further details on permitted land use see Israel Land Administration website: 
http://www.mmi.gov.il/IturTabotData/tmm/haifa/tmm6.pdf  [Hebrew].  
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Gan Shmuel commercial zone (figure 28), 22.8 km southwest of Umm al-Fahem, is a 
case in point.249 It is cited as a successful example of the economic benefits generated 
from materialising the potential of a main road, and an evidence of allowed 
development in Jewish areas alone. The commercial zone includes a big McDonalds, 
an Ace (American hardware store), a super pharm, and a number of other Israeli chain 
stores and coffee shops. Gan Shmuel is crowded with Palestinians from Wadi Ara 
who use the commercial area for shopping and recreational purposes. “80 per cent of 
Wadi Ara [the Arabs] spend their time there. I go there. I have got no choice. I go 
there for shopping. I take the kids there for leisure,” said the city’s architect (22 June 
2009). 
The question that begs itself is, “why is it that Gan Shmuel [a kibbutz with a 
population of 839 (CBS 2011)] is allowed to have a commercial zone adjacent to the 
road…and Umm al-Fahem, as a central city in Wadi Ara, is not,” asked the architect. 
Majiddo, which is less than 10 km northeast of Umm al-Fahem, is another case in 
point. They are planning for “a terrifying commercial zone,” said the architect. The 
plan is for “bi-polar commercial zones, so that Umm al-Fahem is sandwiched in 
between them…so that it remains a hotel: we work in Tel Aviv and come back to 
sleep at home,” said the architect (ibid).  
                                                
249 Distance worked out through Google maps. 
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A future railway line, according to the national master plan for railways TAMA 23, is 
projected to pass across road number 65. The district committee sees this as another 
factor for designating the area a green zone. Umm al-Fahem’s suggestion to the 
committee is to use the planned railway line to the benefit of the city, not the 
opposite. It suggested a stop in Umm al-Fahem, which would be linked to the 
commercial zone. This would also be to the benefits of the residents of Wadi Ara, 
who currently have to travel to the Jewish town of Binyameenah (about 30 km west) 
to be able to use to the train.  
But life continues… 
Fahmawis, defying the planning authorities’ restrictions, went ahead with their plans. 
They took a chance. They built about 35 retail shops along the road, including 
bakeries, supermarkets, printing services, etc. The commercial zone has started to 
pick up economically and is already employing dozens of workers from the city. But 
the conditions in terms of infrastructure are poor and the properties are built cheaply. 
Property owners are keen to invest in building modern, even luxurious properties but 
they are aware of the planning regulations. They know that their properties are 
unauthorised and therefore are against the law. Many of them have already received 
demolition orders and some have already been demolished, as was the case with the 
fruit and vegetable store (cited at the beginning of the chapter).  Therefore, the market 
looks disorganised, cheap and messy.  
The story with the planning authorities and the resulting disorder in the streets is 
repeated again. The authorities do not allow development on one hand, and 
criminalise people who build on the other, all in the name of law. The locals blame 
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the authorities for their chaotic, precarious condition. They are also aware that the 
authorities interfere and choose to implement the Planning and Building Law more 
rigorously when Jewish interests are at stake. For example, the demolition orders are 
more likely to take place when buildings and structures are close to areas considered 
sensitive to the Jewish public, such as road number 65. However, and despite all of 
this, the message Fahmawis send is also one of resilience and defiance (figure 29 
below). They insist on building, developing and materialising their right to 
development. They protest against reducing and perpetuating their city to what they 
call a hotel city or a refugee camp.   
 
Figure 29: Rebuilding the fruit and vegetables store which was demolished in the market area 
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Conclusion 
The chapter has discussed how Israel’s very centralised, interventionist, hierarchised 
and comprehensive planning system combines with its racialised and Manichaean 
land system to simultaneously shape the very materiality of the city of Umm al-
Fahem and its everyday life, thus questioning the very meaning and functionality of 
the city. Through discussing local and regional master plans the chapter demonstrated 
how the system is employed to achieve political ends, not the wellbeing of all 
citizens. Operating within the confines of a racialised and Manichaean nomos, this 
system is employed as a powerful technology of control and governmentality that 
works towards producing suspended, docile, socially controlled and privatised 
Palestinian citizens and spaces that are in a perpetual state of dependency and arrested 
development, or in other words in a state of urbicide. 
To illustrate the arguments, the chapter started by sharing excerpts from an interview 
with a local resident whose fruit and vegetable store got demolished while conducting 
the ethnographic fieldwork. His story captures the essence of living in suspension, the 
deliberate policies of economic de-development in the name of keeping law and 
order, and the insistence of Fahamwis on their right to economic development.  The 
chapter then moved to describe the Al-Shikunat housing project in the city. The 
project is discussed in the context of what both the local government and the citizens 
are capable of achieving when the state and its planning authorities are collaborative. 
Not only are the Al-Shikunat built on state land but also detailed plans prepared by the 
local government are approved. The Al-Shikunat are therefore planned with the 
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wellbeing of the citizen being the prime priority. The chapter then moved to discuss 
how the housing project is the exception, not the norm. The prevailing planning and 
housing reality is one of nightmare, complexities and (non)-planning. The city’s 
professional planning team is faced with the challenge of planning under what often 
feel like irreconcilable (post)colonial conditions.  
The chapter discussed how the absence of an approved up-to-date master plan in the 
city, the existence of an out-dated master plan from 1965, dwindling private land 
resources and increasing demand for land for housing in a distinctively young city 
with more than 50 per cent of the population below the age of 19, has resulted in 
entropy, crowdedness, illegal and unauthorised buildings, a housing problem, as well 
as increasing social control. These problems are exacerbated by the withdrawal of the 
state on the one hand, and the persistently politicised and racialised employment of 
planning policies, on the other. The chapter discussed how, against these conditions, 
citizens not only are forced to take a chance and live in suspension by building with 
no authorisation, but they are also encouraged to act selfishly. Their priority is not to 
give up some of their precious land for public use, but to secure housing for 
themselves, even if this means risking demolition and criminalisation.  
The chapter also discussed the implications which the private tenure of land, based on 
inheritance, and the self-provision of housing have on everyday life, the social make-
up of society and the very meaning of the urban experience. It discussed how 
heterogeneity, being impersonal, or choosing freely where to live in the city are badly 
affected, even non-existent.   
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The chapter then moved to discuss the grounds for declining a master plan that was 
prepared by the local government. It reached the conclusion that keeping the Jewish 
and Palestinian communities apart, and preventing Umm al-Fahem’s geographical 
continuity is what stands at the heart of the regional planning committee decision. 
Mei Ami and Al-Mua’alaqah cases were used to illustrate the conclusion. It also 
discussed the exacerbated housing problem and the partial planning remedy that the 
local government found for it.  
Planning for arrested racialised development and Umm al-Fahem’s resistance to these 
plans by insisting on getting out of the situation where the city is merely a hotel that 
serves the rudimentary functions of eating, drinking and reproducing, was the final 
subject discussed in the chapter. Through visiting Haifa’s regional master plan, 
TAMAM 6, in relation to Umm al-Fahem and the subsequent objection to the plan by 
the city’s planning team, the chapter discussed how TAMAM 6 and its zoning 
policies curb the city’s economic development and expansionism. Drawing on Gan 
Shmuel commercial zone that is in zero distance from the main road of 65, the chapter 
illustrated how TAMAM 6 and the regional planning committee are informed by 
racialised considerations that work to economically empower the Jewish sector, while 
de-developing that of Umm al-Fahem. Umm al-Fahem prepared plans for a 
commercial zone in the city adjacent to road 65 but these were declined on planning 
and zoning grounds, one of which being in almost zero distance from the road. The 
chapter discussed how, for Umm al-Fahem, TAMAM 6 meant perpetuating the 
nominal status of their city and depriving them of the right to development.  
Umm al-Fahem’s resistance to these urbicidal policies and insistence on living with 
hope is written in the opening pages to the TAMAM 6 Objection Document, prepared 
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by Umm al-Fahem’s local government and submitted to the national council for 
planning. The Objection Document (2004: 2) states: “[t]he residents of the city 
perceive the proposed TAMAM 6, as both a punishment and a catastrophe brought 
upon them by the central government. We, however, believe that the catastrophic and 
punitive character of the plan could be transformed into hope, an act of conciliation 
and a positive move which the central government could bring upon the welfare of the 
city’s residents.”  
While this chapter discussed direct interventionist technologies of control and 
governmentality deployed by the planning and land system, the next chapter takes up 
the subject of indirect forms of control, or what it calls control from within, that is the 
incorporation of Fahmawis into their own subjugation and the attempts to reduce 
them to their faith.  
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Chapter 7 
Control from within: religious identities, biopolitical hegemony and 
the socio-spatial and political Islamisation of Umm al-Fahem 
 
In 1989, the Islamic Movement won the local elections in a landslide victory.250 Its 
victory inflicted a massive and enduring defeat on the principal rival incumbent 
communist leadership, who by then had been in office for over 10 years. Throughout 
the last 25 years since the Movement first took office it has been repeatedly winning 
the local democratic elections, thus establishing an unequivocal hegemony in the city. 
As expected, the shift in local politics has been accompanied by a shift in the city’s 
socio-spatial and cultural landscape. Therefore, the year 1989 ushered in a new era 
and new conjuncture in the history of Umm al-Fahem. Some locals refer to it as the 
cultural turn in the everyday life of the city.  
Perhaps one of the most important and defining changes of this era (1989 onwards) 
has been the relationship between the state and Umm al-Fahem’s local government 
and vice versa. The animosity towards the communist-led local government, 
manifested primarily but not solely in inadequate budgeting, was replaced by a new 
level of sponsorship and endorsement to the newly elected Islamic Movement. 
Meanwhile, the confrontational, vocal and challenging relationship that the 
predecessor local government had towards the state was replaced with pragmatism 
and localism. Being a vocal voice against Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and 
Gaza, the national and political oppression of Palestinians and the demand for equal 
                                                
250 The chapter uses the Islamic Movement and the Movement interchangeably.  
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rights and a politically just solution to the conflict were not the Movement’s top 
priorities, at least not in its beginnings. In fact, in the run-up to the 1989 elections 
anti-communism and raising the banner of ‘Islam is the solution’ was what defined 
the Movement’s political campaign. 
The Movement chose to concentrate on and prioritise local, social, bodily and 
everyday matters in the life of the city and its residents. Improving the ailing and 
dysfunctional urban infrastructure, focusing on education, health, rehabilitation of 
drug addicts, the building of healthy functioning family units, establishing an 
economic base, and a general commitment to improving residents’ wellbeing were its 
major priorities. It also sought to Islamise the socio-spatiality of the city by 
introducing a new social, moral and normative order that worked towards promoting 
religiosity, reviving the Islamic identity, changing residents’ daily practices and 
producing new subjectivities: the Muslim man and new society.251  Therefore, its 
slogan ‘Islam is the solution’ was presented as the panacea for all the mundane, 
spiritual and moral ills of society.    
Against this brief background, this chapter is concerned with deconstructing the 
workings of governmentality as manifested in Umm al-Fahem’s contemporary socio-
spatial, cultural and political order, particularly in the immediate years around 1989. 
                                                
251 Man in this context applies to either sex. It means a human being. The building of healthy, happy 
and functioning nuclear families is part of building a healthy society. For more information on this see 
www.sanad-osra.com/ [Arabic]. Sanad in Arabic is support. The webpage states clearly that its vision 
is to build and develop a society according to Islamic Shariah and its mission is to educate families to 
take on the task of building a society according to Islamic Shariah in order to achieve cohesive and 
happy families. Offering support to mothers and young women through counselling and educational 
days and conferences is amongst its missions.   
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The chapter identifies these years as defining times in the city’s history. 
Governmentality, here, is deployed in relation to two different but interconnected 
contexts. First, how the state sought to incorporate Fahmawis into their own 
subjugation through employing a mixture of technologies and by using the democratic 
structure of local elections, in what the chapter refers to as control from within.  
The second is in relation to the way the Islamic Movement sought to direct 
Fahmawis’ conduct and render them governable. Two concepts are mobilised here to 
illustrate and discuss the Movement’s governmentality. These are Gramsci’s 
hegemony and Foucault’s biopolitics. Both hegemony and biopolitics, in this context, 
are entangled together, with one reinforcing and legitimising the other. By hegemony 
I mean ruling by (active) popular consent of the local population.252 I describe the 
process and the mechanisms through which the Movement won the trust and support 
of the majority of Fahmwais, thus establishing and sustaining its dominance in the 
city. The concept also accounts for how the Movement established itself as the voice 
of authority in moral and social affairs.  
Foucault’s biopolitics as a practice and a technology of intervention that seeks to 
govern populations and maintain control in the name of higher morality and 
objectives is particularly relevant to understanding the Islamic Movement’s regulatory 
                                                
252 Although the concept of hegemony occupies a pivotal role in Gramsci’s analysis of social, cultural 
and political processes, he does not always employ it consistently. As noted by Anderson (1976) the 
concept underwent numerous mutations throughout his writing. In the Selections from the Prison 
Notebooks, Gramsci refers to hegemony as “the spontaneous” consent given by the great masses of the 
population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group” (Hoare 
and Nowell-Smith 2001: 145).  In a different context he brackets hegemony as the active consent (ibid: 
504).   
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practices in the city and the way it governed its residents.253 Moreover, the concept 
proves insightful as the Movement’s mode of government has been to a large extent 
concerned with life and inscribed in the body with special regard to biological and 
physical features. Whether it was public hygiene and public health campaigns, the 
commitment to creating a better society, or the dedication to work on the female body 
in both its singularity and collectivity, these were all biopolitical interventionist 
strategies par excellence that the Movement followed and which helped it to establish 
its hegemony in the city.  
The chapter argues that in a colonial context where the colonised are seen as a 
problem and a challenge that needs to be contained, by resorting to this mode of 
governmentality which is characterised by indirect soft forms of control, what 
Foucault (1979: 211) calls “flexible methods of control,” the state guarantees 
efficiency, maintains a façade of democratic rule and satisfies the colonised right to 
self-government within the existing democratic structures. This mode of control is 
more viable and more economical. It, in fact, goes hand in hand with the thoughtful 
reflection by Joseph Servan, the French General who served as a Minister of War 
during the French Revolution, who wrote: “[a] stupid despot may constrain his slaves 
with iron chains; but a true politician binds them even more stronger by the chain of 
                                                
253 This understanding of biopolitics draws on a number of sources; primarily Foucault’s direct writings 
and analysis of the concepts of biopolitics and biopower as appears in History of Sexuality: an 
Introduction (1990) and Society Must be Defended, and Security, Territory and Population (2003). In 
the history of sexuality (1990), Foucault defines biopower as “the diverse techniques for achieving 
subjugation of bodies and the control of populations…” The work of other key theoreticians of 
Foucault and his concepts of biopolitics and biopower has also contributed to the formulation of the 
concept. These include Thomas Lemke’s (2011) Biopolitics, David Macey’s (2009) article ‘Rethinking 
Biopolitics: Race and Power in the Wake of Foucault,’ and Paul Rabinow’s and Nikolas Rose’s (2006) 
article Thoughts on the Concept of Biopower Today.     
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their own ideas” (quoted in Foucault 1979: 102-3).  
The chapter demonstrates how this form of control was concretely materialised 
through crippling the existing communist-led local government and other progressive 
forces to facilitate the way for the rise of the Islamic Movement to power. It discusses 
how slow violence, in the shape of under-budgeting aimed at affecting the very 
materiality of the city, along with using water and sewage as political weapons, were 
some of the main tangible and operative technologies at the hand of the state to 
achieve this objective. The chapter’s overall aim is to demonstrate that weakening the 
communist local government which was successful at mobilising nationalist feelings 
in the 1970s and 1980s and therefore perceived as potentially threatening, through 
reducing subjects to their faith by encouraging religious identities was the most 
suitable mode of governmentality at that time. It also puts forward the argument that a 
tamed biopolitical hegemonic Islamic Movement, concerned with encouraging 
religious identities, social and moral conservatism and which organically possesses 
strong disciplinary and regulatory capabilities and which operates within the tolerable 
boundaries of law and order becomes invaluable to the production of a docile, self-
regulating city and citizens consumed with social conformism. Moreover, religious 
identities are congruous with the state’s fragmenting strategy of divide and rule.  
The chapter is divided into four main sections which engage in critical reading of the 
situation on the ground before and after the rise of the Islamic Movement to power. 
The first section starts by disentangling the relationship between the urban and the 
political, through discussing the very materiality of the city and the politics of water 
and sewage which brought the local communist-led government to defeat and helped 
the Movement rise to power. It illustrates how the former was incapacitated by under-
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budgeting and persisting budget deficiency that rendered it incompetent with poor 
performance in delivering urban services. 
The second section discusses in more details the processes and mechanisms through 
which the Movement established and sustained its biopolitical hegemony and how 
within a short period of time of coming to power had managed to radically transform 
the city’s urban landscape. It focuses primarily on the domains of urban regeneration, 
health and education, the Islamisation of the socio-spatiality of the city and the 
Movement’s high competency and performance in managing the city’s mundane and 
everyday affairs. It also touches on the Movement’s economic mechanism that 
enhanced both its performance and biopolitical hegemonic presence.254 A key thread 
that runs through this section is the Movement’s ability to tightly entangle ideology 
with practice through presenting religion as the panacea for all the ills in society, not 
only rhetorically but materially as well.  
The third section takes up the subject of the state and its relationship to the Islamic 
Movement. It illustrates how the latter was endorsed and financially supported by the 
former. This new level of sponsorship contributed to the Movement’s performance 
and was another factor that helped establish its hegemony. It then moves to discuss 
how the material support was part of a larger plan to encourage religious identities 
that worked to weaken the popularity of the communists and other left forces. To 
illustrate the argument, it draws on statements made by state officials as reflected in 
                                                
254 Possessing an independent economic base, through Zakat and alms, and offering active support for 
the creation of a financially established class, such as by way of providing public land to establish 
businesses, was another mechanism that helped establish the Movement’s hegemony. It is however 
beyond the scope of this chapter to elaborate on this mechanism.   
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two Israeli newspapers: Haaretz and Yediot Ahronot, as well as official statistics 
regarding state budgets received by the local government.    
The fourth section discusses the issue of control from within. It discusses how the 
Islamic Movement used its biopolitical hegemonic power to promote social 
conservatism in ways that favoured what it perceived as religious ways of life over 
existing practices and culture. It illustrates how through the Islamic wedding 
phenomenon and the example of the dismissal of a secondary school teacher, the 
Movement sought to promote social conformism and dismiss existing social practices 
by introducing new ones.  
Moreover, the section discusses the female body and how it became a site and 
signifier of political change. It deconstructs the politics of the veil and how the veiling 
campaign was mobilised to create a new body and a new society. This subsection 
illustrates how the flip side of the campaign was political and social. The veil became 
not only a religious identity marker but worked as a political screening mechanism for 
those who were associated with the Movement and those who were not. It also 
discusses how the veil interfered in the public and everyday spatialisation of the body.  
As far as literature and methodology are concerned, the chapter draws mostly on 
primary material and employs discourse and historical analysis to illustrate the 
arguments. To discuss the city’s conditions under communist government, the chapter 
draws mostly on Al-Itihad newspaper and Al-Ghad magazine, both associated with 
the Communist Party. The newspaper of Sawt Al-Haq wa Al-Hurriyyih, the Islamic 
Movement’s mouthpiece, provides a documented history on the fundamental changes 
in the city’s history after 1989, especially in regard to the Movement’s successful 
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record in what they called the urban renaissance that took place during the 
Movement’s very early years in office. Both Haaretz newspaper and Yediot Ahronot 
are used in the section on the state and the Movement.  Last but not least, the rich and 
fascinating material gathered throughout the fieldwork informs the essence of this 
chapter. In fact, the chapter reflects field interviewees’ first-hand experiences of the 
socio-political and spatial changes in their city.  
Years of siege: the politics of shit, the politics of water  
Hashim Mahameed, Umm al-Fahem’s mayor before 1989, describes his years in 
office as ones of siege and isolation.255 Throughout his tenure, the local government 
suffered from severe budget deficiency that shackled its development and left it 
dysfunctional and incapable of performing its duties towards its residents. Basic 
services could hardly be delivered with shortages in almost every sphere of public 
urban life. In 1985, for example, the city of 22,000 (Statistical Abstract 2008: 129) 
with almost half of its population under the age of 19 had thirteen schools in total, 
eleven of which were primary schools, one secondary school, and one for special 
needs. One-third of primary schools’ classrooms, 80 out of 240, were rented in 
squalid conditions; lacking health and safety standards, and some even with no doors, 
windows, toilets, playgrounds, or even ceilings (Al-Ghad 1985; Nevo 1985).  
In 1987 the local government could not pay its employees their salaries for months on 
end. This prompted the secondary school, which had 1020 students and 67 teachers, 
                                                
255 Fieldwork interview, Umm al-Fahem, 13 August 2009.  
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to go on strike.256 Within the space of four years the school had a total of about 225 
days in strike, reaching the equivalent of more than one academic year. Both students 
and teachers believed their school was the victim of a deliberate policy of financial 
strangulation and siege employed against the city (Al-Ghad April 1987). 257  To 
translate words into figures, the local government budget for that year was 4,947,499 
Israeli Shekels (Central Bureau of Statistics 1990: 69-70), and its deficit was 
4,000,000 Israeli Shekels.  
The provision of sports facilities was almost nil. Playing basketball, tennis or going 
swimming in the city was all but a dream for the local residents.258 Football was the 
only sport they could play. The city’s football team was heading the list of the 
national B League and yet providing an adequate space for them to play and train 
became increasingly difficult to maintain. The city's only football grounds had to be 
shut down for health and safety reasons. This meant that every time the team wanted 
to train it had to travel 80km to get to a Palestinian locality that had the appropriate 
facilities (ibid).  
                                                
256 In Israel, administration of secondary schools falls under local governments responsibility.   
257  See Qasim, G. (1987) ‘Umm al-Fahem’s High School: a Victim of a Policy of Financial 
Strangulation and Siege against the City of Umm al-Fahem’, Al-Ghad, April 1987 [Arabic].  Also, in 
chapter 6 on planning, I discussed how government budgets provide the main income for Palestinian 
localities.  
258 See interview with Mahameed in Nevo, A. (1985) ‘His Honour, The Mayor’, Yediot Ahronot, 22 
November [Hebrew]. In the interview Mahameed said: “we have got no sewage pipes. Therefore, there 
are severe diseases which do not exist in other city. There is a shortage of 80 classrooms. The majority 
of classrooms have got no doors, no widows, and without sanitation. There is no cultural club, not even 
one public park or basketball court. Umm al-Fahem’s football team is heading the list, in B League, yet 
they travel to Kufur Qasim to get training. What am I asking for? I have not asked for either a 
swimming pool nor a tennis court.” 
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In regards to neutral cultural centres, the ‘student house’ was the only one. The 
facility however had hardly the capacity to serve one-fifth of the students. Although 
the city in the 1970s and 1980s was buzzing with cultural activities, and had two 
functioning cinemas, these were mostly partisan or religious.259 The Communist Party 
club and that of Abnaa el-Balad (Sons of the land) were the main centres offering 
non-religious cultural activities. 260  Their activities included youth camps, poetry 
evenings, art exhibitions, film screenings (mostly documentaries), theatrical sketches, 
musical events, etc. In many occasions school playgrounds used to provide the space 
for these activities.  
Urban hygiene, however, was probably the most visibly dysfunctional sphere of all 
public services. Not only were the streets narrow, potholed and with piles of 
uncollected rubbish, but they were also conduits for sewage. For many years the local 
government had plans to fit sewers, but lacked adequate budget to execute them. The 
(state) planning authorities were not collaborative either, and were part of the problem 
rather than the solution. In 1987, the city’s budget for development was U.S. 
$100,000, when 60 million dollars were needed to tackle the city’s rough terrain of 
hilly topography and harsh socio-economic conditions (Al-Ghad March 1987).261 It is 
no surprise therefore that flowing sewage and dirty streets became recurring motifs in 
many articles written on the city’s distressing conditions before 1989. As might be 
expected, poor public hygiene made the city vulnerable to diseases. In November 
                                                
259 Umm al-Fahem had two privately run cinemas. One of them was called the ‘Red Cinema’ and used 
to show Bollywood films, amongst other things. It closed down in the early 1980s. The other cinema 
got burned down in late 1970s.  
260 See the section on Al-Hadaf cultural empire in chapter 5: historical sociology. 
261 See ‘Umm al-Fahem Challenges Water-Starvation,’ Al-Ghad, March 1987. [Arabic] 
 
287	
1985, Mahameed told Yediot Ahronot that because of the absence of sewerage, the 
city suffered from severe diseases that were not found in other cities (Nevo 1985). 
Living in a city with a basic public hygiene system was a fantasy for Fahmawis.  In an 
article entitled ‘He Has Got a Dream,’ which appeared in Yediot Ahronot on the 25 
June 1987, a day after half a million of Palestinians in Israel went on strike against the 
state’s discriminatory policies, Mahameed said: “my dream focuses on the sewage of 
Umm al-Fahem. It makes me angry that my child goes to school… and on his way he 
has to step on sewage. As long as refuse is not flowing in sewers, as in Afula, I will 
not keep silent” (Yediot Ahronot  25 June 1987). 262 
The gravity of the situation, in particular the flowing sewage in the streets and 
alleyways of the city was perhaps best reflected in the political sphere. Not only did it 
represent a living embodiment of persistent state negligence and dire socio-economic 
conditions, but it also proved influential, if not a leading force, in shifting the political 
                                                
262  Comparison with the neighbouring Jewish city of Afula, which had almost the same size of 
population was inevitable. It served as an example provided by both fieldwork interviewees and 
newspaper articles to point out to the disparities in resources, urban infrastructure, and what a city of 
the same size could be like. In 1982-3 the population of Umm al-Fahem and Afula was 20,000 and 
21500, respectively (Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), Ministry of Interior, Local Authorities in 
Israel 1984/85 Financial Data, Published by the Central Bureau of Statistics, Jerusalem 1987 p 59.) 
[Hebrew]). In 1985 and 1986, the budget of Afula was 3.80 times more than that of Umm al-Fahem, 
with NIS 11582497 and NIS 3045131 respectively (CBS 1988: 65). In an article on the biggest Arab 
local governments’ strike against discrimination, which included half a million of Palestinians taking 
part, Hashim Mahameed told Yediot Ahronot how he would love to swap with any of his fellow Jewish 
mayors to run their towns, just for three weeks, to have a taste of what it is like to work under 
comfortable conditions with available resources. “I’d like them to come here and take over my seat and 
then tell me how they could manage a city of 25,000 with such a budget, with such problems and 
without any budget for development,” said Mahameed. Continuing the same line he asked “why does 
Auvadia Ali of Afula get a budget which is four or five times bigger than mine and then they come and 
blame us for mismanagement,’’ (Kitzal 1987). For Mahameed Umm al-Fahem is not rewarded 
accordingly. Despite being “loyal to the state, a population which is doing its best to build and work, 
and in return the state view us as an unwanted, oppressed stepchild. They do not treat us as equal 
citizens,” (ibid).   
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map of the city. It was the epitome of the incapacity of the communist-led local 
government, which eventually brought it down, and paved the way for the Islamic 
Movement's rise to power. Before elaborating on the latter's rise to power, it would be 
most relevant to discuss the subject of water which was another factor that contributed 
to the fundamental change in the political landscape. For many Fahamwais, the straw 
that broke the camel’s back, as the Arabic saying goes, was the systematic water cuts 
in the city.  
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Aquacide and the politics of water: the demise of the communists and the rise of 
the Islamic Movement 
Figure 30: Umm al-Fahem's Demonstration .. Demanding Water...! (Al-Ghad March 1978 
 
Figure 31: Umm al-Fahem Challenges Water-Starvation! (Al-Ghad March 1987) 
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Twice in one month in 1987 thousands of Fahmawis together with other Palestinian 
and Jewish progressive forces took to the streets to protest against the policy of water-
starvation and financial strangulation (Al-Ghad March 1987). The city's water was 
systematically cut off. In January 1987 Yediot Ahronot and Haaretz reported that the 
water supply was cut off for six consecutive days.263 Cutting the water supply of an 
entire city was particularly ruthless on hot summer days. This was exacerbated by the 
fact that the bulk of the city’s labour force worked in construction, which meant 
depriving those workers of the right to wash off the sweat of their working day.   
The declared grounds for cutting the water off was the local government's failure to 
pay its 90,000 Shekels debt to the state water company of Mekorot.264 The real reason, 
however, was political. Water-starvation policy is what the chapter characterises as 
aquacide, that is the deliberate policy of cutting off an entire population's water 
supply for political ends. Water is a powerful tool to further exacerbate the already 
dire conditions in the city and blame the local government for mismanagement. This 
policy started in the 1970s (see figure 30) when the elected local government was run 
by progressive forces associated with the communists and the Abnaa el-Balad. It 
intensified in the mid 1980s when the communists were still in power (see figure 31).  
                                                
263  See ‘Umm-el-Fahem Without Water’, Yediot Ahronot 29 January 1987, p 12 and Frister, R. (1987)  
‘Water Fuel- Water adding Fuel to Fire’, Haaretz, 30 January 1987 [Hebrew]. 
264 Figures quoted from the sources above. Mekorot, a pre-state Zionist water provider, is the national 
water company which trades itself as “one of the world’s most technologically advanced water 
companies...provides a steady flow of clean water to a rapidly growing population despite the region’s 
limited freshwater resources, arid climate and difficult geopolitical realities.” see www.mekorot.co.il  
[Hebrew].  
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Fieldwork interviewees and newspapers’ articles covering the subject support the 
argument that water was cut off on political grounds, for political ends. Mahmoud 
Abu Nasir, a local government councillor, noted in an interview with Al-Ghad (1987) 
that the city’s debt was not as big as that of the Kibbutzim movement, from which the 
water supply was not cut off despite its 550 million U.S. dollars in debt, 22 million of 
which belonged to one Kibbutz (Mishmar Ha-Negev). Haaretz journalist Roman 
Frister referred to the situation as “a war of attrition” between the establishment and 
the local government. Wondering if its architects would manage to get rid of the city’s 
mayor, Frister noted that: “whoever shut the water pipes in Umm al-Fahem was of the 
view that water is an effective political weapon” (Frister 1987).  
Contextualising the water crisis, Hashim Mahameed framed it within the saga of his 
relationship to the state which wanted to rid of him, ostensibly for what they called 
failed management. Debunking the state’s claims, Mahameed in his interview with 
Haaretz journalist gave the following account: “why do they want to get rid of me? 
The answer is very clear. The establishment, or at least parts of it, has been used to 
having a submissive Arab leadership. I am a Hutzpan who speaks at the same eye-
level ... I’m not one of those who gives his prayers to God every morning that we’ve 
got a colour TV ... I am well aware of our rights and I demand their fulfilment. This is 
a relatively new language being communicated between us and the Jewish 
establishment, and there are some who would rather not understand it” (Frister 1987). 
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In support of Mahameed’s reading of the situation, Frister revealed that soon after 
Mahameed was elected, officials from the Ministry of Interior had warned, “with 
Hashim Mahameed there will be trouble.” They have not forgotten that Mahameed 
had previously referred to Israel’s Army as an “occupying army” (ibid).265 Twenty 
years later, reflecting on his days in office, Mahameed said “being political was the 
harshest thing for the [Israeli] establishment ... they just wanted us to manage rubbish 
collection ... good management was waste management.”266 
In February 1989, the Islamic Movement decided to stand for the local elections for 
the first time. Electorate participation was impressive and so were the results. Over 80 
per cent of the electorate turned out to vote, giving the Islamic Movement’s 31-year-
old candidate, Sheikh Raed Salah, 75.5 per cent of the votes, 21.5 per cent to Hashim 
Mahameed and 2.5 per cent to Abnaa el-Balad.  The Islamic Movement had also won 
61.8 per cent of the local government council, reported Yediot Ahronot on 1 March 
1989 (Broida and Ringel-Hufman 1989). For Fahmawis, the Movement which was 
initially voted in as a vote for change had soon proved to be successful, with 
promising performance and leadership capabilities. Since then, the Movement has 
been repeatedly elected for the local government, thus establishing almost 
unchallengeable hegemony in the city.   
 
                                                
265  In July 1988, following the Communist Party request, the Knesset demanded the government 
allocate three million shekels to resolve the city’s water crisis, to the building of a new water tank and 
for comprehensive changes to the main water grid to be carried out (Al-Itihad 1988). 
266 Fieldwork interview, Umm al-Fahem, 13 August 2009.  
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Biopolitics in the making: urban renaissance, health, education and the 
way to hegemony 
Delivering on promises and high performance in the sphere of urban services coupled 
with possessing material resources and delivering charitable services to the poor, 
helping establish businesses in the city, as well as being active in the fields of health 
and education have all contributed to consolidating the Islamic Movement's 
hegemony in the city.267 Moreover, from very early on, the Movement displayed high 
levels of competency, organisational and leadership skills as well as stamina and 
discipline to prove itself. Embedding itself in the grassroots, the Movement also put 
special emphasis on involving residents in public activities, especially in the urban 
and social spheres. Although started in the years prior to 1989 victory, this process 
was accelerated especially in its early years in office, as many public institutions, such 
as schools and mosques, fell under its direct sphere of influence.268 This section will 
look into the Movement’s governmentality and its modus operandi particularly in the 
urban and social spheres. It deconstructs its hegemonic and biopolitical mode of 
government and touches on its ideological and economic base.  
In the urban realm, and within a relatively short period of time, the new 
administration managed to complete existing major infrastructure projects and initiate 
new ones. It managed to secure budgets from the Ministry of Interior which would 
                                                
267 As mentioned in footnote number 252, the Movement in various ways has actively helped establish 
a business class in the city. This is a very important subject that deserves a special section dedicated to 
it. It is however beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss it effectively.  
268 This is not a comprehensive study of the Islamic Movement. I therefore limit myself mostly to the 
early years of the Movement’s government, which as I said earlier have been formative to the 
contemporary history of Umm al-Fahem. They were also the years that fieldwork interviewees 
concentrated on the most.   
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allow it to continue the work of fitting sewers and revamping major water works,269 
set up a professional strategic town planning unit to deal with the problem of land and 
spatial planning in the city as well as purchase vehicles and bins for rubbish 
collection. Accelerating the process of approving detailed master plans, as well as 
initiating the work on ‘build your house’ housing project were among its priorities.270 
In practical terms, both the subject of detailed plans and preparing the grounds for the 
housing project meant that the local government was addressing the acute problem of 
housing and house demolition in the city. In 1991, the new administration also 
managed to secure money off the state to build two new schools for the 1992 
academic year (Sawt Al-Haq wa Al-Hurriyyih 7 June 1991).271 
Promoting active citizenship and agency by encouraging locals to take responsibility 
for their local environment was one of the ways to maintain a direct relationship 
between the newly elected Movement and the residents. This was particularly 
cultivated through two major events: the Islamic voluntary work brigades and public 
health events. By 1991, in less than a decade, the Movement had managed to 
complete eight Islamic voluntary work brigades. Like the previous voluntary work 
brigades under the communists, the Islamic brigades also centred on accomplishing 
urban projects.272 The projects included cleaning and maintenance work to public 
facilities, especially mosques, paving streets, and building mosques. For example, 
                                                
269  I say continued because work on these two major projects was started by the previous 
administration, albeit in its last year in office.  
270 On the importance of detailed plans and on the ‘build your house project,’ please see chapter 6 on 
planning.  
271 See ‘Two New Education Edifices’, Sawt al-Haq wa al-Hurriyyih 7 June 1991. 
272 See chapter 5 on historical sociology for more on the communist voluntary work brigades, initiated 
from the late 1970s till the first half of 1980s.    
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according to Sawt Al-Haq wa Al-Hurriyyih among the projects accomplished in the 
eighth brigade, carried out in the summer of 1991, were: clearing land for two public 
parks in the city, planting trees and flowers, paving streets and building two mosques: 
one in the newly established park and another in the secondary school premises (Sawt 
al-Haq wa al-Hurriyyih 2 August 1991).    
To address shortfalls in public health provision and in an attempt to identify serious 
health and social issues that had been neglected before, particularly in regard to drug 
abuse, the Movement set up clinics to offer highly subsidised medical, dental, as well 
as free rehabilitation services. Al-Rahamah, the compassion, association, the first of 
its kind in the Palestinian community, was set up to deal with drug addicts, offering 
them detoxification and rehabilitation services. Both the healing process and raising 
awareness about the subject were not limited to the physical confinements of the 
clinic. The message was taken out to the people through mosques and schools. As far 
as affordable medical services are concerned, the Islamic Al-Noor, the light, clinic 
was set up to offer 24-hour medical services. The clinic had a dentistry department 
and an ambulance, which was one of the first, if not the first in the Palestinian 
community.   
Reaching out to people, Al-Noor clinic, together with the local government, schools 
and the Daa’wa and Islamic Sciences College, initiated public health events in the 
city. In 1991, for example, the second weeklong health event took place. The event 
included a number of activities that were engaging, practical and educational. As well 
as performing medical checks for chronic and preventable diseases; testing for 
hypertension, diabetes, heart conditions and dental health and hygiene, public lectures 
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on raising awareness about health matters and grassroots cleaning campaigns were 
also a part of it.   
In mobilising for the event and in an attempt to encourage the active involvement of 
schools and neighbourhoods in these events great emphasis was put on the religious 
duty of keeping clean, along with promoting a system of mundane rewards. The 
cleanest school, the cleanest neighbourhood, and the best essay written by a school 
student on the subject of the public health event were to win prizes. Mobilising locals 
and schools worked. The city was buzzing with activities. Students were in charge of 
cleaning their schools, mosques and cemeteries. And neighbourhoods were busy 
cleaning and decorating their streets, drawing on the walls and putting signs up asking 
people to take care of their environment.  
In his concluding comments on the first health event in the city in 1990 which lasted 
for one day, the mayor Sheikh Raed Salah highlighted the importance of deepening 
the concept of health, a healthy environment and cleanliness in people’s perceptions, 
and their role in strengthening the sense of belonging. For him these concepts were 
deeply embedded within Islamic values. In an interview with Sawt Al-Haq wa Al-
Hurriyyih Salah said: “We are well aware that deepening people’s awareness in 
general and inculcating values in their minds and behaviours are indispensable to the 
building of society. Therefore, through this day we sought to deepen the concept of 
health, cleanliness, and healthy environments in students’ and residents’ lives, hoping 
that each individual in Umm al-Fahem will have a sense of responsibility in keeping 
Umm al-Fahem and its streets clean. Coupling material resources with general 
awareness will help us bring fundamental change to this aspect of our lives…I would 
like to thank all those who made the day successful and have worked on inculcating 
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the values which promote faith and which Islam has imprinted in the slogan, 
‘cleanliness emanates from faith” (Sawt Al-Haq wa Al-Hurriyyih 15 June 1990).  
The realm of education was another avenue through which the Movement tried to 
establish itself and spread deeply into society. This took several shapes and forms and 
over the years has developed to include other spheres of influence. 273  In its 
beginnings, the Movement put special emphasis on the early-years age group, a 
potentially easy-going generation for indoctrination and the building of the Muslim 
Man. During the 1980s the Movement set up Islamic nurseries and the Taw-a’iyha 
association for raising awareness. The association’s prime audience was school 
children offering them extracurricular activities in the fields of physical education, 
preparation for university admission exams, educational excursions, as well as 
religious education.274  
Another potentially influential group to cater for was future teachers in religious 
studies as well as Imams and preachers. In 1989/1990, the Al-Noor association for 
science and Islamic studies established the Daa’wa and Islamic Sciences College. 
Among the College objectives were training teachers, Imams, and preachers in 
Islamic studies and enhancing their abilities (especially Imams and preachers) in 
providing guidance to the public (test.islamic-college.org/News/543). Although the 
                                                
273 It was not until mid 1990s that the Movement started to work and organise amongst university 
students, primarily through the Eqraa foundation. Eqraa offers a variety of services to students and 
students-to-be, including financial support. Deepening religious and national consciousness and the 
preservation of the Islamic and Arabic identity is one of its objectives. For further information see 
www.eqraa.com [Arabic].  
274 Sawt Al-Haq wa Al-Hurriyyih details the activities of Abu-Thir centre which was opened under the 
patronage of the Taw-aiyah association. For more details see Sawt Al-Haq wa Al-Hurriyyih (1991) 
‘Under the Patronage of Taw-aiyah Association in Umm al-Fahem’, 12 April 1991 [Arabic].  
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Daa’wa College was not officially recognised, authorised or funded by the state, the 
Movement’s relatively strong financial base meant that graduates could be employed 
and incorporated in the Islamic Movement’s frameworks and activities (Ringil-
Hofman 1993).275  
To go deeper into society, a committee for propagating Daa’wa, that is the call for the 
revival of Islamic identity and values, was set up. Its activities were not limited to 
mosques, but spread to include home visits, public and social occasions such as 
weddings and funerals. To help reach out to as many people as possible the Islamic 
Al-Shuruq, the sunrise, pirate cable station was set up. 276  Daa’wa was not only 
diverse in location but also flexible in time. For example, in the latest Daa’wa week 
which took place in the first week of May 2014, cadre members of the Movement 
used the main entrances to the city to distribute leaflets and refreshments at the crack 
of dawn to workers who were on their way to work out of the city, (http://www.um-
                                                
275 According to. Ringil-Hofman of Yediot Ahronot (18 June 1993), the president of the Islamic college 
from 1989 to 1993  (when the article was written) was from a West Bank village near Ramallah, who 
graduated from Saudi Arabia. To employ him the Movement had to get a special permit from the 
Israeli authorities. According to the Movement, he was chosen for his persona and qualifications. 
Among the Arabs in Israel no one had his qualifications. This piece of information is interesting in 
itself, especially in the context of the model of Islamic teaching that could be influenced by the 
conservative Saudi school of thought that promotes strict Islamic values, especially in relation to social 
matters. In his critical article on the politics of promoting social conservatism through the strict 
puritanical version of Saudi Arabia’s Islam, Timothy Mitchell (2002) deconstructs the relationship 
between this and imperialism. He claims that the underlying motivation behind the Saudi version of 
Islam, which it seeks to export to other countries, is geopolitical and is linked to keeping the Middle 
East under control. Their form of Islam encourages social conservatism, and keeping away from 
mundane politics. This is welcomed and encouraged by imperialist countries, primarily the U.S.A..     
276 Al-Shuruq pirate station was closed down by the state in 1991. See Sawt Al-Haq wa Al-Hurriyyih 
(1991) ‘The Authorities [Israeli authorities] Close Down the Islamic Al-Shuruq Station’, 18 October 
1991. 
.  
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elfahem.net). At the centre of all of these activities and institutions stood the 
production of the Muslim Man, with an emphasis on Islamic morals, rituals and the 
reciting of the Quran.277  
In a society which already felt a strong affinity to religion and suffered from state 
racism and low socio-economic conditions, adopting Islam as its ideology provided 
the Movement with a privileged position from which appealing to people to win their 
hearts and go deep into them was not as challenging, when compared to other political 
forces. The communists and other secular forces could not fully provide tangible 
answers to people’s everyday problems and did not have a strong economic base 
either.278 This organic ideology, to borrow from Gramsci (Hall 1986: 20 [original 
emphasis]), is deeply embedded in society. Not only did it resonate with existing 
practices and rituals which are part and parcel of everyday life, but it also had ready-
made socially legitimate modus operandus and organisational structures and spaces, 
such as mosques, Friday sermons, alms, that is the non-obligatory giving of charity 
and Zakat, the obligatory duty of giving charities. Zakat, which is one of the fifth 
pillars of Islam, together with alms, provided the material basis for charity, welfare 
and social solidarity.   
 
                                                
277 In 1999, the Movement set up the Hiraa Foundation for the memorisation of Quran. The foundation 
has more than 70 centres and 20 schools across the country. It is particularly active in school years, in 
both primary and secondary schools. For more information see www.heraa.net [Arabic].  
278 Political Islam is particularly empowering in a context where there is political oppression, combined 
with a failure of nationalist secular forces to offer a solution. Umm al-Fahem in this sense is not an 
isolated example but part and parcel of regional and global political and social developments. The rise 
of the Movement to power and the demise of the communists coincided with the demise and defeat of 
global communism and the triumph of identity politics, religious revivalism and neoliberalism.  
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Mosques boom  
Becoming the guardian of religious, moral and social affairs in the city, including the 
collection of Zakat and alms, allowed the Movement to have a mosques building 
boom in the city.279 The mosques boom would not only transform Umm al-Fahem’s 
cityscape but would also mean a further consolidation to the Movement’s hegemonic 
rule. Historically the city had four major mosques operating in the four historic 
neighbourhoods of the city. Since the Movement’s rise to power, over 20 new 
mosques were built, some on state land and others on land donated by residents.280 
The Movement also renovated two of the old mosques in the city. In the second half 
of the 1980s and before winning the 1989 elections, the Movement demolished the 
old 100-squared-metre and one-storey mosque in the Ighbariyih neighbourhood to 
build a new 550-squared-metre modern complex.281 The four-storey complex, named 
Abu Oubaida, completed in 1989, hosted a mosque, the Islamic medical clinic of Al-
Noor, a venue for public events, and the Movement’s offices.  
                                                
279 On the issue of charity and ordinary people’s donations to the Movement, see the example of 
women donating their gold jewelry to the Movement: Sawt Al-Haq wa Al-Hurriyyih (1991) ‘Umm al-
Fahem’s Women Donate their Jewelry’, 2 August 1991.  
280  In Islam donating private land for public purposes, such as a mosque is a good deed that is 
considered a ceaseless charity (sadaqah jariyah) that rewards its donor with continuous positive points 
called hasanat.  
281 The demolishing of the old mosque, with residents’ consent, was a carte blanche for the Movement 
to do whatever it saw suitable to any mosque in the city. For some Fahmawis, the modern Abu Oubaida 
complex is an alien object that was forced and imposed on the environment. To regulate the mosque’s 
temperature, for example, the new mosque has to depend on technology, which is liable to break down. 
The old mosque, in contrast, was built in a harmonious vernacular style, with thick walls and long 
vertical windows that kept it cooled down in the summer and warm in the winter. This meant that 
worshipers’ spiritual time was not interrupted by sweat or cold. The mosque also had water well and a 
palm tree to rest under. It also had no high stairs either, which made it more accessible for the elderly.  
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Abu Oubaida soon became the Islamic Movement edifice in the city and the symbol 
of its hegemonic power. It occupied a central role in the everyday life of the city and   
symbolised the spatial shift on the local political map. It replaced the historic city 
centre of Al-Meedan, which was the hub for political and cultural activities prior to 
1989.282 The complex became a political and cultural symbol, hosting weekly lectures 
on religious, cultural, social and political affairs, all under the Movement’s auspices. 
It also became the centre for Daa’wa work and the dissemination of the Islamic 
message.  Politically, socially and culturally, Abu Oubaida became the meeting and 
commencing point of the Movement’s public activities, such as festive marches. 
Another fact that helped promote and maintain the mosque’s centrality has been its 
Friday sermon preacher, Sheikh Raed Salah. Sheikh Salah, a political and religious 
leader with a charismatic and popular personality, has been the mosque’s prime 
preacher since its establishment; all through his tenure as a mayor (1989-1999) up 
until today.  
As expected, the majority of mosques in the city came under the direct control of the 
Movement. As mosques are not only places of worship, but also places of education, 
indoctrination and discipline, this also provided the Movement with an advantageous 
position. Politically, through the mosques, the Movement could gain direct access to a 
large number of people who could be brought under its influence. Therefore, unlike 
other political forces in the city, the Movement had multiple political headquarters 
                                                
282 Al-Meedan was home to the communist party club, the Abnaa el-Balad club, Al-Itihad newspaper 
office, and was a transport hub of the city where workers would gather to go to their work, a 
commercial centre and the place where political leaflets would be distributed and where many 
demonstrations would start. Historically it was also the place where Fahmawis were told they were part 
of Israel in 1949 and where they were asked to hand over all their resistance guns to the Israeli army.  
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where it could exercise its power to promote its agenda and contribute to 
consolidating its hegemony.283  
Situating Islam and Islamic identity and values at the centre of any of the Movement’s 
activities was perhaps its unequivocal principal strength, as it managed to successfully 
couple practices with ideology. It was certainly one of the main factors which 
contributed to establishing and maintaining the Movement’s hegemony in the city and 
which allowed it to carry out its biopolitical projects successfully. After all, the 
Islamic Movement won the elections under the banner of ‘Islam is the solution,’ 
which was presented as the panacea for all the troubles that distressed and interrupted 
Umm al-Fahem’s life, including the sewage that flowed in the streets of the city.  
 
The state and the Islamic Movement 
The Islamic Movement’s hard work and commitment to develop the city and improve 
its socio-spatial conditions was enhanced by a shift in the way the state related to the 
city under the new administration. Shortly after winning the local elections, the 
Ministry of Interior, headed by Rabbi Aryeh Deri of the religious party of Shas, had 
decided to write off all the city’s debts and increase its budgets to 16 million shekels 
                                                
283 According to the Islamic department at the Ministry of Religions, 160 mosques were built in the 
space of five years, between 1989 and 1993. Prior to that there were only 80 mosques in the entire 
country between 1949-1989 (Ringil-Hofman 1993). 
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for the year 89-90.284 The decision came after the minister convened a meeting with 
the newly elected mayor Raed Salah and other local government members to discuss 
the city’s problems (Sawt Al-Haq wa Al-Hurriyyih 3 November 1989). The budgets 
increased 3.77 times for the years 1990-91 and 6.81 times for the year 1993 compared 
to 1987-1988 (CBS 1990: 69-70, 1993: 82).  Moreover, in the attempt to push the city 
forward, in March 1991 the same ministry sent a delegation to the local government 
to study and discuss a 30 million shekels recovery plan for the city. The plan’s 
objective was to develop the city and improve its infrastructure and conditions so that 
it joined the ranks of other development cities in the country (Sawt Al-Haq wa Al-
Hurriyyih 15 March 1991).  
In contrast to Islamophobia that often characterises the Israeli discourse and the 
hostile image that the media often promotes about the Islamic Movement, the state 
has developed more of an amicable relationship to the city since the overwhelming 
victory of the Movement in 1989. The increase of the local government budgets and 
the special plans for boosting the city’s development constitute living examples of the 
shift in the relationship to the city. The underlying motivation behind this shift is the 
state’s preferential policy of promoting religious politics that are inherently 
exclusionist and particularistic. This would also mean the fragmentation of the 
Palestinians along religious lines and equally important the weakening of the 
                                                
284 For more information see, ‘Ministry of Interior Write off all of Umm al-Fahem’s Debts and Allocate 
“16” Million Shekels for the City’s Budget this Year’, Sawt Al-Haq wa Al-Hurriyih, 3 November 1989. 
  
Also, Minister of the Interior, Rabbi Derih in his first official visit to the city praised the commonalities 
between his party and that of the Islamic movement, emphasising that both worship the same god. This 
was particularly insulting for those who are Muslims but with leftist politics. “As if we worshipped a 
different god,” said one research interviewee, August 2009. 
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nationalist secular forces, primarily the communists, who were particularly popular 
among the Palestinians in the 1970s and 1980s.285  
The Islamic Movement with its social and moral agenda, as well as focus on local 
rather than national politics, seemed more tolerable in those years than nationalist 
secular movements who were fighting in the name of the Palestinian people as a 
whole. The Movement’s 1989 elections campaign proved the state’s choice 
particularly true. Anti-communism and presenting Islam as the solution were the 
campaign’s two principal themes as discussed previously. The Movement’s prime 
rivals were not the state but the communists, whom it blamed for mismanagement and 
social decadence. The communists were also denounced as atheists and infidels 
whose beliefs were contradictory to Islamic norms and religion.    
On a number of occasions when the Movement came under fire by the media, and 
when some Israeli politician’s called for its banning, senior state officials came to its 
defence. For example, in 1993, Shmuel Toledano, the Prime Minister's advisor for 
Arab Affairs between 1966-1977, wrote an article in Haaretz defending the Islamic 
Movement against accusations which linked the Movement to the militant Islamic 
Movement of Hamas which operated in the 1967 Occupied Palestinian Territories. 
His article titled ‘Not all are Hamas’ (Haaretz 29 July 1993) came as a response to the 
                                                
285 Dr Alexander Bligh, prime minister vice advisor and later advisor for Arab affairs (1987-1990, 
1990-1992 respectively), told Yediot Ahronot that in the 1980s the state tried to revive the Akka based 
Al-Jazzar college for religious teaching that used to be the biggest college in Palestine before 1948, but 
its attempts failed. The college did not manage to attract students. Students of religious studies chose to 
go to the West bank colleges of Hebron and Nablus. For more details see (Ringil-Hofman 1993). 
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concluding comments in Haaretz 23 July 1993 made by the journalist Ze’ev Schiff 
that Hamas was permeating Israel. Toledano believes that Ze’ev’s conclusion was 
wrong. He also warned against generalisation and what he called irrational fears 
which Jews have of the Israeli Arabs.  
To support his argument, Toledano provided a number of reasons, which could be 
qualified as revelations from within the establishment. Up until 1975, he noted, the 
government policy was to encourage religiosity among Muslims in Israel, especially 
amongst the young generation. The rationale behind it was to weaken the increasing 
popularity of the Communist Party. The assumption was as he put it “a religious 
Muslim will have to be against a Communist Party which does not believe in 
religion.” For this, the government allocated budgets for (re)constructing mosques, 
gave extensive autonomy for the religious courts, set up Muslim trustee committees in 
mixed cities, etc. 
According to him, and in light of the increasing interest in religious revivalism among 
the Muslim Arabs, special government bodies in charge of dealing with Arab affairs 
became less unanimous in regards to the policy which should be adopted. One group 
was in favour of continuing with the same policy line of actively encouraging 
religious revivalism. The other group was in favour of adopting a policy of what 
could be read as inactive interference, while keeping a close eye on developments on 
the ground. In either case, the government did not adopt a policy of inhibiting the 
Islamic Movement from increasing its popularity.  
Importantly, Toledano noted that the growing power of the Movement did not alarm 
the security services, despite the public’s increasing concerns. According to him, the 
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security services knew very well the fundamental differences between Hamas and the 
Islamic Movement. They knew that the Movement in Israel was not Hamas. The two 
had substantive differences in regard to their relationships to the state and the 
objective socio-economic and political conditions under which they were operating. 
The Islamic Movement, unlike Hamas, recognised Israel and was against armed 
resistance. Hamas operated under the reality of occupation. Distressing socio-
economic and political conditions prompted the Palestinians of the occupied 
territories to look for “a redeeming answer,” which Hamas provided (ibid). It also 
addressed their national aspirations. The Islamic Movement in Israel was operating in 
a society with relatively better socio-economic and political conditions.  
Toledano’s revelation resonates with policy recommendations made by Yisrael 
Koenig, the police commissioner in the northern district of Israel (1964-1976), in his 
1976 confidential document to the Ministry of Interior.286 Although Koenig does not 
directly relate to the encouragement of religious identities among the Palestinians as a 
way of fragmenting and controlling them, he certainly does state clearly the need to 
weaken the increasing popularity of the Communist Party. Describing what he called 
“the demographic problem and the manifestations of Arab nationalism” Koenig 
wrote: “[t]he era of international victories by the Palestinians and the achievements of 
the nationalists in Israel point to a process of open confrontation with the Arab 
problem in Israel, a process which will grow as long as RAKAH [the Communist 
                                                
286  The report first came to public in September 1976, after the MAPAM daily newspaper Al 
HaMishmar had leaked it. Although it was not publicly endorsed as an official government document, 
the report does reflect how powerful segments of the state and its security apparatuses perceived the 
Palestinians (MERIP 1976). It should also be noted that the northern district has the highest percentage 
of Palestinians in Israel.  
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Party] carries the resistance to the establishment exclusively ... The usurping by 
RAKAH of ‘quasigovernmental’ institutions, such as the local councils, creates a 
legitimate basis for a political nationalistic activity, both overt and clandestine, 
adopting methods that were in use by the Jewish community in the ‘pre state era,’ as 
well as worldwide communist methods...” (Koenig 1976: 12 [original emphasis]). 
To confront this, Koenig’s recommendation was, “[t]o deny RAKAH its ‘priority’ in 
carrying out a national struggle and representing Israeli Arabs and to provide a valve 
for communities still sitting on the ‘fence,’ a sister Labor Party should be established 
in which the stress will be on ideas of equality, humanism and language, social 
struggle and on raising the banner of peace in the region. The establishment has to 
prepare itself to maintain covert presence and control in the party” (ibid [original 
emphasis]). 
Jumping back to the 1990s, in March 1992 the Minister of Arab Affairs, David 
Magen, came against some calls to outlaw the Islamic Movement in light of the 
revelation that those responsible for the killing of three Israeli soldiers in the Kibbutz 
of Gilaad were members of the Islamic Movement of Umm al-Fahem. In an interview 
with the army radio station, Galaz, Magen said that the Islamic Movement operates as 
a legitimate religious movement and that the public statements made by its leadership 
were within the law. According to him, in cases where there is incitement against the 
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state in mosques and other frameworks, both the legal and security arms of the state 
know how to deal with it (Regev 1992).287  
To conclude, in the final analysis, what the state fears the most is a seriously 
organised political movement which challenges its interests and colonial policies, 
regardless of the former identity, whether Islamist, communist or even Jewish.288 The 
Islamic Movement, although recognised and praised for its charitable work, is also 
closely monitored by the state’s security services. To illustrate this, in September 
1999, when revelations were made in relation to the involvement of Islamic 
Movement members in terror attacks against Israel, Prime Minister Ehud Barak, 
according to Yediot Ahronot 23 September 1999, warned against making sweeping 
generalisations about the Movement which according to him should be recognised for 
its important charity work. At the same time, the decision was made to set up a police 
station in Umm al-Fahem which would enforce law and order (Shaked, Douek and 
                                                
287 For more information see Regev, D. (1992) ‘Islamic Jihad in Gaza Warns the Head of the Islamic 
Movement in Israel: ‘Withdraw Your Condemnation of the Killing of the IDF Soldiers - or You’ll be 
Liquidated’”, Yediot Ahronot, 8 March 1992: 10 [Hebrew]. It should be also noted that the killing 
incident prompted Umm al-Fahem’s local government to issue a statement condemning the killing of 
the soldiers (see ibid). On the Movement being closely monitored by the state see (Ringil-Hofman 
1993). Her article revealed that the Minister of Defence Office, the Prime Minister Office and the 
security services all receive a translated copy of the Islamic Movement newspaper and mouthpiece, 
Sawt Al-Haq wa Al-Hurriyyih.  
288 The Black Panthers movement in Israel, which was made up of Mizrahi Jews with very strong class, 
and social justice consciousness, was smashed by the state. 
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Shiffer 1999), or in other words, which would closely monitor the movement’s 
activities and hold them in check.289  
Control from within: morality and social conservatism in the city 
When the Movement emerged into the local scene first as a social and later as a 
political force it took on the mission of imposing a strict puritanical form of Islam as 
part of religious revivalism. As part of this process, the Movement sought to alter 
existing cultural and social practices, which it denounced as decadent, and to produce 
instead a new normative order and new Muslim Man and society. The chapter 
identifies three sites where the Movement sought to pursue its agenda. These are: the 
attack on the communist and nationalist secular forces and the secular culture 
associated with them,290 the introduction of the Islamic wedding, and the female body.  
Operating in a city that at the time had sizable nationalist and communist forces made 
the Islamic Movement's task particularly interesting. Armed with self-righteousness, 
and acting as the guardian of religion and morality in the city the Movement waged a 
smear campaign against the communists and secular political forces. It introduced 
                                                
289 The mayor Sheikh Raed Salah objected to setting up a police station in the city (Shaked, Douek and 
Shiffer 1999). Despite the objection, the plan went ahead. The police station is located at the main 
entrance to the city. While conducting my fieldwork, the police was often driving through the city. In 
recent years and light of the wave of violence that swept the city and which left it with a few cases of 
murder, locals expressed their anger and frustration with the police who have not managed to bring 
criminals into justice.    
290 Secularism is relative. Umm al-Fahem before the Movement was not really a secular society. It was 
always a Muslim conservative society but in a relaxed way. It was relatively secular in the context of 
the strict interpretation of what a Muslim society should be from the Islamic Movement’s perspective. 
Moreover, the secular nationalist forces were not anti-religious as such. For them, religion was a 
private matter. From their perspective and in the context of living under a reality of national oppression 
and racialised politics, the focus and the efforts should be on fighting these mundane matters. For them 
the prime oppressor was the state. Some members and supporters of the communist party and/or the 
Abnaa el-Balad movement were and are practicing Muslims. They did/do follow Islamic rituals and 
fulfil/ed, if not all then many of, the five pillars of Islam.     
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binary brandings and judgments of believers/non-believers, religious/non-religious, 
thus vilifying those who were not part of religious revivalism as infidels, even 
atheists.291 The attack was extended to include a rejection of anyone and anything that 
was not part of the Movement. On a few occasions, the attacks were physical, for 
example, tomatoes and eggs were thrown at non-Islamic voluntary work brigades, as 
those were not male-only events. The Movement promoted gender segregation and 
boycotted gender mixed events.  
As can be expected, over the years, and especially after 1989, the nationalist, secular 
and left leaning discourse started to shift into a religious one. This meant that what 
was once a city of big demonstrations and national commemorations, a city of 
outdoors political rallies and events had entered a new phase and developed new 
priorities. Nationalist and political events and celebrations either dwindled in size or 
changed form altogether. Symbolic olive tree planting replaced the Land Day annual 
commemoration, which used to be remembered by a general strike and a big 
demonstration. With years, the Land Day could hardly be noticed in the city. 
Moreover, the outdoors annual public celebrations of the International Workers Day 
                                                
291 In a conservative society these are strong allegations that could be frustrating and inhibiting at the 
same time.   
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of the first of May became almost extinct.292 Instead, religious rallies and celebrations 
started to take place.    
When the Movement came to power, another area of interest it sought to influence 
was formal education. Pressure was put on teachers in the secondary school to 
conform to the Movement line. In a number of incidents, teachers, especially those 
associated with the Communist Party, were even sacked. For example, in 1990 the 
new local government dismissed the secondary school Arabic teacher (Shabi 1990). 
He was suspended on the grounds that he hurt students’ religious feelings by choosing 
to teach a poem that was critical of fatalism and destiny.293 “The teacher hurt the 
students’ feelings, and has left them confused, after having attacked some of the 
principles of Islam. The students believe in those principles with no evidence. When 
we believe in God we do not see him and we do not hear him,” said the deputy mayor 
in an interview about the dismissal case (ibid).294 
As part of the cultural and political shift, and the attempts to produce new 
subjectivities and a new identity, the Movement sought to change the name of the city 
from Umm al-Fahem to Umm el-Noor, the mother of light. The change of name 
implied that the Movement was lifting Umm al-Fahem from darkness into light: the 
                                                
292 The disappearance of non-religious events is not to blame the Movement for. It was more the 
defeatism experienced by leftist forces and the change of the local, even international political climate 
as a result of change in the local and international political map. The First of May celebrations were 
also affected by the international defeat of communism, which was epitomised by the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and the fall of the Berlin Wall. Locally, the Movement’s priorities and agenda were 
clearly religious.   
293 The poem he taught was Nizzar Qabani’s, Bread, Hashish and Moon. For more information on the 
case, including an interview with the dismissed teacher and the local government’s response, see Shabi, 
A. (1990) ‘Dismissed because of a Poem’,Yediot Ahronot, 8 June 1990, 7 days: 49-50. [Hebrew].  
294 According to the newspaper article, three of the teacher’s students who were associated with the 
Islamic Movement, reported to the parents’ committee, which in turn reported to the local government.  
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light of religion and the straight path, the light of the power of belief.295 In the sphere 
of everyday colloquial language, for example, non-religious greetings were replaced 
with religious ones. The Movement worked hard to change existing social norms and 
practices. Many things became haram and banned. One of the most noticeable 
changes in the social sphere was the banning of the folkloric wedding and the 
introduction instead of the religious wedding. 
The religious wedding  
In a society where a heteronormative wedding occupies a central social event, 
attempts to control its rituals and celebrations become a crucial site of the struggle for 
power. It is no wonder therefore that the Movement sought to introduce its own 
version of how a wedding should be conducted and celebrated. As part of the 
haram/halal binary system that the Movement introduced in its way to materialising 
what it called the new Muslim society, through the introduction of the religious 
wedding the Movement aimed to obliterate existing wedding practices, traditions and 
rituals. The folkloric rituals of celebrating a wedding with the haddah, the folkloric 
singer, preceded by the zaffah, the celebratory procession of the groom accompanied 
by a chorus of women singing traditional wedding songs marching in the streets of the 
city after having a bath at one of his friends’ home, were all rejected, banned and 
declared haram. Gender segregation in weddings was another major haram. The 
                                                
295 Although the name was not changed officially, Umm el-Noor still features in the Movement’s 
literature and documentation. For example, in a questionnaire about the mosques in the city, the name 
of the city appears under Umm el-Noor, not Umm al-Fahem.   
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female and male members of the family of a groom or bride were not allowed to mix 
together in one place.  
So the religious wedding was a wedding stripped of celebrations, music, and the 
folkloric scene. As part of the new tradition, a wedding would start with reciting the 
Quran. This would be followed by what one of the interviewees called “a distorted 
theatrical sketch,” which was not relevant to a wedding day.296  Towards the end of 
the wedding, a charismatic leader, such as Sheikh Raed Salah, or Abdulallah Nimr 
Darweesh (cofounders of the Islamic Movement), would deliver a sermon. Prior to 
the wedding ceremony and in order to attract people to attend it, a message would be 
disseminated in mosques that a charismatic leader would be attending the wedding.297 
Veiling the ummah: the hijab as the zeitgeist of religious revivalism and high 
morality   
Women’s bodies embody the zeitgeist of religious revivalism. With the emergence of 
the Islamic Movement, the female body was perhaps one of most conspicuous marker 
of change in the city.298 It became and in fact remains the site on which social and 
political developments are inscribed. While wearing a scarf has always been part of 
the culture before the emergence of the Movement, especially amongst married and 
old women, the distinctiveness of the Movement lies in its proactive missionary, all-
ages campaign to veil female bodies. As part of the perspective that saw women’s 
                                                
296 Fieldwork interview, Umm al-Fahem 12 July 2009.  
297  Locals attest that the phenomenon of the strict religious wedding has faded away. Religious 
weddings are more relaxed nowadays and some of the things that were banned, no longer exist. They 
even talked about ‘religious disco,’ that is using pop music from the Arab world, but changing the 
lyrics to Islamic ones.  
298 The increase in the number of mosques in the city as well as veiled women were the most visible 
socio-spatial markers of change in the city.   
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bodies as repositories of morality for men and women alike, the vulnerable link that 
needs to be protected and governed, the Movement promoted the veil as the best way 
possible to protect a woman and therefore protect a man as well (See figure 32). 
 
Figure 32: The veil is a protection for a woman and a chastity for a man 
Promoted as a religious duty, a covering veil, which ensured the hair, the ears, as well 
as the neck were properly covered, became the centrepiece of many of Daa’wa 
circles. The veil was an all-ages matter, not exclusive to mature or married women 
(see figure 32 which shows a veiled young girl in the sign promoting the hijab). 
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Veiled young schoolgirls, who also fulfilled their religious duties such as fasting the 
entire month of Ramadan, were used as exemplary models of Islamic upbringing.299 
Visualising the message, whether through newspapers articles, or putting signs up in 
the streets asking women to wear the hijab and dress modestly, as part of their 
religious duty and obedience to god, were also among the powerful tools to promote 
the hijab. The message, especially the visualised one, was often addressed singularly 
and often personally. As the images show (figure 32 & 34) the semantics and the 
language of the text placed the onus of a man’s sexuality on the female body. The veil 
was only one part of the story. Dressing modestly was equally important. Whether the 
message of the veil was protection for the woman, and chastity for the man (figure 
32), or that flaunting is a war on God and his messenger (figure 33) or the one which 
asked women not to sell their beauty for the cheapest of gazes (figure 34), they all 
shared the message that a woman is responsible not only for her body’s morality but 
for the man’s as well, and therefore society as a whole.  
                                                
299 Under the title of ‘An Example of Islamic Upbringing’, Sawt Al-Haq wa Al-Hurriyyih published a 
photograph of a veiled seven-year-old girl who had fasted Ramadan. See, ‘An Example of Islamic 
Upbringing’, Sawt Al-Haq wa Al-Hurriyyih, 26 April 1991 [Arabic].    
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Figure 33: Flaunting.. is a war on Allah              Figure 34: Sister.. Do not sell your beauty 
and his Messenger and is a losing trade                    for the cheapest gaze  
The scale of the campaign and the multitude of methods used to promote it proved 
successful. The number of veiled women of all-ages increased exponentially. Veiling 
the ummah however had social and political repercussions. It worked as a screening 
method which dichotomised society and increased its controlling gaze. Socially, the 
veil as a visible marker of identity made unveiled women more visible and perhaps 
less spatially and socially comfortable, rendering the simplest of activities such as 
strolling a street less comfortable and more bodily conscious. The veiled/unveiled 
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dichotomy and the controlling gaze become even more powerful in a context of a city 
that offers little anonymity. 300  
Politically, especially in the immediate years before and after 1989, the veil 
demonstrated the binary divide between those who were with the Movement and 
those who were not, those who went to the mosque and those who did not, those who 
went to Al-Aqsa Mosque and those who did not.301 On the other hand, the veil as a 
register of high morality provided a veiled woman with a carte blanche to be more 
spatially comfortable with her body. As figure 34 asserts, the veil and modesty protect 
the woman from the gazing eyes.  
Conclusion  
The chapter has discussed the workings of governmentality in the city in two different 
but complementary contexts. The first was in relation to the state and how through 
employing a mixture of technologies and reliance on the structure of democratic local 
elections it sought to incorporate Fahmawis into their own subjugation. For the state, 
incapacitating the communist-led local government through under-budgeting that 
rendered it incompetent and incapable of delivering the most basic of services on one 
hand, and endorsing and financially supporting the winning Islamic Movement 
through budget grants and writing off debts, on the other hand, was the way forward. 
Encouraging tamed religious identities and reducing subjects to their faith seemed the 
                                                
300 See chapter 6 on planning for the controlling gaze under particular land and planning system, which 
makes everyday activities in the streets more challenging for both veiled and unveiled women alike.  
301 Visiting al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem a number of times a week all along the year has been one of 
the main missions and projects of the Islamic Movement. For more information see: www.iaqsa.com 
[Arabic].  
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best way to weaken the potentially threatening communists and nationalist politics at 
a time when their popularity was on the increase.  
The second context was in relation to how the victorious Islamic Movement sought to 
render the residents of Umm al-Fahem governable. The chapter discussed how the 
Movement since winning the local government elections in 1989 has been repeatedly 
voted in, thus establishing itself as a hegemonic power. The very materiality of the 
city which brought the preceding local government down helped facilitate the 
Movement’s rise to power. High performance in delivering public services, exhibiting 
leadership and organisational skills, embedding itself in the grassroots, and mobilising 
them to take care of their environment, as well as addressing some of the acute 
shortages in the city in the realms of public health and hygiene, education, and 
housing, and situating religion at the centre of all its activities were amongst the 
mechanisms that contributed to consolidating the Movement’s hegemony. 
The chapter identified this mode of governmentality as biopolitical par excellence. It 
showed how biopolitical projects carried out by the Movement reinforced its 
hegemony and vice versa. The projects were versatile: concerned with life, body 
politics and correcting the morality of society and the creation of a new normative 
cultural order.  In the realm of public health, the Movement set up a highly subsidised 
24-hour medical clinic that had an ambulance at its service. It also addressed the long 
neglected problem of drug addiction by setting up a rehabilitation clinic and carrying 
out public campaigns raising awareness about the subject. The names given to these 
clinics, Al-Noor, the light and Al-Rahamah, compassion, are themselves biopolitical 
and carry the message of transition to positive progress. The Movement also carried 
out health events, offering the public free medical checks and raising awareness about 
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preventable diseases. In the realm of urban hygiene, it completed fitting public 
sewers, replacing water pipes in addition to purchasing rubbish collection vehicles 
and bins.  
In the realm of education, it set up Islamic nurseries and associations, including a 
Daa’wa college, that was dedicated to Islamic teachings and spreading the message of 
Daa’wa that called for reviving Islamic identity and Islamic practices. It also built 
dozens of mosques which were under its sphere of influence. In regards to official 
education, the Movement sought to impose an atmosphere of social conformism. In a 
few incidents when teachers did not conform to its line of thought, as in the case of 
the secondary school Arabic teacher, they were dismissed.  
The chapter discussed how the organic base of its ideology which already possessed 
existing socially and economically legitimate modus operandi was indispensable to 
the Movement’s relatively strong economic base which allowed for and legitimised its 
biopolitical hegemonic mode of government. It also discussed how biopolitical 
hegemony coupled with becoming the voice of authority in moral and social issues 
was used to Islamise the social, the cultural and the spatial. It helped diminish existing 
social and cultural practices that were denounced as decadent and introduce instead 
the Movement’s version of Islamic practice and culture. The chapter referred to this 
mode of government as control from within. It discussed how through promoting 
social conformism in the name of religion and creation of new subjectivities and a 
new society, concentrating on bodily politics, in the shape of the female body, gender 
segregation and the Islamic weddings, a general atmosphere of becoming consumed 
with these matters over political nationalist ones was facilitated.  
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To conclude, the chapter showed how the reliance on the colonised to govern, control 
and fragment themselves in ways that are unthreatening to the state was invaluable.  It 
illustrated how the latter was to a large extent successful in promoting religious 
identities, thus fragmenting the Palestinians along these lines and shifting the 
nationalist and secular discourse and cultural references towards becoming more 
religious. The communists and nationalist forces suffered an enduring defeat, thus 
radically transforming the city’s local political map. The once vocal city of mass 
mobilisations, demonstrations which challenged the state’s oppressive and racialised 
policies has over the years retreated to focus more on local, social and religious 
matters. In other words, the chapter demonstrates how the state was relatively 
successful in fragmenting Palestinians along religious lines and domesticating and 
dociling their cities.302  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
302 I say relatively because in crucial moments in the history of Palestinians, Umm al-Fahem still 
played an important role in leading demonstrations. The bloody events of 1998, mentioned in chapter 6 
on planning, after the declaration of some of Umm al-Fahem’s land as a military fire zone, and the 
2000 October events after the break out of the 2000 Palestinian intifada are two cases in point.  
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Conclusion 
 
In this thesis I have sought to conceptualise and form an understanding of the 
Palestinian city in Israel and ask whether the right to the city could be fulfilled under 
(post)colonial conditions. The right to the city in this context means the right to 
urbanity, diversity, full substantive citizenship, and to live without the burden of 
colonisation and racism which carries with it potential encroachments on personal and 
collective liberties and rights, the spectre of an existential threat and life in suspension 
and precariousness. It is the right to a city of personal and collective potencies, a city 
of opportunities and potentialities, production and employment, heterogeneity and 
assemblages, openness and tolerance, culture and creativity. It is the right to a social, 
political and cultural site where subcultures and countercultures can emerge, where 
one can enjoy being impersonal and have the right of association with other 
likeminded groups and individuals, and where, in the spirit of David Harvey 
(2008:23), individuals can change themselves by being able to change and shape their 
environment.  
Through unsettling the nominal status of the city of Umm al-Fahem, the first 
Palestinian village to gain the official status of a city in Israel, I have set out to try and 
find answers to my concerns about the absence of functioning Palestinian cities, 
urbanisation and urbanism in Israel, the limited, if not absence of, neutral public 
spaces and job opportunities. The changing character and socio-spatial, political and 
everyday conditions of Palestinians’ localities, and increasing consumerism and 
articulations of neoliberal values, or the ascendency of consumerist citizenship in 
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Palestinians’ everyday life, as Paul Gilroy (2010) would put it, were some of these 
concerns. My premise was that cities, the way they are organised, produced and 
reproduced reflect historical, social, political, and economic developments that 
contribute to their (un)making and as such provide analytical tools to examine these 
developments with.  
Articulating these concerns in what seemed to be the most efficient and direct way of 
finding answers, I decided to ask the simple question: is Umm al-Fahem a city? I 
thought that the residents of Umm al-Fahem were the only ones who could provide a 
satisfactory answer to whether the transition in Umm al-Fahem’s administrative status 
has been substantive. Their lived experiences simultaneously question the 
functionality of the city and challenge its claims to being a city. Therefore, 
ethnography and immersing myself in the field, meeting with residents and the city’s 
planning department, taking photographs of its built-environment, and trying to grasp 
its semiotics seemed the most suitable method, at least in the first phase of the 
research.  
While in the field, I soon realised that the simple question unravelled a complicated, 
multifaceted, and multi-contextual story that needed to be unpacked. I also realised 
that although the main research question remained indispensable to the prime 
objective of conceptualising the Palestinian city, providing a definitive answer to 
whether Umm al-Fahem is a city became virtually irrelevant. Accordingly, new 
questions and meta-questions needed to be asked, new material needed to be revealed, 
new methods needed to be added, and a new conceptual framework needed to be 
developed.  
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The ethnographic experience made it clear that gaining a better understanding of the 
urban question cannot be divorced from structural, historical, social and political 
forces that shape the making of a city. These forces relate to two different but 
interconnected levels. Firstly, the nature and character of the state, its foundational 
structure, the citizenship it offers, its mode of governmentality, the relationship it has 
with its citizens, and the means through which it seeks to render them governable. 
Secondly, the social and political make up of the city itself, its history and the 
relationship it has with the state. Against this conclusion, the research developed to be 
simultaneously in and of the city. Umm al-Fahem became the subject and object of 
analysis. It is the subject which through its history and residents spoke about its socio-
spatiality, materiality, semiotics, economy and culture, politics and future trajectories. 
It is the object of analysis in relation to analysing the Palestinian city under 
(post)colonial conditions and how historical, structural and political forces shape it. 
The wealth of material that emerged in the field also generated urgent meta-questions 
about: what can be made of Palestinian cities inside Israel? What kinds of spatial 
configurations and arrangements are being formed and why? What kinds of socio-
political and cultural orders are being formed and why?  How does the city respond 
under (post)colonial conditions? And can there be a functional city and a fulfilment to 
the right to the city under (post)colonial conditions?   
The new developments in the research meant that the initial methods of ethnography 
and photography were not enough to help provide conclusive satisfactory answers. 
Equally important was the pivotal role the new additional methods would offer in 
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dealing with methodological challenges pertaining to the production of objective 
knowledge based on qualitative ethnographic research, conducted in contested, 
politicised and multiple contexts (chapter 2). Therefore, excavating archival 
resources, official state statistics about, primarily but not solely, Umm al-Fahem’s 
socio-economics, population and land, along with primary material from the Ministry 
of Interior in relation to planning regulations and master plans needed to be consulted. 
Moreover, historical, sociological, and discourse analysis needed to be employed.  
Following on from this was my dedication to producing a thesis committed to the 
integrity of research in ways that reflected best the unfolding material without having 
to compromise field interviewees’ experiences and perceptions of their city. 
Therefore, anchoring the research in one scholarly discipline or limiting literature to 
one school of thought would have impinged on the quality and integrity of the 
research, the objectives it sought to obtain and the scholarly contribution it aimed to 
make. As a result, the research had to be situated within multiple, inter and intra-
disciplines that combined the historical, the sociological, the (post)colonial, the urban, 
the cultural and the political and the visual together.  
The thesis had to be anchored in two theoretical foundations (chapter 3 and 4). 
Chapter three was a literature review that dealt with the urban question, citizenship 
and the state. It situated the Palestinian city in the wider contexts of what makes a city 
and addressed the meta-questions of why the city and why public space. It 
deconstructed the concepts of the city, public space and urbanity and their 
indispensable role in enhancing citizenship, democracy, politics, public life, culture 
and creativity. It also reviewed the changing meaning of cities and the increasing 
erosion of public space under neoliberalism and how attacks on the undesirables were 
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performed in and through space. Drawing on Frantz Fanon and Mahmood Mamdani, 
it discussed the colonial city and the urbanisation of black South Africans under 
colonialism. It concluded that regardless of the state’s character and nature, whether 
capitalist, post-industrialist or colonial, urban and public space and the undesirables 
are perceived as threats that need to be fragmented and controlled. 
The second foundational chapter was on Israel’s colonial nomos. It provided an 
overview of structural and macro historical forces that shape the Palestinian city and 
citizenship and perpetuate their conditions (chapter 4). It discussed how Israel’s “Jews 
only” inscriptions, rooted in its Zionist foundational ideology, are Manichaean and 
governed by an ethnic absolutist logic, and therefore are exclusionary-exclusive in 
character. It argued that such characteristic logic sets the conditions that doom Israel 
to never be a state of all its citizens, but a state that will always treat its Palestinian 
citizens as a problem that needs to be contained and governed, thus perpetuating their 
citizen-enemy suspended dialectic.  
Before getting into Umm al-Fahem’s contemporary transitional history starting from 
1985 onwards, the thesis recognised the importance of writing a historical sociology 
of Umm al-Fahem (chapter 5) from 1949 when it was handed over to Israel up until 
1985 when it was declared a city. The chapter formed part of the historical processes 
that shape the making of the city. Three main and interconnected themes were 
discussed. These were: the subject of governmentality and the way the state sought to 
render Umm al-Fahem and Fahmawis governable, Fahamwis’ response to it, and 
Umm al-Fahem’s materiality. It discussed how Umm al-Fahem’s particular history of 
political activism, defiance and struggle for social and political justice generated 
anxieties amongst the establishment and turned it into a targeted village/city first by 
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the state and later by far right Zionist political groups as well. It traced its 
particularism back to the years between 1949-1966 when communist and nationalist 
activists refused to succumb to repressive controlling military regulations, demanding 
instead an end to both the military regime and the suspension of their citizenship, and 
a fulfilment of their rights. 
The historical sociology chapter had three overall objectives. First, it aimed to show 
that Israel employed a mixture of technologies whose underlying objective was to 
control and produce domesticated, docile and fragmented Fahmawis. The 
technologies included direct military rule, co-option, favouritism, material incentives, 
criminalisation of political activists, direct intervention in local politics, as well as 
persistent negligence of urban infrastructure. The second objective was to help 
unravel the nature of the city and citizenship under (post)colonial conditions. The 
third objective was to situate the chapter as part of a holistic, one-unit thesis. As such, 
the chapter helped demonstrate the transition in the technologies of control that the 
state employed throughout Umm al-Fahem’s history from 1949 onwards. It illustrated 
that the deployed technologies were not monotonous but diverse and in 
correspondence to operating local political and social forces. These technologies will 
be discussed below.  
Empirical findings and conclusions: conceptualising the Palestinian city 
In the process of analysing the unfolding material of the research, answering its meta-
questions, and verifying its arguments, I employed the Foucauldian concept of 
governmentality as the basis for analysing the Palestinian city in Israel. 
Governmentality was chosen because it accommodates within it complex 
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technologies of control which could be employed to shape the general conditions of 
everyday life and the conduct of people and their cities in this context. In unpacking 
the different technologies which make up governmentality, I came to a number of 
findings and reached a number of conclusions.  
Absenting the city: suspension and urbicide 
I found that absenting the Palestinian city, that is the deliberate absence and 
deprivation of the right to a functioning city and urbanisation, and the production 
instead of an ambiguous space, neither city nor village, a space that resides the 
betwixt and between and the suspended dialectic of inclusion-exclusion is the process 
which is at stake. In the suspended dialectics, the city acquires new functions and 
assumes new objectives. As demonstrated in the case of Umm al-Fahem, the city is 
reduced to the status of a hotel, hostel city, even a refugee camp (chapter 6). It is a 
dormitory and consumption site that serves mostly the rudimentary functions of 
eating, drinking, reproducing, consuming and worshipping.  
It is a city that grows mainly due to natural reproduction. Its spatial borders are almost 
static. Its confined limited space suffers from a conspicuous shortage of neutral public 
spaces and job opportunities. The lack of industrial and commercial zones in the city 
and limited employability mean that the process of urbanisation, which forms an 
indispensable feature of cities, is almost non-existent and therefore the city’s social 
fabric is homogenised. It is a crammed, concrete, and claustrophobic city that offers 
little or no space to be impersonal and has instead prolific controlling gazing eyes 
(chapter 6). 
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I called the absenting process urbicide. By urbicide I mean the killing of the city not 
by means of war which violently obliterates its physical existence, but by deliberately 
detaining and withholding its materiality: its socio-spatial and economic development. 
Slow violence, which is manifested in racialised land and spatial policies, under-
budgeting, limited access to public resources and a perpetual state of dependency on 
the state and its Jewish cities and towns, is the operative technology to achieve this  
(chapter 6 and 7). Urbicide in other words became tantamount to the deprivation of 
the right to the city.   
In relation to land and spatial policies, I found that a professional up-to-date master 
plan for the city, with suggested commercial and industrial zones, was prepared by the 
local government and put forward to the planning authorities, but was frustrated and 
declined (chapter 6). This proved that the wellbeing of the Fahmawis and their city’s 
economic development were not a priority. The ramifications of this on the urbanity, 
socio-spatial and economic development of Umm al-Fahem and its residents have 
been far reaching.  
Delays in approving master plans in a city with a distinctively young population (over 
50 per cent below the age of 19) and increasing demands for housing, with hardly any 
public housing available and limited access to public land, meant that zoning is 
almost static. Therefore, citizens take a chance every time they build a house, 
commercial or light-industries premises. The operating interventionist, centralised and 
hierarchised planning system forces them to build illegally, or more to the point 
without authorisation. This leaves them living under a constant threat of demolition 
and in a state of perpetual precariousness and suspension.  
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Socially and in relation to the urban experience, the planning system combined with 
the private ownership of land, and self (private) - provision of housing, forces 
Fahmawis to act selfishly. Their priority is to secure housing, not give some of their 
land for public purposes, as stipulated by law. This also means that because of the 
hereditary land system, brothers and relatives end up living in close proximity. 
Consequently, the right to choose where to live and how to live is limited, even non-
existent. This, inevitably, contributes to homogenisation, social conformism, and 
increases the gazing and controlling eye of society. People are expected to be 
accountable for their social actions and movements, and in some cases feel 
embarrassed not to do so, especially if the neighbour is a cousin, an uncle, or a 
brother.     
The same system which does not approve a commercial zone in Umm al-Fahem in the 
name of planning regulations, allows Jewish development to take place under almost 
identical conditions. While development in zero distance from the artery road of Wadi 
Ara was not authorised and approved in the case of Umm al-Fahem, which is in 
desperate need for it, a bustling commercial zone in Gan Shmuel, a small kibbutz with 
less than a thousand people, 22.8 km southwest of Umm al-Fahem, was authorised in 
zero distance from the same road. This demonstrates the racialised Manichaean nature 
of the planning system: development for one side, and arrested or even de-
development for the other. It reinforces the suspended existence of the Palestinians, 
the state of dependency, and demonstrates urbicide at work. 
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Religious identities: biopolitical hegemony 
As manifested in the case of Umm al-Fahem, when citizens and their leadership have 
what could be perceived as challenging politics, are aware of their citizenship rights, 
question the nominal status of their city, and demand their substantive fulfilment, and 
when suspension and urbicide were not enough to control the city and its citizens, the 
state resorted to additional (in)direct modes of governmentality. This time it sought to 
govern through incorporating the subjects into their own subjugation, or what the 
thesis called through control from within (chapter 7). Changing the political map of 
the city and its power configurations through the existing democratic structure of 
local elections was the way forward. 
In Umm al-Fahem this was done through weakening the existing vocal, nationalist 
and left wing local government led by the communists who had been in office from 
the mid 1970s to 1989, and encouraging instead a religious movement whose prime 
concern was the moral and the social. From the state’s perspective, a tamed religious 
movement, which had deep roots in society and is endorsed by the state, would help 
weaken popular nationalist politics and reduce subjects to their faith. Religious 
identities are also compatible with its fragmenting policies of divide and rule.  
Exercising what could be qualified as slow violence, the state worked to render the 
communist local government incompetent, and unable to deliver the most basic of 
services. The materiality of the city was the prime theatre upon which this violence 
was to be exercised. Up until 1989, sewage flowed in Umm al-Fahem’s already poor 
and inadequate roads and alleyways. Rubbish was left uncollected for days because of 
the shortage in rubbish collection vehicles and public rubbish bins. On the educational 
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front, the local government could not provide enough classrooms and other education 
facilities. At times it could not pay secondary school teachers and staff their monthly 
salaries, forcing them to go on strike on numerous occasions. It also could not pay its 
accumulated debts to the national water company which left the city's water cut off 
for days.  
1989 was identified as the turning point in the history of the city, which had enduring 
effects on the socio-spatial and political landscape of the city. Umm al-Fahem in its 
local elections voted the Islamic Movement in with an overwhelming majority. The 
Islamic Movement had what could be considered as the right ingredients and 
mechanisms to secure its success and the right material conditions to facilitate its 
success. Already before running to office it exhibited organisational and leadership 
skills, and managed to build a successful record in offering welfare services and tap 
into residents’ needs. Its fresh breath for change, commitment to improve the city’s 
ailing and dysfunctional infrastructure and change its socio-spatial and cultural order, 
along with its relatively strong economic base allowed the Movement to accomplish 
many public projects, deliver services and transform Umm al-Fahem’s cityscape, all 
within a relatively short period of time. 
As discussed in chapter 7, the Movement embarked on biopolitical projects in the 
fields of education, public health, and body politics which were congruent with its 
ideology. Its projects favoured the family, society and their general wellbeing. It 
established numerous facilities and associations that allowed it to build strong civil 
society networks. It set up Islamic nurseries, Daa’wa College and circles, and offered 
extracurricular activities including physical education and Quranic teaching for school 
children. To meet the shortages in health services and address neglected social and 
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health issues, it set up an Islamic medical clinic that operated 24-hour and seven days 
a week, offering a highly subsidised service and free rehabilitation clinic for drug 
addicts.  
In an attempt to actively engage with the public, the Movement initiated Islamic 
voluntary work brigades and health events. It offered free medical tests and delivered 
public seminars about preventable diseases and other health issues. It also encouraged 
residents to fulfil their agency and religious duty in keeping their city clean. By 
situating its ideological base at the centre of all its projects, activities and practices, 
the Movement managed to demonstrate how its slogan ‘Islam is the solution’ was the 
unequivocal panacea for all the ills of society.  
Its performance, and ‘talking the talk and walking the walk strategy’ were enhanced 
by the state’s change of policy towards the city. As soon as the Movement was 
elected in 1989, the state increased the local government budgets and wrote off all of 
its debts. It also allocated extra budget for development, and helped establish a 
department for strategic spatial planning. This, combined with the Movement's 
success and high performativity in managing the city, and its young and charismatic 
leadership, helped it establish a hegemonic rule, which I called, in a Foucauldian 
Gramscian spirit, biopolitical hegemony. The Islamic Movement has been repeatedly 
elected for the local government over the last 25 years.  
Throughout its tenure, the Movement has managed to Islamise the socio-spatiality of 
the city. Dozens more mosques were built, and more women and young girls are 
wearing the hijab. It has also managed to change existing cultural practices and bring 
people’s religious identities to prominence. In its beginnings, it even managed to 
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facilitate a situation in which it became uncomfortable for different ways of being and 
thinking to exist. Through introducing the halal/haram binary, communists and 
secular forces were denounced as infidels, and a few secondary school teachers 
associated with the Communist Party were dismissed. Folkloric cultural practices 
were denounced as haram and boycotted. Nationalist and secular events, once widely 
celebrated by Fahmawis, either changed form altogether or dwindled in size. 
Religious ceremonies and festivals, such ‘Al-Aqsa is in danger’ festival, gathered 
more prominence and attracted more people. Moreover, everyday colloquial and 
political references were taken over by religious references.  
Against this backdrop, the thesis concludes that suspension, urbicide, religious 
identities and biopolitical hegemony are interconnected technologies of control that 
make up the governmentality project whose underlying objective is the management 
of Palestinians in ways that produce suspended, domesticated and fragmented cities 
and citizens. They are employed to shape the general conditions of everyday life, 
shape the materiality of the city, control the conduct of cities and citizens, perpetuate 
a state of dependency and deprive the Palestinians of their right to a functioning city. 
The thesis also concludes that Israel’s colonial Manichaean nomos that is governed by 
the logic of ethnic absolutism perpetuates Palestinians’ state of suspended dialectics 
of citizens-enemies, inclusion-exclusion, and forms the main obstacle to the 
fulfilment of the right to the city. 
Although the macro structural foundations, that is Israel’s nomos, are systemic, and as 
such not unique to Umm al-Fahem, the thesis nonetheless recommends further 
research to be conducted on other Palestinian cities to help contribute to a more 
conclusive theory. Another related field that the thesis recommends would be 
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researching the question of whether a cosmopolitan city could exist under 
(post)colonial conditions. 
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